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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON FINANCE OF INNOVATION, FIRM DYNAMICS, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH
Sînâ T. Ates¸
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde
Aggregate productivity, fundamental cause of long-run economic growth, plays a crucial
role in determining economic development and living standards of nations. The main
source of aggregate productivity growth is technological advances that are the outcomes
of firms’ and entrepreneurs’ innovative activity. Complementary to the growing litera-
ture that studies how firm dynamics shape technological change, my dissertation focuses
on how financial decisions of these agents affect this process. The three chapters of my
dissertation provide theoretical, empirical, and quantitative investigation of the interplay
between financial and innovative actions of heterogeneous firms along with its implica-
tions on aggregate productivity growth.
Chapter one studies the impact of financial system on net firm entry, an important source
of aggregate productivity growth. Selective funding of most promising ideas by financial
intermediaries creates a trade-off between the mass of entrant firms and their average
contribution to aggregate productivity. This chapter highlights the relevance of firm het-
erogeneity for the relationship between finance and growth, and discusses the theoretical
and empirical implications of the resulting trade-off in firm entry.
Chapter two also builds on the above mass-composition link, and uses it to study the per-
manent productivity losses due to sudden stops (SS). The model embeds the main mech-
anism into a real business cycle small open economy framework to measure the forgone
productivity contribution of entrants deprived of funding. The theoretical prediction is
that, during SS, smaller yet on average more productive cohorts enter the market. Chilean
iv
plant-level data that cover the 1998 SS verify this prediction, while the calibrated model
demonstrates the quantitative significance of heterogeneity and selection in measuring
the long-run productivity loss.
Chapter three focuses on a specific financial intermediary that is especially relevant to
innovation and growth, namely venture capital (VC) finance. It studies VC’s quantitative
impact on firm dynamics and economic growth using a new dynamic equilibrium model
of technological change with heterogeneous firms and an explicit VC market. Distinc-
tively, the model incorporates a unique feature of VC firms: their operational knowledge
(OK) bundled with their investment. Experiments based on the estimated model high-
light the quantitative relevance of OK and analyze policy implications.
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Chapter 1
Project Heterogeneity and Growth:
The Impact of Financial Selection on
Firm Entry
This chapter is co-authored with Felipe E. Saffie.
Abstract
In the classical literature of innovation-based endogenous growth, the main engine
of productivity growth is firm entry. Nevertheless, when projects are heterogeneous, and
good ideas are scarce, a mass-composition trade-off is introduced into this link: larger
cohorts have a lower average contribution to aggregated productivity. Because one of the
roles of the financial system is to screen the quality of projects, the ability of financial in-
termediaries to detect promising projects shapes the strength of this trade-off. We build a
general equilibrium endogenous growth model with project heterogeneity, and financial
screening to study this relationship. We use two quantitative experiments to illustrate the
relevance of our analytic results. First, we show that accounting for heterogeneity and
selection allows the model to conciliate two well documented and apparently contradic-
tory effects of corporate taxation. Corporate taxation has a strong detrimental effect on
firm entry while affecting the long-run growth only mildly. A second illustration studies
the effects of financial development on growth. This experiment shows that size based
measures of financial development (e.g. domestic credit over GDP) are not always good
proxies for the ability of the financial system to select the most promising projects. Fi-
nally, we propose a novel firm level measure to assess the accuracy of financial selection
across countries.
1
1.1 Introduction
The link between financial development and long-run economic growth is a long-
lasting question in the literature. In his seminal survey, Levine (2005) summarizes the
growth-enhancing functions of the financial system into five channels: i) ex-ante infor-
mation production about investment opportunities and capital allocation, ii) monitoring
investments and providing corporate governance, iii) diversification and management of
risk, iv) pooling and channelling savings, and v) facilitating the exchange of goods and
services. Among those, pooling savings and providing capital to investments has drawn most
of the attention in the theoretical and empirical literature. However, in a world with vast
heterogeneity among potential investments, selecting the most productive uses to allocate
resources is crucial. This chapter contributes on theoretical grounds to the analysis of this
selection channel and illustrate its relevance for theoretical and empirical research.
The main source of long-run growth is improvements in aggregated productivity;
hence, a study of the impact of financial development on growth needs to focus on the
mechanisms that link the financial system with the productivity process of the econ-
omy. Early models of innovation such as Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion
and Howitt (1992) provide micro-foundations of productivity growth incorporating the
Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction into this literature. In a nutshell, entrepreneurs
with a new invention (creativity) have lower production costs; and when they enter the
market, they replace the former leader (destruction). Therefore, firm entry plays a central
role in the determination of long-run growth.1 But new firms need external finance in
order to access the market.2 This suggests a first link between finance and growth: more
developed financial systems are able to pool more funds to finance more start-ups, allow-
1Bartelsman et al. (2009) use firm level data for 24 countries to study firm dynamics and the sources
of productivity growth. They document that between 20% and 50% of the overall productivity growth is
explained by net entry.
2For instance, Nofsinger and Wang (2011) document that 45% of the start ups in their 27 country panel
use external funding.
2
ing more creative destruction and therefore more long-run growth. Nevertheless, good
ideas are scarce.3 Therefore, selecting the most promising projects is not a trivial task.
In this sense, the financial system creates value not only by pooling funds, but also
by allocating resources efficiently. In fact, Fracassi et al. (2012) document a loan approval
rate of only 18.2% for start-ups, using loan application data for a major venture capital in
United States.4 Moreover, the allocation of credit is not random. In fact, funded start-ups
in their sample survive longer and are more profitable than rejected ones. This suggests
that financial intermediation is not only about the quantity (mass) of the entrant cohort,
but also about its quality (composition). Thus, a model that studies the link between the
financial system and long-run economic growth needs to include both dimensions.
In order to understand how the mass and the composition of the cohorts of new
firms shape long-run productivity growth, we modify the quality-ladder framework of
Grossman and Helpman (1991) along two dimensions. First, we introduce ex ante project
heterogeneity that is translated into ex post firm heterogeneity in the intermediate good
sector. Second, we introduce a financial system, with access to a screening technology.
The accuracy of the screening device represents the level of financial development of the
economy. Our analytical characterization of the unique interior balanced growth path
shows how creative destruction is shaped by the interaction between mass and composi-
tion of the entering cohort.
Two quantitative experiments illustrate both the strength and the relevance of the
composition effect introduced in this chapter. The first experiment relates to the empirical
literature on corporate taxation, firm entry, and growth. The model is able to generate
mild responses in growth for a wide range of corporate taxes, and at the same time
match the strong detrimental effect on entry rates. In fact, in the model, when taxes
3Silverberg and Verspagen (2007) document that both patent citation and returns to patenting are highly
skewed toward relatively few patents.
4See also Benfratello et al. (2008). They use Italian firm level data to show how the development of
banking affected the probability of firm innovation.
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increase, a large set of projects are not enacted. Nevertheless, for financially developed
economies, the marginal contribution of those forgone entrants to economic growth is
negligible. However, as tax rates increase further, the contribution of the marginal entrant
rises rapidly. This implies a non-linear effect of corporate taxation on economic growth.
The second quantitative illustration revisits the classical link between financial de-
velopment and growth. In line with the empirical literature, the model suggests that the
main source of economic growth in more financially developed economies is the efficiency
in the allocation of resources rather than the mass of resources allocated. Moreover, this
experiment also shows that the accuracy of the financial system is non-monotonically re-
lated to the amount of resources allocated in the economy. In particular, for countries
characterized by high entry rates, an increase in the accuracy of the financial system
might lead to lower domestic credit over GDP and lower entry rates. Therefore, mass
related proxies are potentially misleading when trying to capture the allocative aspect of
financial development.
As a first step to address the insufficiency of mass related variables to capture the
selection margin of financial development, this chapter proposes a variable that could be
used in the empirical literature to complement the existing proxies. Our model implies
that the accuracy of the financial system is inversely related to the skewness of the ratio
of value added to cost of the firms operating in the economy. The intuition behind this
result is that with better selection entrants below a profitability threshold are observed
infrequently. Therefore, the bad tail of the distribution gets thinner.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews some of the related contri-
butions in the endogenous growth literature, then Section 1.3 presents the model and the
analytical results. Section 3.4 show the two quantitative experiments that illustrate the
relevance of the mechanism. Section 1.5 presents the analysis of the skewness measure,
and section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2 Related Literature
The role of a financial structure that evaluates investment projects has been consid-
ered in the growth literature for a long time.5 Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) introduced
this idea into an externality driven endogenous growth model inspired by Romer (1986)
to study the interdependence between financial development and economic growth. One
study in that strand to which the current work particularly relates is Bose and Cothren
(1996). They study how improvements in the screening technology of the financial system
affect the growth rate of the economy. They develop a two type (borrowers and lenders)
overlapping generation model where young borrowers seek resources to start heteroge-
neous projects. Financial intermediaries use screening and credit rationing to allocate the
resources of the lenders. Projects differ only in their success probability (low or high),
and the economy growth rate is driven by the externality generated by the average cap-
ital stock in the economy. They show that cost reducing improvements in the screening
technology can decrease economic growth. Notice that heterogeneity and financial selec-
tion influence growth only through the mass of successfully enacted projects. Moreover,
this class of models rely on aggregate externalities to generate an endogenous growth
process, rather than providing micro-foundations for the increases in productivity.
An early innovation based endogenous growth model with heterogeneity and finan-
cial selection is proposed by King and Levine (1993a). They introduce heterogeneity to
the original Aghion and Howitt (1992) model dividing the population between agents
that are capable to manage an innovative project and agents that are not. The role of the
financial system is to pool resources and try to identify capable individuals in order to
put them in charge of projects. Hence, the better the screening device the larger the mass
of firms entering the economy. Anotehr paper by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2012) builds on
the non-Schumpeterian innovation tradition of Romer (1990), including heterogeneous
5We can trace this idea back to Bagehot (1873) and Schumpeter (1934), but a more formal exposition can
be found on Boyd and Prescott (1986).
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agents as in Lucas (1978) to study the non-linear relationship between taxation and long-
run growth. In their model every successfully enacted project enlarges the measure of
intermediate good varieties by the same amount. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs are hetero-
geneous in their ability to enact projects. As the ability distribution is skewed, only a few
of them account for most of the generation of new varieties and, thus, output growth.
Hence, as taxation discourages relatively unproductive entrepreneurs, both the mass of
firms created and the growth rate of the economy decrease very mildly for a wide range
of tax rates.
None of the endogenous growth models discussed above attempt to link the ex-ante
heterogeneity with ex-post differences on the production side. Hence, the impact of finan-
cial selection is only driven by the mass of entrants. In particular, these models imply a
monotonic relationship between firm entry and growth: the larger the mass of an entrant
cohort, the higher the growth rate of the economy. In contrast, instead of using hetero-
geneity on the success rate, our model includes ex ante project heterogeneity that is also
translated into ex post firm heterogeneity, generating a non-linear relationship between
entry and growth rates.
1.3 Model
This model builds on the classical endogenous growth literature of quality-ladder
models. In line with the seminal contributions of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992), a continuum of intermediate good varieties, indexed by j ∈
[0, 1], are used for final good production and the producer with the lower marginal cost
monopolizes the production of its variety.6 The engine of economic growth is the cre-
ative destruction generated by successfully enacted projects where the former leader is
replaced by a newcomer with lower marginal cost. In order to disentangle the mass
6For a recent review of the relevance and scope of this framework see Aghion et al. (2014).
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and composition effect of financial intermediation, we modify this framework to allow
for project heterogeneity and financial selection. A representative financial intermediary
owns a unit mass of projects, indexed by e ∈ [0, 1], and collects deposits from the repre-
sentative household to enact a portion of them. First, we introduce heterogeneity in both
projects and marginal cost improvements. In particular, after enaction a successful project
can generate either a drastic or an incremental innovation that leads to cost reduction in
a product line. This implies that leaders have heterogeneous cost advantages over their
followers. Moreover, since projects are characterized by their idiosyncratic probability of
generating a drastic innovation, there is also heterogeneity before enaction. Second, we
introduce financial selection by allowing the financial intermediary to access a costless yet
imperfect screening device. In this section, we introduce the components of the model,
define a competitive equilibrium and a balanced growth path, and derive the analytical
characterization of the model.
1.3.1 The Representative Household
The representative household lends assets (at+1) to the financial intermediary at the
interest rate rt+1 and receives the profits of the financial intermediary (πt) as well as the
revenue generated by corporate taxation (Tt), which the government levies on interme-
diate firms. The household supplies L units of labor inelastically, and future utility is
discounted at rate β. We assume constant relative risk aversion utility to allow for a
balanced growth path in equilibrium, and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is
1
γ ≤ 1. In particular, given the sequences of wages, interest rates, profits, lump sum trans-
fers of tax revenue {wt , rt+1 , Πt , Tt}∞t=0, and initial asset a0, the representative household
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chooses consumption, assets {ct , at+1}∞t=0 to solve: 7
max
{ct , at+1}∞t=0
{
∞
∑
t=0
βt
c1−γt
1− γ
}
(1.1)
sbj. to
ct + at+1 ≤ wtL+ at(1+ rt) + Πt + Tt (1.2)
at+1 ≥ 0 (1.3)
As shown in equation (1.2), the price of consumption is set to unity since we use final
good as the numeraire. The interior first order condition that characterizes this program is
(
ct+1
ct
)γ
= β (1+ rt+1) . (1.4)
1.3.2 Final Good Sector
Using a constant returns to scale technology, the representative final good producer
combines intermediate inputs to produce the final good
lnYt =
∫ 1
0
ln xDj,tdj,
which in turn provides resources for consumption. In particular, given input prices and
wages
{
wt , pj,t
}
, the final good producer demands intermediate varieties
{{
xDj,t
}
j∈[0,1]
}
every period in order to solve
max{{
xDj,t
}
j∈[0,1]
}
≥0
{
exp
(∫ 1
0
ln xDj,tdj
)
−
∫ 1
0
xDj,tpj,tdj
}
, (1.5)
7Subject to the standard transversality condition.
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The solution to this problem is fully characterized by the following interior set of first
order conditions:
xDj,t =
Yt
pj,t
. (1.6)
1.3.3 Intermediate Good Sector
In line with the endogenous growth literature, we assume that the amount of the in-
termediate good j produced, xj,t, is linear in labor lj,t, with constant marginal productivity
qj,t. Thus,
xj,t = lj,tqj,t. (1.7)
The efficiency of labor in the intermediate good production evolves with each technolog-
ical improvement generated by successful innovation. Innovations are heterogeneous in
their capacity to improve the existing technology. In particular, the evolution of technol-
ogy follows
qj,t = Idj,t × qj,t−1
(
1+ σd
)
+
(
1− Idj,t
)
× qj,t−1; d ∈ {L,H} (1.8)
where Idj,t is an indicator function that equals to 1 if the product line j receives an in-
novation in period t of type d, and 0 otherwise implying that this period, the level of
productivity is the same as in the last period. Moreover, σd is the heterogeneous step
size of the innovation, with σH > σL > 0.8 This implies that high type projects (H) im-
prove the productivity of labor more than low type projects (L). Therefore, leaders are
heterogeneous in their absolute distance from their closest follower.9
In line with the literature, we assume Bertrand monopolistic competition. This set-
8Incumbent heterogeneity has been introduced in step by step models even with rich incumbent dynam-
ics, for example in Akcigit and Kerr (2010), but that literature has not studied financial selection.
9We allow only two types in order to summarize the composition of the product line with only one
variable, the fraction of leaders with σH advantage.
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up implies that the competitor with the lower marginal cost dominates the market by
following a limit pricing rule, i.e. she sets her price, pj,t equal to the marginal cost of the
closest follower. Denote the efficiency of the closest follower, by q˜j,t, then:10
pj,t =
wt
q˜j,t
. (1.9)
In any product line j, the owner of the latest successful project of type d reaps profits πdj,t
at time t. Profits are subject to the corporate tax rate τ. A firm owner collects after-tax
profits in the current period. In the next period, this firm will continue to produce if it is
not replaced by a new leader. A mass Mt+1 of projects is enacted at time t+ 1, and each
of them becomes a firm with fixed probability λ. As entry is undirected, an incumbent
firm will continue to produce with probability 1− λMt+1. Then, given interest rate rt+1,
the value Vdj,t of owning the product line j at time t for a type d leader is given by
Vdj,t = (1− τ)πdj,t +
1− λMt+1
1+ rt+1
Vdj,t+1. (1.10)
In this framework, incumbents are randomly replaced by more efficient entrants. This is
the engine of economic growth in the model, the Schumpeterian creative destruction. Al-
though we abstract from incumbent firms’ dynamics, this channel captures an important
driver of productivity growth as documented by Bartelsman et al. (2009).
1.3.4 Projects
Projects are indexed by e ∈ [0, 1]. The fixed cost of enacting a project is κ units of
labor. An enacted project is successful with probability λ in generating an innovation. In
Aghion and Howitt (1992) potential entrants are homogeneous, and of infinite mass. One
of the key novelties in this model is how heterogeneity and scarcity are introduced into
this framework, and how the ex ante heterogeneity of projects is related to the ex post het-
10Note that, because there is no efficiency improvement by incumbents, we have qj,t = (1+ σd)q˜j,t. This
framework can be easily extended to allow for undirected incumbent innovations.
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erogeneity of incumbents. In this economy, projects are heterogeneous in their expected
cost reduction, and the ones with large expected reductions are scarce.11 In particular, ev-
ery project has an unobservable idiosyncratic probability θ(e) = eν of generating a drastic
improvement on productivity characterized by σH . As shown in Figure 1, the higher the
index e is, the more likely it is for project e to generate a drastic (type-H) innovation, and
hence, the higher the expected cost reduction. In this sense, e is more than an index, it is a
ranking among projects based on their idiosyncratic θ (e), which is unobservable ex-ante.
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Figure 1: Project Heterogeneity
In this setting, ν governs the underlying scarcity of good projects in the economy.
11A similar strategy in a different framework is followed by Clementi and Palazzo (2013). They introduce
ex ante heterogeneity linked with ex post firm productivity in the framework of Hopenhayn (1992) to study
firm dynamics over the business cycle in a quantitative partial equilibrium model.
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Figure 1 shows that for any θ¯ ∈ [0, 1], the higher the value of ν the fewer projects with
a probability θ(e) > θ¯ of generating a type H innovation. For example, when θ¯ = 0.6, if
ν = 0.2 there is a mass 0.9 of projects that deliver a drastic innovation with probability
higher than 0.6, whereas when ν = 5 only a mass 0.1 is above that level. Hence, ν
is a measure of the shortage of projects that are likely to produce drastic innovations.
Proposition 1 translates the ranking of projects into a probability distribution for θ, the
proof is provided in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1. We can characterize the probability distribution f (θ) by
f (θ) =
1
ν
(
1
θ
)1− 1ν
the mean of this distribution is given by E [θ] = 1ν+1 . Moreover, the skewness S(ν) of f (θ) is
given by
S(ν) =
2(ν− 1)√1+ 2ν
1+ 3ν
and it is positive and increasing for ν ≥ 1.
We assume that good projects are scarce, this means ν > 1. It translates into right-
skewness of the probability distribution of drastic innovations, as suggested by the empir-
ical research in this area. For instance, Silverberg and Verspagen (2007) use patent data to
study the skewness of the patent quality distribution proxied by citations. They find that
both the distribution of citations and the return to patents are highly skewed, and that
the tail index is roughly constant over time.12 The fraction of high-type improvements
when enacting a set M ∈ (0, 1] of projects is given by
µ˜H =
1
M
∫ 1
0
prob(e ∈ M)× θ (e) de
12Other firm related variables with fat tails are widely documented in the literature. For instance,
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) find large skewness on entrepreneurial returns. Axtell (2001) shows
that the size distribution of US firms closely mimics Zipf distribution, where the probability of a firm having
more than n employees is inversely proportional to n. Scherer (1998) uses German patent data to show the
skewness of the distribution of profits and technological innovation.
12
Random selection implies that for all e, prob(e ∈ M) = M. We denote by µ˜H the propor-
tion of high type project on the entering cohort under random selection. Then µ˜H equals
the unconditional probability of observing a drastic innovation:
µ˜H =
∫ 1
0
eνde =
∫ 1
0
θ f (θ)dθ =
1
ν+ 1
Finally, the higher ν is, the lower the proportion of high type innovations among the
randomly enacted cohort. This formalizes one of the main intuitions of the model, that
projects are heterogeneous and good ideas are scarce.
1.3.5 The Representative Financial Intermediary
The second key novelty of this model is the introduction of a non-trivial financial
system that screens and selects the most promising projects.13 The representative financial
intermediary has access to a unit mass of projects every period. It collects deposits from
households, selects in which projects to invest according to their expected value, and
pays back to the household the profits generated by these projects.14 This set up implicitly
assumes that all entrants are in need of external financing as enacting any project requires
investment by the intermediary.15 Note that, if VHj,t > V
L
j,t for any product line j, the
financial intermediary strictly prefers to enact projects with higher e. In particular, if e
were observable, a financial intermediary willing to finance M projects would enact only
the projects with e ∈ [1−M, 1]. However, e is unobservable. Nevertheless, the financial
intermediary has access to a costless, yet imperfect, screening technology that delivers a
13The closest reference of a financial intermediary performing this function in an endogenous growth
model is King and Levine (1993b). Nevertheless, lacking a link between ex ante and ex post heterogeneity, the
focus of their model is only in the effect of the mass of entrants.
14Alternatively, we can assume that the representative household owns the projects but does not have
access to any screening technology. Hence it sells the projects to the representative financial intermediary at
the expected profits net of financing costs, and the financial intermediary earns no profits.
15Nofsinger and Wang (2011) use data from 27 countries, to document that 45% of start-ups use funds
from financial institutions and government programs. Categories for 2003: self saving and income (39.97%),
close family members (12.79%), work colleague (7.7%), employer (14.18%), banks and financial institutions
(33.92%), and government programs (11.02%).
13
stochastic signal e˜ defined by:
e˜t =


e˜t = et with probability ρ
e˜t ∼ U [0, 1] with probability 1− ρ
Note that ρ ∈ [0, 1] characterizes the accuracy of the screening with ρ = 1 implying the
perfect screening case. Levine (2005) suggests that one characteristic of financial devel-
opment is the improvement in the production of ex ante information about possible investments.
In this sense, the accuracy of the financial selection technology ρ is a reflection of the
financial development of an economy. There is also empirical evidence of financial selec-
tion, for instance, Gonzalez and James (2007) document that firms with previous banking
relationships perform significantly better after going public than firms without such re-
lationships.16 Define Vdt = Ej
[
Vdj,t
]
to be the expected value of successfully enacting a
project with step size d. Proposition 2 shows that when the expected return of a drastic
innovation is higher than the one of generating an incremental innovation, the optimal
strategy is to set a cut-off for the signal. The proof is provided in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2. If VHt > V
L
t , the optimal strategy for a financial intermediary financing Mt
projects at time t is to set a cut-off e¯t = 1−Mt, and to enact projects only with signal e˜t ≥ e¯t.
When the financial intermediary optimally uses this technology to select a mass Mt =
1− e¯t of projects, the proportion µ˜Ht (e¯t) of high type projects in the successfully enacted
λMt mass is given by
µ˜H(e¯t) =
1
λMt
∫ 1
0
λ× prob(e˜t ≥ e¯t|et)× θ (et) det
=
1
1− e¯t
[∫ e¯t
0
(1− ρ) (1− e¯t) eνt det +
∫ 1
e¯t
{(1− ρ) (1− e¯t) + ρ} eνt det
]
=
1
ν+ 1
[
1− ρ+ ρ
1− e¯t
(
1− e¯1+νt
)]
. (1.11)
Note that for any cut-off e¯, the composition increases with the level of financial technology
16Keys et al. (2010) document that the lower screening intensity in the sub-prime crisis generated between
10% and 25% more defaults.
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ρ and decreases with the scarcity of high type projects ν. Moreover, in terms of the
resulting composition, financial selection performs at least as well as the random selection
of projects. We summarize these properties in Proposition 3.17
Proposition 3. The proportion of high type entrants µ˜H exhibits the following features:
1. µ˜H(e¯t) is increasing in e¯t. Moreover, µ˜H(e¯t) is increasing in ρ and decreasing in ν for every
e¯t.
2. µ˜H(e¯t) ≥ µ˜H with µ˜H(e¯t) = µ˜H if ρ = 0 or e¯t = 0.
3. µ˜H(e¯t) =
1−e¯ν+1t
(ν+1)(1−e¯t) if ρ = 1 and lime¯t→1 µ˜
H(e¯t) =
1+νρ
ν+1 ≤ 1
In this set up, the financial intermediary collects deposits Dt from the representative
household in order to enact a mass Mt = Dtwtκ of projects every period. Proposition 3
implies that the financial intermediary will always use its screening device.18 Then, given{
VHt , V
L
t , rt, wt
}
the financial intermediary chooses {e¯t, Dt} in order to solve
max
{Dt , e¯t}
{
λDt
wtκ
[
µ˜H(e¯t)VHt + (1− µ˜H(e¯t))VLt
]
− Dt(1+ rt)
−ξ1
(
1− e¯t − Dtwtκ
)
− ξ2
(
Dt
wtκ
− 1
)
+
ξ3
wtκ
Dt
}
(1.12)
where {ξ1, ξ2, ξ3} are Lagrange multipliers that control for the range of e¯, and the equality
of the households’ deposits to the demand of funds by the intermediary. Note that the
term that multiplies the brackets in the first line is the mass of projects that are enacted
and turn out to be successful. The bracketed term is the expected return of the portfolio
with composition µ˜H (e¯). The intermediary needs to pay back Dt plus the interest. As the
objective function is strictly concave, the first order conditions are sufficient for optimality.
As Proposition 3 states, a financial intermediary with ρ > 0 faces a trade-off between
mass and composition of the enacted pool. Now, we examine the optimal decisions of the
17Proof is trivial and therefore omitted.
18When a fixed cost is included the partial solution exhibits a kink. In general equilibrium there is a region
where the equilibrium implies not screening, another region where it always implies screening, and a third
region characterized by non-existence. A well behaved variable cost does not alter the results significantly.
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intermediary. First order conditions regarding {Dt, e¯t}, respectively, yield
λ
wtκ
[
µ˜H(e¯t)VHt + (1− µ˜H(e¯t))VLt
]
− (1+ rt) + ξ1wtκ −
ξ2
wtκ
+
ξ3
wtκ
= 0
λDt
wtκ
(
VHt −VLt
ν+ 1
)[
ρ
1− e¯t
(
1− e¯ν+1t
1− e¯t − (ν+ 1)e¯
ν
t
)]
+ ξ1 = 0.
Note that if ρ > 0 then ξ1 < 0 which in turn implies a positive wedge between the
marginal revenue the intermediary generates and the marginal payment it needs to make
to households. Therefore, the screening technology allows the intermediary to make
positive profits. Furthermore, the unique interior solution (ξ2 = ξ3 = 0) is characterized
by
ρe¯νt =
wtκ
λ (1+ rt)−VLt
(VHt −VLt )
− 1− ρ
(ν+ 1)
(1.13)
The uniqueness crucially depends on ρ being larger than zero. Otherwise, there are no
profits and the intermediary is indifferent when enacting any mass of projects.
This partial equilibrium result is quite intuitive. In fact, the cut-off is increasing in the
enacting cost κ, the interest rate, the wages, and the scarcity of good projects ν. The cut-
off is decreasing in the precision of screening technology ρ and in the value of the projects
which means that, in these cases, the intermediary is willing to enact more projects.
1.3.6 Equilibrium
Having introduced the basic components of the model, we can examine its equilib-
rium and balanced growth path (BGP). First, we characterize the analytical relationships
posed by the equilibrium conditions, then we narrow down our analysis further to state
the existence and uniqueness of a BGP, and characterize it analytically.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of quantities{
Dt,
{
xSt,j
}
j∈[0,1]
,
{
xDt,j
}
j∈[0,1]
, ct, yt, at+1,
{
ldj,t
}
j∈[0,1]
, e¯t
}∞
t=0
, policy parameters
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{τ, Tt}∞t=0, values
{{
VHj,t
}
j∈[0,1]
,
{
VLj,t
}
j∈[0,1]
}∞
t=0
, prices
{
wt , rt+1 ,
{
pj,t
}
j∈[0,1]
}∞
t=0
, finan-
cial intermediary profits {Πt}∞t=0, intermediate good producer’s profits
{
πdt,j
}t=∞
j∈[0,1] , t=0
, entrants
and incumbents compositions {µ˜t , µt}∞t=0 and initial conditions{
a0 ,
{
q0,j
}
j∈[0,1] , µ
H
0
}
such that:
1. Given {wt , rt+1, Tt, Πt}∞t=0, household chooses {ct , at+1} to solve (1.1) subject to (1.2)
and (1.3).
2. Given
{
pj,t
}
, final good producer chooses
{{
xDt,j
}
j∈[0,1]
}
to solve (1.5) every t.
3. Given {wt}, and
{
qj,t−1
}
intermediate producer of good j with type d sets pj,t according to
(1.9), and earns profits πdt,j, for every t that she remains the leader in product line j.
4. Given
{
VHt , V
L
t , rt , wt
}
, financial intermediary chooses {Dt, e¯t} to solve (1.12) every t.
5. Labor, asset, final and intermediate good markets clear:
∫ 1
0
ldj,t dj+ (1− e¯t)κ = L (1.14)
at = Dt = (1− e¯t)wtκ (1.15)
xSj,t = x
D
j,t ⇒ lj,tqj,t =
yt
pj,t
(1.16)
ct = yt = e
∫ 1
0 ln xj,tdj (1.17)
6. Vdj,t evolves accordingly to (1.10), qj,t evolves accordingly to (1.8), and government budget
is balanced every period.
7. The entrant’s composition µ˜t is determined by (1.11) and the composition of the product line
µt evolves according to:
µHt+1 = µ
H
t + λ(1− e¯t+1)
(
µ˜Ht+1 − µHt
)
. (1.18)
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An important feature of this class of models is that profits, values, and labor across
intermediate goods are independent of the efficiency level accumulated in product line j
up to time t. As a result, the particular product line j does not matter for the determina-
tion of these values; the size of the last innovation is a sufficient statistic for them. This is
summarized in Proposition 4, the derivation is in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 4. Equilibrium:
1. ∀j ∈ [0, 1] and ∀D ∈ {L,H} we have:
πdj,t = π
d
t ; l
d
j,t = l
d
t ; V
d
j,t = V
d
t
2. If σH > σL:
πHt > π
L
t ; l
H
t < l
L
t ; V
H
t > V
L
t
Proposition 4 shows that in equilibrium we have VHt > V
L
t and hence the financial
intermediary uses a cut-off strategy when selecting projects.19 The system of equations
that characterizes the equilibrium is in Appendix A.4.
Definition 2 (BGP). Define Qt = exp
{∫ 1
0 ln qj,t
}
dj as the average efficiency level. The economy
is in a Balanced Growth Path at time T if it is in such an equilibrium that, ∀t > T, the endogenous
aggregate variables {Ct, Qt, Yt, at+1} grow at a constant rate, and the threshold e¯t is constant.
Lemma 1 states the existence and uniqueness of a BGP for this economy. The proof
is provided in Appendix A.5.
Lemma 1. Existence and Uniqueness:
κ
L ∈ [a, b], where {a, b} are constants that depend on the model parameters, is a sufficient condition
19Note that more efficient leaders needs less labor to serve the demand of their variety. For concreteness,
imagine a type H leader with a follower of productivity level q˜. This leader will charge the same price as a
type L leader who is also followed by someone with efficiency q˜. This implies that both are selling the same
quantity, nevertheless, the more efficient leader needs less labor to produce that quantity, and hence earns
more profits.
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for the existence and uniqueness of an interior BGP for this economy.
1.3.7 Mass and Composition Effect
As derived in Appendix A.5, the long-run growth of this economy is characterized
by the following expression:
1+ g(e¯) =
[
(1+ σH)µ
H(e¯)(1+ σL)1−µ
H(e¯)
]λ(1−e¯)
(1.19)
The economic intuition of equation (1.19) is clear: the long-run growth of this economy
is the geometric mean of the efficiency improvement weighted by the composition of the
entrants and scaled by the mass of entrants. The trade-off between mass and composition
is manifested in this term. Lower credit standard (low e¯) implies a larger pool of entrants
that increases the exponent of this term, but also decreases the base through the indirect
effect on composition µ(e¯). The interaction of these two margins determines the long-run
growth g(e¯). Nevertheless, e¯ is an endogenous variable, so we should also clarify the
optimization problem that determines this variable.
To understand the source of the trade-off it is useful to think about two alternative
cases the intermediary could face when investing in projects: An economy with no accu-
racy (ρ = 0) where project initialization is random, and a model with no heterogeneity
(σH = σL) where selection is useless. These two alternatives have in common that the
expected step size of the marginal enacted project is constant with respect to the total
enacted mass, destroying the trade-off between the enacted mass and its composition.20
But, the full model is characterized by the decreasing expected step size of the marginal
entrants with respect to the total entry, this tension introduces a trade-off between mass
and composition into the model. Since this is a general equilibrium model, the economic
20In both cases, the financial intermediary has no profits. Nevertheless this is not the source of the
composition effect, if we impose a zero expected profit condition, as long as ρ > 0 and σH > σL, all the
results carry on.
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impact of this trade-off should be assessed by studying the long-run comparative statics
of the model. Proposition 5 shows the general equilibrium comparative statics to changes
in the enacting cost κ, the patience coefficient β, and the corporate tax rate τ.21
Proposition 5. General Equilibrium Comparative Statics:
1. An economy with higher enacting cost κ has higher lending standards, less entry but better
composition. Long-run growth decreases with κ:
∂e¯
∂κ
≥ 0 ; ∂g(e¯)
∂κ
≤ 0 ; ∂µ
H (e¯)
∂κ
≥ 0
2. An economy with lower patience coefficient β has higher lending standards, less entry but
better composition. Long-run growth increases with β:
∂e¯
∂β
≤ 0 ; ∂g(e¯)
∂β
≥ 0 ; ∂µ
H (e¯)
∂β
≤ 0
3. An economy with higher corporate tax rate τ has higher lending standards, less entry but
better composition. Long-run growth increases with τ:
∂e¯
∂τ
≥ 0 ; ∂g(e¯)
∂τ
≤ 0 ; ∂µ
H (e¯)
∂τ
≥ 0
Proposition 5 shows first that economies with higher enacting cost (κ) enact in equilib-
rium less projects and hence, exert a tighter selection. Note that those economies are char-
acterized by a lower rate of long-run growth but a higher composition on their product
line. Second, economies with a higher patience coefficient (β) save more they are able to
enact more projects. Although those economies grow more in the long-run, their average
composition is lower. Finally, economies with higher corporate taxes (τ) have lower entry
rates and lower long-run growth, but higher composition. All these cases share an impor-
21We select these parameters for the intuitive relationship to the main mechanism of the model, other
results are available upon request. The proof is provided in Appendix A.6.
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tant result: the mass effect generated by the underlying parametric change dominates the
composition effect. Nevertheless, the composition effect introduces non-linearities on the
relationship between credit availability and growth. In fact, in the alternative models that
lack either selection or heterogeneity any marginal amount allocated to project enaction
has a constant contribution to growth. Therefore, the relationship between entry (or total
credit) and growth is linear. The model presented here breaks that linearity introducing
a non-trivial relationship between entry and growth shaped by the interaction between
heterogeneity, scarcity, and financial selection that characterizes the economy. In fact, the
strength of the selection margin that determines the magnitude of the trade-off between
mass and composition rest on the accuracy of the screening technology of the financial
intermediary. Before concluding this section, we study the relatively more complex effect
of a better screening technology (higher ρ).
Intuitively, better selection technology can be used to avoid enacting bad projects or to
aim for more high-type projects. On the one hand, we can expect economies characterized
by a high entry rates to increase their lending standards (higher e¯) in response to an
increase in the accuracy of their financial system. In fact, for those economies the marginal
project enacted is more likely to be of low type, so the marginal benefit of improving
the overall quality of the pool by reducing its size outweighs the potential benefit of
increasing its mass. On the other hand, economies that are currently enacting less projects,
should be willing to relax the selection standards and aim for a larger entry, since the
marginal entrant has a high probability of becoming a type H leader. Proposition 6 gives
analytical support to this intuition.22
Proposition 6. Financial Development:
1. Let s¯ > s be two constants that are determined by the model parameters. For any economy
with an equilibrium level of selection e¯ ≥ s¯ a marginal increase in the accuracy of the
22The proof is provided in Appendix A.6.
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screening technology ρ will result in a less selective equilibrium.
e¯ ≥ s¯ ⇒ ∂e¯
∂ρ
< 0.
2. For any economy with an equilibrium level of selection e¯ ≤ s a marginal increase in the
accuracy of the screening technology ρ will result in a more selective equilibrium.
e¯ ≤ s ⇒ ∂e¯
∂ρ
> 0.
Proposition 6 suggests that the effects of financial development are non-monotonic. In
particular, the level of domestic savings shapes the marginal response of entry to changes
in the accuracy of the financial system.23 This non-monotonic relationship between do-
mestic savings and financial development challenges the most widely used proxy for
economic development in the empirical literature. In fact, most of the cross country em-
pirical research that relates financial development and economic growth proxies the first
by the credit to output ratio. If we emphasize the screening role of the financial system,
this strategy is only valid for economies with low entry rates. Moreover, the ambigu-
ous relationship between financial development and firm entry carries on to the effect in
growth. For example, if an increase in ρ triggers a reduction in the entry, the final effect
on growth will depend on the relative strength of the two margins: a smaller cohort versus
a higher proportion of drastic improvements.
To sum up, this section introduced a long-run endogenous growthmodel that features
project heterogeneity and financial selection. In this economy good ideas are scarce and
the ability of the financial intermediary to select the most promising ones is limited. This
induces a trade-off between mass and composition as the larger the entrant cohort is,
the lower the fraction of drastic innovations in the economy. The growth rate of this
economy is endogenously determined and results from the interaction between mass and
23Recall that equation 1.15 imply a one to one mapping between entry and savings in equilibrium.
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composition effect described above.
1.4 Mass and Composition: Two Quantitative Illustrations
In this section we perform a quantitative exploration of the model to illustrate the rel-
evance of the composition effect introduced in this chapter. After proposing a reasonable
parametrization of the model, we revisit two classical development problems.
First, we study the effects of corporate taxation on firm entry and economic growth.
The empirical research points to an almost insignificant negative effect on long run growth
but a strong and significant negative effect on firm entry. As the trade-off between mass
and composition effect implies that the marginal entrant’s contribution to growth is de-
creasing in the size of a cohort, the model can successfully account for both facts.
Second, we study the impact of financial development in economic growth. In the
baseline parametrization, financial development reduces entry but increases growth due
to a better allocation of resources. In particular, more financially developed economies
tight their lending standards, experiencing gains from the composition margin that out-
weigh the losses on the mass margin. This generates a negative relationship between the
level of financial development and the size of the entrant cohort. Alternative parametriza-
tions with lower entry rates can generate a positive relationship between mass and finan-
cial development. Interestingly, the marginal gain from reallocation is increasing in the
level of financial development. Moreover, in line with the empirical literature, financial
development influence growth mostly by improving the allocation of resources.
1.4.1 Parametrization of the Model
We focus the baseline parametrization in high income economies, and then in each
experiment we study deviations from this set-up. We proceed this way due to the avail-
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ability of empirical literature on mark-up, and manufacturing productivity for more de-
veloped economies. Table 1 shows the baseline parametrization for the quantitative ex-
periments of this section.
κ λ σL σH β ν ρ γ τ L
0.12 0.25 0.095 0.45 0.95 5 0.9 2 0.3 1
Table 1: Parameter Values
Given the normalization of the labor force to 1 the value of κ implies that 12% of the
labor force is enough to enact all the projects in the economy. The value of λ implies
that one out of every four projects are able to generate a successful innovation in some
product line. When the innovation is drastic the increase in the productivity of labor is
45% while an incremental innovation just generates a 9.5% increase in productivity. Given
the scarcity parameter ν, the underlying heterogeneity of the projects is such that one out
of every six projects is expected to generate a drastic innovation, this implies a highly
skewed distribution for the probability of generating a drastic innovation.24 The value of
ρ suggests that 90% of the projects are successfully screened by the financial intermediary.
In line with the average statutory corporate tax for high income economies presented by
Djankov et al. (2010), we set τ to 30%. Finally, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is set to 0.5 and the patience coefficient β to 0.95.
Table 2 presents a summary of the long-run implications of the model under the
baseline parametrization.
e¯ µH λ(1− e¯) g r κwY κ(1− e¯) Av.(σ) Sd.(σ) Sk.(π)
0.599 0.373 0.100 0.012 0.095 0.105 0.048 0.228 0.172 0.524
Table 2: Output of the Model
The resulting cut-off value implies that 40% of the projects are enacted, given the
level of financial development the resulting composition on the intermediate good sector
24The implied skewness using Proposition 1 is 1.66, in general, any value larger than one is considered
high.
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is more than two times higher than the one under random selection. The entry rate of 10%
is in line with the international firm level evidence for developed countries.25 The growth
rate is also consistent with the average labor productivity growth of the European Union
and the United States reported by Ark et al. (2008).26 Fracassi et al. (2012) report an aver-
age interest rate for start up loans in the United States 11.5% slightly higher than the one
generated by this set of parameters.27 According to the Doing Business project, the average
entry cost in 2012 resulting from fees and legal procedures among the OECD countries
was 4.5% of the average per capita income. Moreover, the average minimum capital re-
quirement to start a business was 13.3% for those countries, also in 2012, so the entry cost
generated by the model of 10.5% of the average income is in line with the data. Fairlie
(2012) states that in 2011, according to the Kauffman index of Entrepreneurial Activity,
0.32% of adults in the United States were engaged in business creation every month. This
implies that almost 4% of the adult population was engaged in entrepreneurship every
year which is comparable to the 5% generated by the parametrized model. The average
markup generated by the model is also consistent with the estimates of Christopoulou
and Vermeulen (2012). They document an average markup of 28% for the manufacturing
and construction sector in the United States between 1981 − 2004 and a corresponding
value of 18% for the Euro area. The standard deviation of the markup is roughly half of
the one estimated by Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2005) for the French economy between
1978− 2001.28 Finally, the resulting skewness of the profit distribution is roughly consis-
tent with the values reported by Scherer et al. (2000).29 The first quantitative experiment
studies the effects of corporate taxation in both entry and growth rates.
25According to the International Finance Corporation’s micro small and medium-size enterprises database
the Euro area has an average entry rate of 8.9% between 2000− 2007 while United States has a 12.9% average
entry rate between 2003− 2005.
26They report an average of 1.5% for the European Union between 1995− 2005 and 2.3% for United States
over the same period.
27They use the complete set of start-up loan applications received by Accion Texas between 2006− 2011.
This number is consistent with the 11.3% reported by Petersen and Rajan (1994) from the National Survey of
Small Business Finance also in the US for the years 1988 and 1989.
28Their weighted markup average estimation (33%) more than doubles the one estimated for France by
Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012).
29Note that financial selection implies that not all the underlying skewness is passed to the composition
of the intermediate producers.
25
1.4.2 Corporate Taxation, Firm Entry, and Growth
The empirical literature indicates a weak negative relationship between corporate
taxes and long-run growth rates, whereas the effect on firm entry is found to be negative
and sizeable. On the one hand, a cross sectional study with 85 countries performed by
Djankov et al. (2010) suggests that decreasing the average tax rate from 29% to 19% would
increase the average entry rate from 8% to 9.4%. Moreover, Da Rin et al. (2011a) explore
a firm level panel data for 17 European countries, and find a non-linear relationship
between corporate taxes and entry rates with high responses in the relevant corporate tax
range. On the other hand, the empirical growth literature finds only a slightly negative
effect of corporate taxation on growth. To compare the magnitude of this relationship
to the former stated regularity on entry rates we can take the estimation of Gemmell
et al. (2011), where a 10 percentage points corporate tax reduction could increase long-run
growth by at most 0.3 percentage points.30 In summary, the research in corporate taxation
suggests a fragile negative effect on growth and an economically significant negative effect
on entry.31
Figure 2 shows the long-run responses of entry, composition, and growth in the model
to changes in corporate taxation for the baseline parametrization (ρ = 0.9) and three
other values of ρ. Figure 2d displays the entry elasticity of growth defined as the ratio
of the percentage change in growth to the percentage change in entry generated by a
one percentage point increase in taxation. In particular, an elasticity smaller than one in
absolute value implies that marginal increases in taxation have larger absolute marginal
effects on entry than in growth. In other words, growth responds to taxation less than
entry does. In line with Proposition 5, increases in marginal taxation reduce both entry
30Easterly and Rebelo (1993) study this relationship using a panel of 125 countries spanning over 1970−
1988 and find that there is no robust effect of taxes on growth. Widmalm (2001), and Angelopoulos et al.
(2007) establish a similar result for the OECD countries. Moreover, Levine and Renelt (1992) argue that the
negative relationship documented in the literature is not robust to slight changes on the specifications of the
econometric model.
31For concreteness, Appendix A.7 uses cross country data to illustrate that higher taxes are significantly
and strongly correlated with lower entry, but the negative correlation with growth rate is extremely weak.
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and growth, but improve the composition of the economy.32
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Figure 2: The Effect of Corporate Taxation on Growth and Entry
We first focus the analysis on the responses of the model when ρ is at its bench-
mark level. As Figures 2a and 2c show, the response of long-run entry and growth to
changes in taxation are both highly non-linear, yet the growth rate exhibits the strongest
non-linearity. Moreover, the responses of both, entry and growth are in line with the
magnitudes suggested by the empirical literature discussed above. In fact, a tax cut of 10
32Recall that this result holds only for interior solutions. In fact, after a corner solution is met, entry and
growth are both zero and do not react to extra taxation.
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percentage points from the baseline parametrization of 30% increases growth from 1.98%
to 2.11% while the increase in entry from 10% to 12.5% is also in line with the empirical
studies. This asymmetry in the response to taxation is summarized in Figure 2d: For a
wide range of tax rates, the percentage decline in the growth rate caused by a one per-
centage point increase in taxation is only 60% of the corresponding decline in the entry
rate. The reason behind this difference is the strength of the composition effect. As seen
in Figure 2b the decrease in entry induced by higher corporate taxation implies tighter
lending standards and hence a higher composition. In fact, financial selection implies that
the contribution of the marginal entrant to growth is decreasing in entry. Therefore, the
initial reductions in entry triggered by higher corporate taxation do not impose an im-
portant cost in terms of growth to this economy. Only when the level of taxation reaches
extremely high levels, the sacrificed entrants pose a sizeable challenge to the long-run
growth of the economy.
In a related article, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2012) use a similar mechanism to generate
extremely non-linear responses of long-run growth to taxation. Their model combines the
product line expansion framework of Romer (1990) with the heterogeneous ability frame-
work of Lucas (1978). In a nutshell, entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their ability to
create firms, and more skilled entrepreneurs have a higher rate of success when enacting
a project.33 As the distribution of ability is highly skewed, relatively few entrepreneurs
explain most of the entry rate of the economy. Hence, increases in taxation discourages
only marginal entrepreneurs, and both the entry and the growth rates respond mildly
for a wide range of taxes. In their model there is no ex post heterogeneity, all the active
incumbents are identical, and hence the average per firm contribution to growth is the
same for every cohort, regardless of its size.34 In other words, even though their model
33In the context of our model, the heterogeneity is not in σ but in λ. Nevertheless, as the frameworks are
completely different, this comparison need to be taken cautiously. In fact, Romer (1990) engine of growth is
not the Schumpeterian creative destruction of Aghion and Howitt (1992), but an expansion in the number of
intermediate varieties without replacement.
34They focus on self selection instead of financial selection, we believe that both mechanisms are present
in the data and reinforce each other.
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features selection, the only engine of growth is the volume of the entrant cohort: the
mass effect. The absence of a composition channel implies that their model exhibits, by
construction, an elasticity equal to one for any level of taxation, so it cannot generate any
asymmetry between the responses of entry and growth.35 Hence, the composition margin
is fundamental when modelling this asymmetry.
Returning to Figure 2, to illustrate the key role of financial selection in determin-
ing the strength of the composition effect, we compare the baseline parametrization with
three others that only differ in the value of ρ. The dotted line represents a model with no
financial selection (ρ = 0) where project enaction is random, and in line with Proposition
3, composition is constant, and the responses of growth and entry to taxation are linear.
Moreover, as shown in Figure 2d, there is no asymmetry between the two responses. The
other two parametrizations exhibit intermediate levels of financial development. Figure
2a shows that for a wide range of corporate tax rates the parametrizations with lower lev-
els of financial development exhibit higher entry rates. Nevertheless, as seen in Figure 2c,
these economies are not able to capitalize the larger entry into higher economic growth.
This is a consequence of the potential strength of the composition effect, where economies
with less entry can grow at a faster pace only due to a higher proportion of drastic in-
novation. In fact, as shown in Figure 2b, the higher the corporate tax rate, the bigger
the compositional advantage of the more developed economies. Moreover, for extremely
high tax rates, a more developed economy can have larger and better cohorts than a less
developed one, dominating the later not only in composition but also in mass. Finally,
note that more financially developed economies exhibit extremely convex responses in
growth, accentuating the asymmetry between the sensitivity of growth and entry to cor-
porate taxation. This is clear in Figure 2d, where more financially developed economies
35Jaimovich and Rebelo (2012) do not study the effects on entry. When interpreting their results we use the
same definition as in Romer (1990) for an entrant. Nevertheless, if an entrant is defined as one entrepreneur
regardless of the number of product lines that she owns, then that model also generates this asymmetry
between entry and growth. In this case, the composition should refer to the average size of an entrant in
terms of the number of product line per entrepreneur. Yet, still the only engine of growth is the increase in
the number of product lines, and hence, a mass perspective.
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have systematically lower entry elasticities to growth. Given the relevance of the financial
development parameter ρ, we explore quantitatively its influence in entry and growth in
the next experiment.
1.4.3 Financial Development, Resource Allocation and Output Growth
To close the quantitative section we explore the interactions between financial devel-
opment, resource allocation and output growth. In particular, we emphasize the relevance
of Proposition 6 when studying the empirical relationship between financial development
and economic growth. To illustrate this we present our results under three parametriza-
tions that differ only in the fixed cost of project enaction (κ). Note that in Proposition 6,
κ does not enter in s¯ or s, and it affects e¯ monotonically. Hence, different values for κ
are a natural choice to illustrate the non monotonicity introduced by changes in financial
development (ρ) for economies with different entry rates. In particular, economies with
high κ, which are characterized by a higher e¯ and a lower entry rate, are likely to increase
entry when ρ increases, but the opposite is expected from economies with low κ.
Size Measures and Financial Development
Figure 3 shows the long-run responses of entry, growth, composition, and the ratio of
entry and composition effects to changes in the accuracy of the screening technology. To
calculate the last component, we start by taking the natural logarithm of equation (1.19):
gt+1 ≈ ln (1+ gt+1) = λ (1− e¯t)
(
µHt ln
(
1+ σH
1+ σL
)
+ ln
(
1+ σL
))
30
Taking natural logarithm again we have:
ln (gt+1) ≈ ln (λ (1− e¯t)) + ln
(
µHt ln
(
1+ σH
1+ σL
)
+ ln
(
1+ σL
))
Then, the change in this expression as a response to one percentage point shift in ρ yields
approximately
∆%ρ g ≈ ∆ρ%mass+ ∆ρ% composition
Now we can define the relative measure of entry and composition effects at each level of
ρ:
ηρ =
|∆ρ%mass|
|∆ρ% composition| .
Note that, ηρ > 1 implies that mass effects accounts for most of the percentage change
in growth due to a marginal change in ρ, and ηρ < 1 reflects the dominance of the
composition effect.
In line with Proposition 6, Figure 3a shows that at high levels of entry (dashed and
asterisk lines) entry rate decreases with financial development, while for the highest value
of κ (solid line) the entry rate increases in ρ. As shown in equation 1.15, the entry rate
λ(1− e¯) and the level of domestic savings (1− e¯)κw are always positively related. As a
result, the non-monotonicity between the entry rate and financial development implies
that the relationship between domestic savings and financial development is not mono-
tonic as well. Therefore, size based measures such as domestic credit over output do not
necessary reflect the cross-country differences in the accuracy of the financial systems.
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Figure 3: The Effect of Financial Development on Growth and Entry
Resource Allocation and Financial Development
Note first that in Figure 3, under the baseline parametrization, mass and composition
effects act in opposite directions: a higher level of financial development reduces the
mass but improves the composition of the entrant cohort.36 Note that as ηρ < 1 for all
the domain, the composition effect dominates the mass effect for this parametrization,
36Two forces explain the rise in composition: a direct one due to the increase in ρ, and an indirect one due
to the reduction in entry.
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and thus growth is increasing in ρ in Figure 3c. This suggests that under the baseline
parametrization, the main source of growth is the reallocation of resources, and not an
increase in the volume of resources allocated. In contrast, for low levels of κ (asterisk
line) ηρ > 1 in the low ρ region, the mass effect dominates, and output growth might
even decrease with ρ.37
Figure 3d also shows that the relevance of the composition effect is always rising
with ρ for every value of κ. This pattern can be explained using Figures 3a and 3b. While
the proportion of high type leaders rises at increasing rates in Figure 3b, the changes in
entry take place at decreasing rates for any κ. Moreover, for high levels of ρ, ηρ < 1 at any
value of κ. Hence, an increase in ρ in more financially developed economies translates into
higher gains in growth mainly through the composition channel. In other words, more
financially developed economies do not necessarily allocate more resources in order to
grow, but they are more efficient in allocating them.
It is also interesting to note that for any given κ more financially developed economies
experience larger improvements in growth due to a marginal increase in ρ than less de-
veloped economies do.38 In fact, the effect of financial development on economic growth
is highly non-linear: countries that are financially challenged benefit less from financial
development than financially developed countries.
Related Empirical Work
Before reviewing some of the related empirical literature it is useful to recall the three
main messages delivered by Figure 3: i) entry and financial development exhibit a non-
monotonic relationship, ii) the main channel through which financial development affects
37Bose and Cothren (1996) find a similar result in the context of optimal contracting in an externality-
driven growth model. Imposing a zero profit condition on the financial intermediary can eliminate this
feature of our model.
38Note that at higher levels of ρ the difference in growth rates for different entry costs κ decreases. In
accordance with Asturias et al. (2012), this suggests that financial development helps to overcome entry
barriers, and that the importance of ρ in terms of economic growth is greater when κ is higher.
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economic growth is the better allocation of resources, rather than the allocation of more
resources, and iii) the effect of financial development on economic growth is highly non-
linear, more developed countries benefit more from marginal increases in their ability to
select promising projects.
On the empirical side, the seminal contribution of Rajan and Zingales (1998) examine
a cross country cross industry sample and find that industries with higher financial de-
pendency grow faster in countries with more developed financial markets. Note that, in
the context of the model presented in this chapter, industries more in need of the financial
system should be subject to more screening, and hence, grow more in more financially
developed countries. Nevertheless, this analogy is accurate only if the empirical proxy
for financial development is a good measure of the screening accuracy ρ. Rajan and Zin-
gales (1998), as most of the literature, use a size measure in order to proxy for financial
development, in particular, they use the total size of the stock market and the measure of
domestic credit. But, as seen in Proposition 6, the amount of resources available in the
credit market is not always positively related with the accuracy of the financial system.
Rioja and Valev (2004) explicitly mention this issue when using a 74 countries panel
data to study if the effect of financial development in growth is monotonic across levels
of financial development. In fact, they use three proxies for financial development, two
of them centered on the size dimension (private credit and liquid liabilities) and a third
measure that tries to proxy for the ability of an economy to perform a more accurate
selection (the ratio of commercial bank assets over central bank assets).39 For the two size
measures they find that the effects of financial development are stronger for countries
with an intermediate level of financial development than for countries with high levels.
Moreover, the effect on countries with very low levels of financial development is insignif-
39The empirical work of King and Levine (1993b) and King and Levine (1993a) states these and other
proxies for financial development. They suggest that the higher this ratio is, the stronger the screening in
the economy, since commercial bank tend to exert a more thorough selection. For each of their measures
they find a strong relationship between economic growth and financial development, moreover, they use case
studies of financial reforms to validate them.
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icant. Nevertheless, when using the third measure, they also find a significant economic
effect for lower levels of financial development. All their specifications point to strong
non-linearities in both the relationship between volume of credit and economic growth,
and the relationship between screening intensity and economic growth. These observa-
tions are in line with the non-linearities displayed under different parametrizations in
Figure (3).
In another related empirical study, Wurgler (2000) studies the efficiency of the alloca-
tion of resources for different economies. His main contribution is the development of an
elasticity based index that measures the ability of an economy to increase its investment
in growing industries, and decrease it in the ones that are shrinking. He finds no signifi-
cant relationship between the volume of capital allocated in manufacturing and his proxy
for financial development. Therefore, in line with Figure 3d, financially more developed
economies grow faster mainly because of a better allocation of resources. He also finds
that his measure of efficient capital allocation is strongly and positively related with the
idiosyncratic (firm level) information available in the stock prices, a measure of the infor-
mation available in the economy.40. Finally, Galindo et al. (2007) use a different approach
to study the relationship between finance and the allocation of resources.41 They use firm
level panel data for 12 developing countries to build a measure of the efficiency in the
allocation of resources, and then they use the chronology of financial reforms in Laeven
(2003) for those countries. They find that episodes of financial liberalization are linked
to better allocation of resources, but not necessarily to a larger mobilization of resources,
this is again consistent with Figure 3d.
In sum, this section presented a quantitative examination of the strength and rele-
vance of the composition effect. The first experiment showed that the composition effect
40The lower price synchronicity on the stock market, measured as in Morck et al. (2000), the higher the
idiosyncratic information contained on the stock. He also finds that reallocation is more efficient when state
ownership declines, and minority stockholder rights are strong
41They also review the cross country and firm level literature on the relationship between financial liber-
alization and growth. They argue that the positive effect on growth is well established, while a clear effect
on the amount of resources allocated has not been found.
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can overturn the mass effect and allow an economy to grow faster even when enacting
less projects. We also explained how the composition effect can rationalize the empirical
relationship between corporate taxation, firm entry, and economic growth. The second
illustration replicated the empirically observed non-linear relationship between financial
development, allocation and reallocation of resources. This experiment also exemplifies
the risks associated with the use of volume based proxies for financial development.
1.5 Skewness: A Proxy for Financial Selection
This chapter suggests that size-based measures are not appropriated proxies to assess
the accuracy of the financial development in an economy when allocating resources to
their best uses. In this section, we propose a micro-based measure that can potentially
capture the selective function of the financial system. We also show that in line with
the prediction of the model, size based measures and the proposed proxy behave non-
monotonically.
The model implies that economies characterized by high accuracy (ρ) are successful at
selecting projects ranked above the intended threshold (e ≥ e¯). Thus, among the enacted
projects there are only few that with extremely low probability will generate a high cost
reduction. This implies that the left tail of the realized ratio of value added to cost (prof-
itability) among entrants is thin. Therefore, more financially developed economies should
be characterized by low skewness in the profitability distribution of their incumbents.42
Data to generate this variable are obtained from Private Enterprise Survey conducted by
the WorldBank. This is an annual survey of about 135,000 firms in 135 countries that
focuses on the financial and private sectors. Cost is defined as sales minus electricity,
raw materials, and labor expenses. Value added is sales minus cost. Each observation of
skewness is weighted by the firm weights specified by the survey. For the relevance of
42The underlying assumption is that countries of interest have similar levels of ex-ante skewness across
the potential projects.
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using weights, see Garcia-Santana and Ramos (2013).
According to Proposition 6 for low entry rates more financial development (lower
skewness) should be associated with higher resources to firm entry, whereas the oppo-
site should hold for countries characterized by high entry rates. We build our size based
proxy to take into account the different entry costs across countries. In particular, we
divide domestic credit by the average entry cost faced by firms, it reflects the total num-
bers of firms that could be created if all the credit is used to finance start-ups. We call
this variable Credit to the Private Sector. Following our theoretical result we divide the
sample of countries into two groups: below and above median entry, and we evaluate the
relationship of the two measures.
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Figure 4: Financial Development and Private Credit
Figure 4 shows the results.43 Our finding confirms the theoretical argument. Finan-
cial development and private credit have indeed a non-monotonic relationship, and the
direction of it is governed by the level of entry rate, as suggested by our model. This
again shows why a researcher should be cautious when proxying the level of financial
soundness of an economy with measures that only reflect the size of funds available to
firms. Such proxies capture only one side of the impact of the financial development on
economic growth, yet miss another one: the selective role in allocating resources. Hence,
43Figure 18 in Appendix A.8 presents a version after removing the outliers. Results remain the same.
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variables that capture the selective margin of the financial system should complement
the empirical analysis of financial development. As a first candidate, we propose the
skewness of the ratio of value added to cost observed in the economy.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced project heterogeneity and financial selection in an an-
alytically tractable way to the classical endogenous growth framework of Aghion and
Howitt (1992). A financial intermediary, with access to an imperfect screening device,
selects ex ante heterogeneous projects characterized by an idiosyncratic probability of
generating a drastic innovation. Following implementation of the projects, the model
also delivers an ex post heterogeneity, where two types of incumbents have different cost
advantages over their followers, and hence, earn more profits. The model has a unique in-
terior balanced growth path shaped by the Schumpeterian creative destruction generated
by new firms. The impact of creative destruction in this economy results from the inter-
action between the mass and the composition of the entrant cohort. The relative strength
of each margin crucially depends on the underlying scarcity of drastic ideas relatively to
the accuracy of the selection technology in the economy.
Two quantitative experiments illustrate the importance of including heterogeneity
and financial selection into the endogenous growth framework. First, since the marginal
entrant has a decreasing contribution to economic growth, changes in the entry rate are
not linearly mapped into the economic growth rate of the economy. Hence, this frame-
work can accommodate the strong negative relationship between entry rates and cor-
porate taxation without delivering a counterfactually strong negative effect of corporate
taxation on economic growth.
The second experiment addresses the widely-debated link between financial devel-
opment and economic growth. Two main lessons arise from this experiment. First, size-
38
based measures miss the selective role of financial system and therefore are not good
proxies for financial development. Hence, variables that capture the selection aspect
should complement empirical work that aim to assess the level of financial development.
As a first step, we suggest the skewness of the ratio of value added to cost across firms.
The idea is that as financial selection improves less extremely unproductive firms operate
in the market, reducing the bad tail of the value added to cost distribution. Second, the
effect of financial development in economic growth is extremely non-linear. In particular,
for a country with a high degree of financial development, a marginal increase in that
financial development leads to a greater increase in growth, relative to the change in firm
entry.
The next chapter extends this framework to study the growth effect of a credit crunch.
A stochastic version of this model is well suited for economic analysis even outside the
balanced growth path. Moreover, when using firm level data from Chile and the finan-
cial crisis triggered by the Russian sovereign default of 1998 as a natural experiment to
test the model, we observe a strong compositional component; in fact, cohorts born un-
der tighter credit conditions perform significantly better than cohorts arising under laxer
credit standards. We believe that this framework can be enriched and brought quanti-
tatively to data in order to perform policy analysis. For instance, changes in corporate
taxation, entry barriers or financial liberalization can be evaluated, even accounting for
the economic transition between the two balanced growth paths.
39
Chapter 2
Fewer but Better:
Sudden Stops, Firm Entry, and Finan-
cial Selection
This chapter is co-authored with Felipe E. Saffie.
Abstract
We combine the real business cycle small open economy framework with the endoge-
nous growth literature to study the productivity cost of a sudden stop. In this economy,
productivity growth is determined by successful implementation of business ideas, yet
the quality of ideas is heterogeneous and good ideas are scarce. A representative financial
intermediary screens and selects the most promising ideas, which gives rise to a trade-
off between mass (quantity) and composition (quality) in the entrant cohort. Chilean
plant-level data from the sudden stop triggered by the Russian sovereign default in 1998
confirms the main mechanism of the model, as firms born during the credit shortage are
fewer, but better. A calibrated version of the economy shows the importance of accounting
for heterogeneity and selection, as otherwise the permanent loss of output generated by
the forgone entrants doubles, which increases the welfare cost by 30%.
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2.1 Introduction
In August 1998, the Russian sovereign default triggered a violent sudden stop in the
developing world.1 Interest rate spreads for the seven biggest Latin American economies
tripled in the weeks after this crisis, decreasing the availability of external funding by
40% between 1998 and 2002. Most of the economic analysis of these crises of interest
rate spreads is centered on the short-run detrimental effects that they imposed on the
real economy. Nevertheless, the empirical studies of large economic downturns by Cerra
and Saxena (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) have documented persistent output
losses associated with large economic downturns, pointing to permanent losses in total
factor productivity. Because firm entry is an important driver of productivity growth,
and because start-ups are in need of external funding, distortions in firm entry are likely
to cause part of this long-run cost. This paper develops a framework that links short-run
financial crises with long-run output losses through distortions in firm entry.
Two aspects are key for a meaningful study of the entry margin. First, behind every
firm lies an entrepreneur’s idea, and ideas are not born alike. In fact, drastic innovations
are a scarce resource. Second the financial system does not allocate funding randomly,
and not every idea has the same chance of being granted an opportunity. Not surprisingly,
when resources are scarce, banks adopt higher lending standards, and fund only the most
promising projects. The main novelty of this study is the recognition that the scarcity of
good ideas and the presence of financial selection induces a trade-off between the size
of the entrant cohort and the average contribution of each firm within that cohort to
aggregate productivity. Consistent with this intuition, we use micro-data to document
that firms born during a sudden stop are fewer, but better. Failure to consider this trade-off
would imply that discarded projects are just as productive as actual entrants, magnifying
1A sudden stop in capital flows is a large and abrupt decrease in capital inflows, characterized by jumps
in sovereign spreads and quick reversals of current accounts deficits. See Calvo and Talvi (2005) for details
of that episode.
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the productivity cost of a crisis, and potentially misleading public policy. Thus, the ability
of the financial system to allocate resources between heterogeneous projects needs to be
taken into account when facing the main question of this paper: what is the productivity
cost of the forgone entry during a sudden stop?
In order to answer this question, we generalize the real business cycle small open
economymodel of Neumeyer and Perri (2005) to include entry-driven endogenous growth
in the tradition of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).2 We
extend this hybrid framework in two dimensions. First, we model business plan hetero-
geneity and scarcity by introducing a financial intermediary with a portfolio of business
plans that can generate either a drastic or a marginal productivity improvement in the
production technology of an intermediate variety. Every project is characterized by its
idiosyncratic probability distribution over those two improvements. Hence, projects are
ex-post heterogeneous in terms of the productivity advantage that they enjoy after entering
the industry, and they are also ex-ante heterogeneous with respect to their idiosyncratic
probability of generating a drastic innovation. Moreover, because only a few ideas are
highly likely to give birth to outstanding incumbents, promising projects are scarce. The
second extension introduces financial selection. In fact, the financial intermediary can-
not unveil the ex-ante heterogeneity of the projects in her portfolio but she can observe
noisy signals of their potential. The optimal allocation of funding follows a cut-off rule
based on the signal, which introduces a linkage between the size of the entrant cohort
and the average efficiency gain generated by its members. The strength of this link and
its implications for entry and productivity are determined by the accuracy of the screen-
ing device of the financial system. The financial intermediary borrows at the stochastic
interest rate to finance start-ups. Therefore, interest rate shocks trigger entry and produc-
tivity dynamics that are absent in a traditional open economy framework. The model has
a unique non-stochastic interior balanced growth path that allows for quantitative solu-
2This combination renders endogenous the trend distortions that Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) use to
explain business cycles in small open economies.
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tions of the stochastic dynamic equilibrium. In the model economy, a mass/composition
trade-off (that is, a quantity/quality trade-off) arises at the cohort level: periods of high
interest rates are characterized by high credit standards that give rise to smaller cohorts
with higher expected average productivity.
The empirical section studies the Chilean sudden stop of 1998-2000 to validate the
trade-off between mass and composition at the core of the model. We focus on Chile for
three reasons: (i) it is a small open economy; (ii) plant level data for Chilean manufactur-
ing firms is publicly available, and this data allows us to directly study entrant cohorts;
and (iii) as argued by Calvo et al. (2006), the sudden stop after the Russian sovereign de-
fault is mainly exogenous to the Chilean economy. We show that firm entry in Chile from
1996 to 2007 decreased by 40% during the sudden stop, even at the three digit industry
level. However, firms born in crisis are not just fewer, they are also better. In fact, the
econometric analysis in Section 2.4 shows that, after controlling by individual character-
istics, firms born during normal times are on average 30% less profitable during their life
span than firms born during the sudden stop.
In the quantitative section of the paper, we calibrate the model to the Chilean econ-
omy between 1996 and 2007. We then use the Chilean sudden stop to assess the perfor-
mance of the model, fitting the real interest rate faced by the country during this episode.
This stylized model with a single shock is able to capture more than 40% of the decrease
in firm entry, 20% of the conditional increase in profitability, and one-third of the ob-
served decrease in firms’ values. After validating the model, we introduce two modified
economies in order to assess the role of heterogeneity and selection in shaping the effect
of a sudden stop: one is a model with exogenous growth, and the other is a model with
endogenous growth but no heterogeneity. We use those alternative economies to high-
light the role of firm entry and financial selection when the economy is hit by a shock
that increases the interest rate.
Three important features arise from the comparisons of these models. First, distor-
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tions in the entry margin trigger permanent losses in output in the models with endoge-
nous technological change. The composition margin shapes the long-run cost of these
short-run crises. In fact, the model with no heterogeneity predicts a permanent loss in
output two times larger than the one predicted by the baseline model, implying a 30%
larger welfare cost, in consumption equivalent terms. This is a large economic magni-
tude that can bias public policy during a crisis toward entry subsidies or indiscriminate
government lending. Second, including endogenous technological progress amplifies the
medium-run effects of a crisis. For instance, the baseline model amplifies the effects of a
sudden stop in output by 30%, compared to the model with exogenous growth. Third,
including heterogeneity among intermediate goods producers triggers compositional dy-
namics that increase the medium-run persistence of these episodes. A final experiment
studies the importance of the allocative function of the financial system during these
crises. More developed economies suffer more in the short run but endure much better
the medium-run effects of the crisis. Moreover, they are subject to a lower permanent
productivity loss. The calibrated model also suggests that the benefits of financial devel-
opment are decreasing in the level of financial development.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related literature.
Section 2.3 introduces our model and characterizes the existence and uniqueness of an
interior balanced growth path. Section 2.4 presents the analysis of the Chilean economy
as a pseudo natural experiment for the model, exploring at the macro and micro level
the consequences of the sudden stop for the Chilean economy. Section 2.5 presents the
calibration of the model and the quantification of the long-run cost of a sudden stop.
Finally, Section 2.6 concludes the paper and suggests avenues for future research.
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2.2 Related Literature
This paper belongs to the intersection between the endogenous growth and the small
open economy literature.3 This is not the only paper introducing endogenous growth into
the small open economy real business cycle framework of Mendoza (1991). For example,
Queraltó (2013) studies the long-lasting productivity effects of a financial crisis; in his
model an interest rate shock triggers a balance sheet channel, which harms the processes
of invention and implementation. Ergo, fewer firms enter the market and fewer ideas are
developed for future use. The endogenous growth model at the core of that paper is the
framework that Comin and Gertler (2006) build around Romer (1990). Guerrón-Quintana
and Jinnai (2014) use a similar framework to study the effect of the liquidity crash in 2008-
2009 on U.S. economic growth. Gornemann (2014) combines the endogenous default
model of Mendoza and Yue (2012) with the variety model of Romer (1990) to study
how endogenous growth affects the decision of the sovereign to default. Because default
increases the price of imported intermediate goods in his model, it decreases the expected
profits of potential entrants, and, hence, depresses productivity growth.
This paper makes three contributions to the existing research. First, by introducing
endogenous growth as in Aghion and Howitt (1992) instead of Romer (1990), it recog-
nizes the dual effect of firm entry: new comers are also a destructive force that replaces
incumbents. Second, it develops a tractable framework to include heterogeneity in this
class of models. This dimension has proven to be key in separately analyzing, the short-
run and the long-run behavior of an economy. In fact, as noted by Bilbiie et al. (2012),
firm heterogeneity significantly affects the short-run fluctuations of an economy. More-
over, the quantitative literature on innovation also shows that firm heterogeneity is crucial
for understanding the long-run effects of technology adoption. A salient example of the
latter can be found in Akcigit and Kerr (2010). Therefore, including heterogeneity when
3Obstfeld (1994) studying the growth effect of international risk sharing is one of the first papers at this
edge.
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studying the link between short-run fluctuations and long-run productivity is a natural
extension and an important element to consider. The third contribution is the use of firm
level data to provide evidence of the main driving force in the model and bring discipline
to the quantitative experiment. This class of models, where the main driving force is
micro-funded, should be compared not only to macro aggregates, but also to firm level
data. This paper is a step in that direction, but much remains to be done in linking micro
data to macro models. This paper is therefore related to the empirical literature that uses
firm level data to study financial crises. Two papers in that literature are particularly
related to our study. Firstly, Schnabl (2012) uses the sudden stop triggered by the Russian
default to document how international banks reduced lending to Peruvian banks, and
how Peruvian banks diminished lending to Peruvian firms during the crisis. Secondly,
Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers (2013) evaluate the effects of recessions using firm level
data from Indonesia during the Asian crisis of 1997. They do not find conclusive evi-
dence of better reallocation among incumbents. In line with our findings, they do find
an increase in the contribution of the entry margin to aggregate productivity during the
crisis.
2.3 A Stochastic Open Economy Model with Entry and Selection
In this section, we introduce a tractable endogenous growth model with heterogene-
ity and financial selection, for a small open economy, subject to exogenous interest rate
shocks. Aggregate productivity in this economy is modeled in the Grossman and Help-
man (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) tradition.4 This means that we follow a Schum-
peterian concept of growth, where new firms (entrants) replace established firms (incum-
bents). In particular, because new intermediate goods producers are more productive
than incumbents, Bertrand monopolistic competition implies that the newcomer sets a
4A detailed review of this literature can be found in Aghion et al. (2014).
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price that forces the old incumbent out of the market.5 In order to study the role of finan-
cial selection in firm entry and productivity during a sudden stop, three main innovations
are added into this traditional endogenous growth framework.
The first variation introduces ex-ante and ex-post heterogeneity in productivity im-
provements. A representative financial intermediary owns business plans (projects or
potential firms) that can generate either a high (H) productivity improvement (step size)
or a low (L) improvement in the technology for producing a particular variety of an inter-
mediate good. Every project is characterized by its idiosyncratic probability distribution
over those two outcomes. Hence, projects are ex-post heterogeneous in terms of the pro-
ductivity advantage that they enjoy after entering the business ({H, L}), and they are
also ex-ante heterogeneous with respect to the idiosyncratic probability of generating a
drastic innovation (PH ∈ (0, 1)). This first ingredient allows us to model the underlying
scarcity of the economy, where only few ideas are very likely to give birth to outstanding
incumbents.
The second addition to the framework introduces an imperfect screening device to the
model. The financial intermediary cannot unveil the ex-ante heterogeneity of its projects,
but it can observe noisy signals of their potential. The optimal allocation of funding
follows a cut-off rule based on the signal. This ingredient introduces a linkage between
the size of the entrant cohort and the average efficiency gain generated by its members.
In fact, periods of laxer credit standards (low cut-off) are characterized by a larger cohort
and lower average step sizes. The strength of this link and its implications for entry
and productivity are determined by the accuracy of the screening device of the financial
system.
Finally, the third modification follows the framework of Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
to introduce exogenous interest rate shocks into the model. This feature introduces eco-
5Bartelsman et al. (2009) use cross-country firm level data to quantify the importance of the entry margin
for productivity growth. Its direct effect ranges from 20% to 40%.
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nomic dynamics into an otherwise deterministic model. Note that, because the financial
intermediary borrows at the stochastic interest rate to finance start-up businesses, interest
rate shocks trigger entry and productivity dynamics that are absent in a traditional open
economy framework. The next sub-section introduces the model, defines an equilibrium
for this economy and proves the existence and uniqueness of an interior balanced growth
path (BGP).
2.3.1 Final Good Producer
Time is discrete in this economy. We denote a history (s0, s1, ..., st) by st, where st
contains all the relevant past information that agents need to make decisions in period t.
For instance, Y(st) is the output at period t under history st, but, because capital used in
production at time t is decided at t− 1, we index it by st−1. There is a representative final
good producer that combines intermediate inputs
(
{
Xj(st)
}
j∈[0,1]), indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], with capital (K(st−1)), to produce the only final
good of this economy (Y(st)). The constant return to scale production function is given
by:
lnY(st) = α
∫ 1
0
lnXj(s
t)dj+ (1− α) lnK(st−1). (2.1)
Equation (2.1) is an extension of a standard unit elastic production function, where α
determines the production share of intermediate varieties. Production is subject to a
working capital constraint. In particular, the final good producer needs to hold a pro-
portion η > 0 of the intermediate goods bill before production takes place. To do so, she
borrows at the interest rate at the beginning of the period and pays back just after produc-
tion takes place.6 Uribe and Yue (2006) show that this constraint can be summarized as a
wedge in the cost of the input when interest rates are positive. In particular, given input
6This is a standard modeling assumption in the open economy literature. It is mostly used to amplify
interest rate shocks using a labor channel. The main mechanism of the model does not need this feature; in
fact, as Appendix B.6 shows, the long-run effect of this channel is negligible. We include it only to compare
the baseline model with a standard open economy model with exogenous growth.
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prices (pj(st)), interest rate (R(st)− 1), and utilization cost of capital (r(st)), the final good
producer demands intermediate goods and capital in every period in order to solve:
max
{Xj(st)}j∈[0,1],K(st−1)

Y(st)−

1+ η(R(st)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost wedge

 ∫ 1
0
Xj(st)pj(st)dj− K(st−1)r(st)

 (2.2)
where the final good price is used as the numeraire. An interior solution to (2.2) is charac-
terized by the following set of first order conditions:
Xj(st) =
αY(st)
pj(st) (1+ η(R(st)− 1)) ∀j , (2.3)
K(st−1) =
(1− α)Y(st)
r(st)
. (2.4)
Both demands are unit elastic; in particular, a monopolist facing the demand in equation
(2.3) would choose pj(st) → ∞ and hence Xj(st) → 0. Only the existence of a potential
competitor can force the intermediate producer to set a finite price.
2.3.2 Intermediate Goods Sector: Ex-post Heterogeneity
There is a continuum of incumbents, each producing a differentiated intermediate
good indexed by j. Labor (Lj(st)) is the only input used in intermediate production
and the technology has constant marginal productivity (qj(st)). Thus, the production of
variety j is given by:
Xj(s
t) = Lj(s
t)qj(s
t). (2.5)
The efficiency of labor (qj(st)) in the production of intermediate goods evolves with each
technological improvement generated by a successful entrant. Entrants are heterogeneous
in their capacity to improve the existing technology. Drastic innovations (type H) improve
the efficiency level by a factor of 1+ σH, while marginal innovations (type L) generate
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improvements with a smaller factor of 1 + σL, where σH > σL > 0.7 Innovations in
this economy come exclusively from newcomers. Then, we define the indicator functions
Idj (s
t−1, st), taking the value 1 if product line j receives an entrant of type d ∈ {L,H} under
st = (st−1, st), and 0 otherwise. We can summarize the evolution of the productivity of
the most efficient firm in product line j as follows:
qj(s
t) =
[
1+ IHj (s
t−1, st)× σH + ILj (st−1, st)× σL
]
× qj(st−1). (2.6)
Hence, productivity in product line j remains unchanged in the next period if, and only
if, no entry takes place in that product line; in that case, the last period’s incumbent
continues to dominate the product line.
In line with the endogenous growth literature, we assume Bertrand monopolistic
competition in each product line. In order to understand how this framework allows
us to abstract from the distribution of productivity along product lines, we solve the
partial equilibrium problem of the intermediate good producer before continuing with the
exposition of the model. This monopolistic competition set-up implies that the competitor
with the lowest marginal cost dominates the market by following a limit pricing rule, i.e.,
she sets her price (pj(st)) at the marginal cost of the closest follower. We denote the
efficiency level of the closest follower by q˜j(st). Then, given wage (W(st)), the optimal
price is set to:
pj(st) =
W(st)
q˜j(st)
. (2.7)
Note that (2.6) implies that a leader with type d has productivity qj(st) = (1+ σd) ×
q˜j(st). Then, using the demand for varieties of the final good producer from (2.3), we
derive the following expression for the profits (Πdj (s
t)) of the leader in product line j with
7We allow for only two types in order to summarize the composition of the product line with only one
variable: the fraction of leaders with σH advantage.
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productivity advantage d:
Πdj (s
t) = Xj(s
t)
(
pj(s
t)− W(s
t)
qj(st)
)
=
ασd
(1+ σd) (1+ η(R(st)− 1))Y(s
t). (2.8)
Note that profits are independent of the product line, because the type of the current
leader is the only relevant characteristic of product line j. Moreover, type H leaders
enjoy higher profits than type L leaders in every period. Profits are subject to corporate
taxation rate (τ). The value of the firm is determined by the present discounted value of
its after-tax profits in the current period. Nevertheless, in the next period, the firm will
continue to produce if, and only if, it is not replaced by a new leader. In fact, at time
t+ 1, when a mass M(st, st+1) ∈ (0, 1] of projects is funded, a portion 0 < λ < 1 of them
will randomly enter the intermediate sector; at that time, every incumbent firm faces a
time-variant survival probability of 1− λM(st, st+1). Finally, using the stochastic discount
factor of the representative household (m(st, st+1)), the expected discounted value Vd(st)
of owning any product line j of a type d leader at time t can be defined recursively by:8
Vd(st) = (1− τ)Πd(st) + E

m(st, st+1) (1− λM(st, st+1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
survival probability
Vd(st, st+1)|st

 (2.9)
where E
[•|st] denotes the conditional expectation over every possible st+1 event after
history st. Note that ex-post firm heterogeneity can be summarized by d ∈ {L,H}, since
every type d leader charges the same price, hires the same number of workers, and earns
the same profits. Therefore, we do not need to keep track of the distribution of labor
productivity across product lines; we can instead summarize the relevant information
of the intermediate sector by the fraction of leaders with step size H, namely, the time-
variant fraction µ(st) ∈ [0, 1].
8See 2.3.5 for the characterization of m(st, st+1).
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2.3.3 Projects: Ex-ante Heterogeneity
There is a financial intermediary that owns a continuum of projects indexed by z and
uniformly spread on the unit interval (z ∈ [0, 1]). The fixed cost of starting (enacting) a
project is κ units of labor.9 After a successful beginning, a project materializes into a new
firm generating an undirected innovation. One of the key novelties in this model is the
way heterogeneity and scarcity are introduced, in particular, how the ex-ante heterogene-
ity in projects is related to the ex-post heterogeneity of incumbents.10
Projects are heterogeneous in their expected step size; every project has an unobserv-
able idiosyncratic probability PH(z) = zν (ν > 0) of generating a drastic improvement in
productivity characterized by step size σH > σL. The higher the index z, the more likely
it is that project z will generate a drastic (type-H) innovation, and, hence, the higher the
expected increase in productivity. In this sense, z is more than an index; it is a ranking
among projects based on their idiosyncratic and unobservable PH(z). Note that ν governs
the scarcity of good ideas in this economy. In fact, the implied probability distribution of
PH is given by:
f (PH) =
1
ν
(
1
PH
)1− 1ν
.
The mean of this distribution reflects the expected proportion of type H entrants when
projects are enacted randomly. In fact, for any M(st), random selection implies that, for
all z, prob(z ∈ M) = M. Therefore, the fraction of high-type improvements (µ˜) when
enacting a set of projects randomly is given by:
µ˜ =
1
λM
∫ 1
0
λ× prob(z ∈ M)× PH (z) dz =
∫ 1
0
PH f (PH)dPH =
1
ν+ 1
9As Klenow et al. (2013) show, cross country industry level data suggests that entry cost is mostly
associated with labor. The main mechanism of the model would not change if the entry cost were instead
denominated in final goods units.
10For the heterogeneity and scarcity of ideas, see the high skewness in firm level related variables. See,
for instance, Scherer (1998) and Silverberg and Verspagen (2007).
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As an example, if ν = 3, then the expected proportion of type H projects in the portfolio
of the financial intermediary is 25%. Therefore, if a mass of M(st) of projects is enacted
randomly, a quarter of the λM(st) entrants generate a step size σH. Moreover, we can
characterize the skewness of f (PH) as follows:
S(ν) =
2(ν− 1)√1+ 2ν
1+ 3ν
Note that the skewness is fully determined by ν, and is positive and increasing for every
ν > 1. Intuitively, note that ν = 1 implies a uniform distribution for f (PH); hence,
S(1) = 0 because the distribution is symmetric. However, for ν > 1, the skewness is
strictly positive, indicating that the left tail concentrates most of the probability density.
This means that only a few ideas have strong chances of generating drastic improvements
in productivity. Thus, ν summarizes the underlying scarcity of good ideas in the economy.
2.3.4 The Representative Financial Intermediary: Selection
In this economy, projects are heterogeneous and good ideas are scarce. Therefore, as
the ranking z is unobservable, project selection is not a trivial task.11 We thus introduce a
screening device in order to study the effects of financial selection.
The representative financial intermediary has access to a unit mass of projects in every
period. It borrows funds and selects projects in which to invest according to the expected
present value of the projects, and pays back the profits generated by its portfolio to the
household every period.12 Note that, because VH(st) > VL(st), the financial intermediary
strictly prefers to enact projects with higher z. In particular, if z were observable, a
11For empirical studies documenting financial selection, see, for instance Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) and
Jiménez et al. (2014). Alfaro et al. (2004) document that more developed financial system can better material-
ize Foreign Direct Investment into economic growth. Moreover, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Chan-Lau and
Chen (2002), and Agénor et al. (2004), study how lending standards vary with macroeconomic conditions.
12Alternatively, we can assume that the representative household owns the projects but does not have
access to any screening technology. Hence, in equilibrium, it sells the projects to the representative financial
intermediary at the expected profits net of financing costs, and the financial intermediary earns no profits.
A similar motivation is used by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2014).
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financial intermediary willing to finance M(st) projects would enact only the projects
with z ∈ [1−M(st), 1]. However, z is unobservable. In order to introduce selection, we
define a costless, yet imperfect, screening technology that delivers the following stochastic
signal z˜ of the underlying ranking z:
z˜ =


z˜ = z with probability ρ
z˜ ∼ U [0, 1] with probability 1− ρ.
The financial intermediary can observe the true ranking of the project with probability
ρ ∈ [0, 1]; otherwise, the ranking of the signal is drawn uniformly from the unit interval.
Intuitively, ρ characterizes the accuracy of the screening, with ρ = 1 implying the perfect
screening case.13
Proposition 7. The optimal strategy for a financial intermediary financing M(st) projects at time
t is to set a cut-off z¯(st) = 1−M(st), and to enact projects only with signal z˜ ≥ z¯(st).
Proposition 7 shows that the optimal strategy is to set a cut-off for the signal.14 When
the financial intermediary uses this technology optimally to select a mass M(st) = 1−
z¯(st) of projects, the proportion µ˜(z¯(st)) of high type projects in the successfully enacted
λM(st) mass is given by:
µ˜(z¯(st)) =
1
λM(st)
∫ 1
0
λ× prob(z˜ ≥ z¯(st)|z)× PH (z) dz
=
1
ν+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ˜
×
[
1− ρ+ ρ1−
(
z¯(st)
)ν+1
1− z¯(st)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
. (2.10)
Note that, for any cut-off (z¯(st)), the composition of H-types (µ˜(z¯(st))) increases with the
level of accuracy (ρ) and decreases with the scarcity of high type projects (ν). Moreover,
in terms of the resulting composition, financial selection performs at least as well as
13For instance, the battery of questions and procedures that commercial banks use to discriminate among
borrowers is sometimes truly informative about the potential of the projects, but false positives and false
negatives also happen.
14As the expected value is strictly increasing in the signal, and the enacting cost is fixed, the cut-off
strategy is optimal and unique.
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random selection does. Because screening is costless, the financial intermediary will
always use its device to select projects. Then, the financial intermediary borrows exactly
W(st)M(st)κ in order to enact M(st) = 1− z¯(st) projects every period. In particular, given{
VH(st), VL(st), R(st), W(st)
}
, the financial intermediary chooses z¯(st) in order to solve:
max
z¯(st)∈(0,1)

λ(1− z¯(st))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cohort’s mass

µ˜(z¯(st))VH(st) + (1− µ˜(z¯(st)))VL(st)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cohort’s expected value

− (1− z¯(st))R(st)W(st)κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total cost of enaction

 .
(2.11)
The bracketed term is the expected return of the portfolio with composition µ˜
(
z¯(st)
)
. The
intermediary needs to pay back the borrowed amount plus the interest. Because the ob-
jective function is strictly concave, the first order conditions are sufficient for optimality.15
As equation (2.10) shows, a financial intermediary with ρ > 0 faces a trade-off between
mass and composition of the enacted pool: lower z¯t(st) increases the mass of projects en-
acted, but it also decreases the average value of the entrant cohort. If an interior solution
(z¯(st) ∈ (0, 1)) exists, it is unique and characterized by:
z¯t(st) =

 W(st)κλ R(st)− [ 11+νVH(st) + ν1+νVL(st)]
ρ(VH(st)−VL(st)) +
1
ν+ 1


1
ν
. (2.12)
Note that, from a partial equilibrium perspective, for ρ > 0 the cut-off (z¯t(st)) increases
with the interest rate. Nevertheless, from a general equilibrium perspective, the interest
rate also affects the intermediary’s choice of cut-off through wages and values.16 Finally,
using the mass (λ(1− z¯(st)) and composition (µ˜(st)) of the entrant cohort, we derive the
law of motion of the composition of incumbents in the intermediate sector (µ(st)). In fact,
as entry is undirected, the evolution of the composition among incumbents is given by:
µ(st) = µ(st−1) + λ
[
1− z¯(st)] [µ˜(z¯(st))− µ(st−1)] . (2.13)
15The second derivative is given by −ρν(ν+ 1) [VH(st)−VL(st)] (z¯(st))ν−1 < 0.
16Random selection (ρ = 0) boils down to a zero profit condition with constant composition µ˜, with the
intermediary either at a corner, or indifferent between any cut-off.
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Note that, given last period’s composition, and the value of this period’s cut-off, we can
pin down this period’s composition.
2.3.5 The Representative Household
There is a representative consumer in this economy, and it is modeled following the
open economy literature that builds on Mendoza (1991). In particular, as in Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006), we include both capital adjustment costs and
a bond holding cost. Capital adjustment costs are very popular in the business cycle
literature, and they become particularly important in an open economy set-up with an
exogenous interest rate. Without them, moderate fluctuations in the interest rate can gen-
erate implausible variations in investment. Bond holding costs are even more important
in this literature because a fundamental indeterminacy arises between consumption and
bond holdings.17 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) discuss several alternatives to solve this
issue, and show that every method delivers the same quantitative results. From an eco-
nomic perspective, bond holding costs can be thought to capture legal and bureaucratic
issues related to levels of debt that differ from their usual long-run level.18 In particu-
lar, the household chooses state-contingent sequences of consumption C(st), labor L(st),
bond holding B(st), and investment I(st), given sequences of interest rate R(st), wages
W(st), capital rental rates r(st), and initial bond and capital positions, in order to solve:
max
{B(st) ,C(st), L(st) , I(st)}∞t=0
∞
∑
t=0
βtE
[
u(C(st), L(st))|s0
]
(2.14)
17In a nutshell, because the interest rate is completely inelastic with respect to the demand for bonds,
consumption shows excessive smoothing and its level cannot be pinned down independently of the amount
of bond holdings. This becomes critical in a dynamic setting as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
bond holding decision exhibits a unit root. Then, in the absence of bond holding costs, when a shock hits
the economy, the level of debt never returns to its stationary value.
18Strong precautionary motives can alter this conclusion. Nevertheless, in this set-up, precautionary
savings are very limited because there is no borrowing constraint.
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subject to:
C(st) ≤W(st)L(st) + r(st)K(st−1) + B(st−1)R(st−1) + T(st) + Π(st)− I(st)− B(st)−Ψ(•)
(2.15)
I(st) = K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1) + Φ(•). (2.16)
where E [•|s0] is the expectation over history st, conditional on the information at t = 0;
0 < β < 1 is the constant discount factor; investment is subject to convex adjustment costs
Φ(•); and bond holdings are subject to the convex cost function Ψ(•). The household also
receives the profits of the financial intermediary Π(st), as well as the revenue generated by
corporate taxation T(st), which the government levies on intermediate firms. As shown in
the sequences of budget constraints defined by equation (2.15), the price of consumption
is set to unity because we use the final good as the numeraire. The program also requires
the transversality conditions on capital and bond holdings.
Following Neumeyer and Perri (2005), we modify Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences
(GHH) to allow for a balanced growth path equilibrium. However, in our set-up, because
aggregate labor productivity (A(st)) grows at an endogenous rate, the scaling is time-
variant.19 We also take from them the functional forms for Ψ and Φ:
u(C(st), L(st)) =
1
1− γ
(
C(st)−ΘlA(st)
(
L(st)
)χ)1−γ
(2.17)
Ψ(B(st),Y(st)) =
ψ
2
Y(st)
(
B(st)
Y(st)
− b¯
)2
(2.18)
Φ(K(st−1),K(st)) =
φ
2
K(st−1)
[
K(st)
K(st−1)
− (1+ gbgp)
]2
. (2.19)
where Θl > 0 is the labor weight, χ > 1 determines the Frisch elasticity of labor
(
1
χ−1
)
,
19The usual economic intuition used to justify the scaling of labor dis-utility by labor productivity is that
the opportunity cost of labor consists mostly of home production. Therefore, if non-market labor productivity
grows at the same rate as market labor productivity, the dis-utility of labor must be scaled by it. Benhabib
et al. (1991) study how home production shapes participation in the formal labor market, and how that
intuition can be modeled by the preferences used in this model.
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γ is the utility curvature, and φ > 0 and ψ > 0 determine the convex cost functions. Note
that, because b¯ is the long-run household debt-output ratio and gbgp the long-run growth
of the economy, the household pays neither adjustment nor bond holding costs along the
balanced growth path. In order to characterize the interior first order conditions of this
problem, we define the stochastic discount factor of the household (m(st, st+1)) as:
m(st, st+1) = β
∂u(C(st+1), L(st+1))
∂C(st+1)
∂u(C(st), L(st))
∂C(st)
where
∂u(C(st), L(st))
∂C(st)
=
(
C(st)−ΘlA(st)
(
L(st)
)χ)−γ
.
Then, the interior first order conditions can be stated as:
B(st) : 1+ ψ
(
B(st)
Y(st)
− b¯
)
= E
[
m(st, st+1)|st
]
R(st) (2.20)
K(st) : E

m(st, st+1)
r(st, st+1) + (1− δ)− φ2
([
1+ gbgp
]2 − [K(st,st+1)K(st) ]2
)
1+ φ
[
K(st)
K(st−1) −
(
1+ gbgp
)] |st

 = 1(2.21)
L(st) : W(st) = ΘlA(s
t)χ
(
L(st)
)χ−1 ⇒ L(st) = ( W(st)
ΘlA(st)χ
) 1
χ−1
. (2.22)
Note that, as equation (2.22) shows, if wage and aggregate productivity grow at the same
rate in the long-run, then labor supply is constant. Therefore, these preferences can
support a balanced growth path. Moreover, labor supply is independent of household
consumption due to the lack of an income effect on the labor decision; therefore, the
efficiency adjusted wage
(
W(st)
A(st)
)
is always positively correlated with the labor supply.
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2.3.6 Interest Rate Process and Open Economy Aggregates
In this small open economy, the interest rate is completely exogenous, and we use the
following AR(1) process to model it:20
ln
(
R(st)
R¯
)
= ρr ln
(
R(st−1)
R¯
)
+ σrǫt where ǫt
iid∼ N(0, 1), (2.23)
where R¯ is the long-run interest rate in the economy. We can easily define net exports as
the difference between production and all its uses (i.e., consumption, investment, and the
bond holding cost):21
NX(st) = Y(st)− C(st)− I(st)−Ψ(B(st),Y(st)). (2.24)
We can also define the foreign debt of the country as the sum of the debt of the household,
the debt that the final good producer incurs in holding working capital, and the debt that
the financial intermediary holds in order to enact projects in every period.22
D(st) = B(st−1)−η αY(s
t)
1+ η(R(st)− 1) − (1− z¯(s
t))κW(st)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Working Capital and Project Enaction
. (2.25)
2.3.7 Total Factor Productivity and Growth
In the remainder of this section, we derive the expression for the total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) in this economy; we then define an equilibrium for the stationary version of
20Neumeyer and Perri (2005) use two uncorrelated autoregressive processes: one for the spread and one
for the international interest rate. Uribe and Yue (2006) use a VAR to estimate the determinants of the
domestic interest rate, and then feed it into their model. Neither procedure alters the qualitative behavior of
the model.
21Intermediate goods can be thought of as specialized labor, and hence as non-tradable goods.
22A country as an aggregate can only borrow at the domestic interest rate, because the rest of the world
is not subject to the same spread. Thus, an important point that must hold along the equilibrium path is that
the country should always be a net borrower (D(st) < 0), so that private savings should not be enough to
fund the domestic sector.
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the economy; and finally we state the existence and uniqueness of an interior balanced
growth path for the model.
We can re-write the production function from equation (2.1) using equation (2.5),
recognizing that intermediate labor depends only on the step size of the incumbent.
Y(st) =
(
A(st)
)α︸ ︷︷ ︸
TFP
[(
LH(st)
)µ(st) (
LL(st)
)1−µ(st)]α (
K(st−1)
)1−α
(2.26)
where A(st) is defined as:
ln(A(st)) ≡
∫ 1
0
ln qj(st)dj.
The TFP in this economy is endogenous and we can characterize it using the evolution of
firm level labor productivity in equation (2.6), together with the entry rate of the economy.
In particular, the following expression for TFP growth explicitly accounts for both mass
and composition of the entrant cohort:
ln
(
A(st)
A(st−1)
)
=
∫ 1
0
ln


(
1+ IHj (s
t−1, st)σH + ILj (s
t−1, st)σL
)
qj(st−1)
qj(st−1)

 dj
=
∫ 1
0
ln
(
1+ IHj (s
t−1, st)σH + ILj (s
t−1, st)σL
)
dj
= λ(1− z¯(st))
[
µ˜(st) ln
(
1+ σH
)
+ (1− µ˜(st)) ln
(
1+ σL
)]
. (2.27)
We get the following intuitive expression that characterizes TFP growth:
1+ a(st−1, st) =
A(st−1, st)
A(st−1)
=
[(
1+ σH
)µ˜(st) (
1+ σL
)1−µ˜(st)]λ(1−z¯(st))
.
Note that TFP growth boils down to a scaled geometric weighted average of the step
sizes, where the weights are given by the fraction of each type in the entrant cohort
(composition) and the scale is given by the size of the cohort (mass). This highlights once
again the interplay between mass and composition effects in the determination of the
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productivity growth of this economy.
2.3.8 Stationary System and Definitions
In order to render the model stationary, we adopt the following convention: any
lower case variable represents the TFP scaled version of its upper case counterpart; for
instance, the stationary transformation of output is given by y(st) = Y(s
t)
A(st) . This transfor-
mation is performed for consumption, bond holdings, capital, wages, intermediate goods
production, investment, and output.23 With this transformation, we define a stationary
competitive equilibrium for this economy:
Definition 3. A competitive equilibrium for this small open economy, given an initial efficiency
level qj(0) for every product line, an initial fraction of type H incumbents, and initial levels of
bond holding and capital for the household is given by:
1. Household optimally chooses
{
c(st) , b(st) , k(st) , L(st)
}
given prices to solve (2.14) sub-
ject to (2.15) and (2.16).
2. Final good producer optimally chooses
{{
xj(st)
}
j∈[0,1] , k(s
t−1)
}
given prices to solve (2.2).
3. Intermediate good producers optimally choose
{
pj(st), Lj(st)
}
j∈[0,1] given wages and their
type following the pricing rule in (2.7).
4. Financial intermediary optimally chooses
{
z¯(st)
}
given values and prices in order to maxi-
mize (2.11).
5. Government budget is balanced in every period.
6. Capital markets clear in every history, and intermediate good markets clear in every history
and product line.
23Appendix B.1 derives the normalized system that characterizes the model, and provides a proof for the
Lemma 5.
61
7. Labor, asset, and final good markets clear in every history:
L(st) = µ˜(st)LH(st) + (1− µ˜(st))LL(st) + κ(1− z¯(st)) (2.28)
d(st) =
b(st−1)
1+ a(st−1, st)
− η αy(s
t)
1+ η(R(st)− 1) − (1− z¯(s
t))κw(st) (2.29)
nx(st) = y(st)− c(st)− i(st)− ψ(b(st)− b¯)2 (2.30)
8.
{
vj(st) , qj(st)
}
j∈[0,1] and µ(s
t) evolve according to (2.6), (2.9), and (2.13).
9. Transversality and non-negativity conditions are met.
We can also define a balanced growth path (BGP) for this economy as follows:
Definition 4. A BGP is a non-stochastic (σr = 0) equilibrium where
{
z¯(st)
}
is constant, and
consumption, bond holdings, capital, wages, intermediate goods production, investment, net ex-
ports, and output grow at a constant rate.
Appendix B.1 derives the BGP for this economy and shows that, as the long-run
growth is determined by the growth rate of productivity, every normalized endogenous
variable is constant. Moreover, that section also proves the following theorem:
Theorem 5. There is a well-defined parameter space where this economy has a unique interior
BGP (z¯ ∈ (0, 1)).
Theorem 5 is fundamental for the quantitative analysis in Section 2.5. In fact, it
allows us to use a perturbation method to solve the stochastic system that characterizes
this economy, centered on its unique BGP. Before exploring the quantitative implications
of the model, Section 2.4 uses plant level data from the Chilean sudden stop of 1998 to
provide empirical evidence of the mass-composition trade-off at the heart of the model.
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2.4 The Chilean Case: Fewer, but Better
This section explores Chilean microeconomic data to assess empirically the main
mechanism of the model, i.e., the existence of a mass-composition trade-off on the en-
try margin. We focus the analysis on Chile for three reasons. First, it is a small open
economy with detailed macroeconomic data. Second, the violent sudden stop triggered
by the Russian default provides the perfect natural experiment to test our mechanism.
Third, we have access to detailed plant level panel data that can be used to directly study
firm entry. We introduce first the firm level data set, and then we show that firms born in
crisis are not just fewer, they are also better.
2.4.1 The Sudden Stop
In August 1998, the Russian government declared a moratorium on its debt obliga-
tions to foreign creditors. This default triggered a sudden and radical increase in the
interest rates faced by emerging markets.24 Latin America was not an exception. Calvo
and Talvi (2005) present a detailed analysis of the impact of the Russian default on the
seven biggest economies of the region. One of the most successful economies of Latin
America, Chile, also suffered the consequences of the Russian default.25 The real interest
rate peaked in 1998:III, increasing by 5 percentage points in a quarter. The interest rate
spread, as reported by Calvo and Talvi (2005), increased from 120 basis points before
the crisis to 390 basis points in October 1998, triggering a 47% decrease in cumulative
external financial flows between 1998 and 2002. The macroeconomic consequences of a
sudden stop in emerging markets have been widely studied, but the effects of the firm
entry dynamics triggered by these episodes have not. From a Schumpeterian point of
view, those changes in entry are harmful even in the long-run, when the well-studied
24For a detailed time-line of the Russian default, see Chiodo and Owyang (2002).
25See Appendix B.2 for a general picture of the Chilean Economy and the macroeconomic effects of the
Sudden Stop.
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short-run effects are no more. In this section, while presenting empirical support for the
composition effect, we aim to contribute to the empirical research on the microeconomic
consequences of a sudden stop.
2.4.2 Mass and Composition during a Sudden Stop
There was no change in the domestic fundamentals of Chile that could have caused
or predicted an increase in the interest rate as sudden and substantial as the one observed
in the data. In fact, the average annualized real GDP growth of Chile between 1990:IV
and 1997:IV was 8.6%, its fiscal policy was steady and sober, and the monetary policy of
its autonomous Central Bank was not expansionary. Moreover, as argued by Calvo et al.
(2006), the generalized and synchronized nature of the increase in spreads charged in
emerging markets also points to an exogenous and common origin for this episode. Thus,
taking the Russian crisis as an exogenous shock, unrelated to Chilean fundamentals, and
completely unforeseen by firms and authorities, we perform a pseudo natural experiment
in order to test the main intuition of the model: cohorts born during the sudden stop
window should be smaller but more profitable.
Chile’s National Institute of Statistics (INE) performs a manufacturing census (ENIA)
every year, collecting plant level data from every unit with more than ten employees.26
The survey contains yearly plant information on sales, costs, value added, number of
workers, energy consumption, and other variables. For the empirical analysis in this
section, we use the information in the surveys between 1995 and 2007 to build a panel.27
We take the first appearance in the data as the entry year and the last appearance as the
26In 1996, 95% of firms in the survey were single plants.
27We restrict attention to this period because the questionnaire and the identification number of each firm
are practically invariant.
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exit date.28 The sample contains practically 4000 plants and 18, 000 observations.29
We first calculate entry rates at year t at the industry level for each cohort, dividing
the number of new plants in year t by the average of the total plants in years t and t− 1.
Table 18 in Appendix (B.3) presents two-year average entry rates for every industry in
the sample. Figure 5 plots two-year average entry rates by industry for the two years
preceding the crisis and the first two years of the sudden stop. Every industry below the
45o line decreased its two-year average entry rate during the crisis.
For all industries but two (355 (rubber based products) and 369 (other non-metallic
products)), the average entry rate in 1998− 99 is lower than in 1996− 97. Moreover, Table
18 shows that, for practically every industry, entry rates remain low until 2002− 03. Entry
dropped dramatically at the industry level during the Chilean sudden stop. In fact, the
28Note that a small firm might appear in the panel after passing the threshold of ten employees, and it
should not be counted as an entry. To minimize this issue, we focus on plants with more than eleven workers.
The results are also robust to a threshold of fifteen workers. Because of lack of entry in some industries, we
restrict our attention to 20 of the 29 industries. For example, the tobacco industry is characterized by only
1− 2 plants, and we observe a positive entry in only two years.
29Appendix (B.3) shows the details of the data construction, and a summary of the variables used in the
analysis grouped by clusters of cohorts (born before, during, and after the crisis).
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average percentage change in the entry rate is −40% between 1996− 97 and 1998− 99.
Although it is clear that fewer firms are born during the crisis, we still have to analyze
whether they are better. In this sense, we want to show that firms born during the sudden
stop are intrinsically more profitable. To capture the profitability of each plant every year,
we build the following measure:
Pi,t =
Revenuei,t − Costi,t
Revenuei,t
.
Define a firm that is one standard deviation above the mean profitability of its industry,
at its first year of life (second observation), as a superstar entrant. The two moments are
calculated using every plant operating in a given year.30 We estimate the probability of
being a superstar firm using the following logit specification:
Pr(Superstar = 1|age = 1) = e
x′iβ
1+ ex
′
iβ
and (2.31)
x′iβ = α+ αj + αr + β ln(Li,0) + γcohort + ui,t,
where αj is an industry control, αr is a geographical control, and Li,0 uses workers at entry
to control for size. The cohort coefficient indicates whether a firm was born during the
sudden stop window or another cohort specific characteristic. Table 3 presents the results
for five alternative regressions.
The first regression compares cohorts born during the crisis (1998-2000) against ev-
ery other cohort. Firms born during the crisis are statistically more likely to become
superstars in their industries. In fact, evaluating the regression at the mean for the most
populated region (central) and two-digit industry code (31), we find that the probability
of being a superstar is 21% for firms born during the episode, while the probability for
a firm born outside this window is 13.4%. The second specification shows that allowing
cohorts born before and after the episode to differ does not change the results. In line
30In particular, we do not drop the firms born before 1995 from the sample to calculate these moments.
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with the fewer but better hypothesis, the third specification shows that larger cohorts at the
industry level are associated with lower probability of being a superstar. The fourth and
fifth specifications show that the results do not change when the probability of being a
superstar is evaluated at the year of entry or two years after entering.31
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Superstar at age 1 Superstar at age 0 Superstar at age 2
Crisis Dummy 0.540∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗
(0.110) (0.0970) (0.135)
In Crisis 0.697∗∗∗
(0.134)
After Crisis 0.240∗
(0.126)
entryj,0 -1.575∗∗
(0.803)
ln(Li,0) 0.222∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗
(0.0527) (0.0526) (0.0521) (0.0436) (0.0605)
Ind. Control (αj) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
region Control (αr) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant (α) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3197 3197 3197 4220 2618
Standard errors in parentheses, bootstrapped (250)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Probability of a superstar firm
Although this exercise is suggestive, the prediction of the model is stronger. In fact, the
model predicts that firms born during crises are on average more profitable during their
entire life, even after controlling by after entry decisions. In this context, we must explore
both the continuous nature of the profitability variable and the panel dimension of the
data. In general, we would like to estimate the following equation:
Pi,t = α+ β1X1i,t + β2X
2
i,t + γ1Z
1
i + γ2Z
2
i + µi + ui,t (2.32)
31If a cohort dummy is introduced year by year, beside the three crisis years, only firms born in 2006 have
a significant coefficient (but of lower magnitude than the crisis years). Controlling by initial capital instead
of initial workers also does not change the results. Results are available upon request.
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where X1i,t represents exogenous time-varying variables (e.g., vacancy index of the econ-
omy), X2i,t refers to endogenous time-variant variables (e.g., number of workers), Z
1
i cor-
respond to exogenous time-invariant variables (e.g., region of the country), and Z2i are
endogenous time-invariant variables (e.g., workers in the entry year). Note that variables
with a superscript 2 are endogenous in the sense that they are likely to be correlated with
the unobserved fixed effect µi. The main challenge of this panel estimation is that the
variable of interest, being born in crisis, is not only time-invariant, but also endogenous.
On the one hand, coefficients on time-invariant variables can be consistently and effi-
ciently estimated by random effects regression, but the estimation is not consistent when
the variable is also endogenous. On the other hand, fixed effects panel regression can
consistently estimate every coefficient associated with the time-variant variables, but it
cannot identify the coefficients of the time-invariant variables. In this situation, the Haus-
man and Taylor (1981) procedure delivers consistent and efficient estimators for every
coefficient in equation (2.32).32
Table 4 presents the results for six different specifications. In the first four regressions,
the dependent variable is Pi,t. The only difference in the first three specifications is the
coefficient of interest. In the first regression, we use a single dummy to determine whether
the cohorts born in 1998 − 2000 perform better than every other cohort. In the second
regression, we use two dummies in order to allow a differential effect for cohorts pre and
post crisis. The third specification studies the effect of the three-digit industry entry rate
at the moment of entry. This means that it is a continuous variable common to every firm
in the same industry born in the same year and is also time-invariant. Note that all the
coefficients of interest are associated with time-invariant endogenous variables, because
better firms (with a higher observable fixed effect µi) are expected to enter in years of
32See Appendix B.3.5 for a succinct explanation. Intuitively, we can think that this procedure aims to
remove the endogenous component from the original regression in order to meet the main assumption
of random effects. More details on this method can be found in Wooldridge (2010), Chapter 11. STATA
software has built-in routines for both procedures; see Schaffer and Stillman (2011). After every estimation,
we perform the Sargan-Hansen test to assess the validity of the instrumental variables procedure at the core
of Hausman and Taylor (1981). The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid, so the higher the
p-value, the better.
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crisis. In the case of the third specification, when fewer firms enter, we expect them to be
better.
The fourth regression changes the initial size measurement from workers to capital; the
aim of this is to verify that the results are not driven by the initial collateral held by
the firm.33 The last two regressions focus on alternative measures of firm quality. In
particular, the fifth regression uses output per worker as a measure of labor productivity
and the sixth specification studies the propensity to accumulate physical capital.
We use as time-variant exogenous variables (X1i,t) four macroeconomic aggregates:
an index of manufacturing production, the unemployment rate, an index of wholesale
producer prices, and an index of the cost of labor.34 The coefficients associated with
these variables are stable across the profitability regressions. The signs of the significant
coefficients suggest that profitability is higher when production is high, labor costs are
low, and inflation in producer prices is also low. Note that the fifth specification suggests
that labor productivity increases in bad times. In particular, a high unemployment rate
is associated with higher labor productivity.35 There are four endogenous time-variant
variables (X2i,t),: electricity consumption, number of workers, capital stock, and the age of
the plant. The signs of the significant coefficients suggest that older firms and firms that
are increasing their capital stock are more profitable. Also note that the fifth and sixth
specifications point to a strong complementary relationship between labor and capital. We
use five geographic regions and two-digit industry controls as time-invariant exogenous
variables (Z1i ). Besides the coefficients of interest, we include the initial size of the plant,
specified as the initial number of workers or the initial capital holdings. In order to
control for competition at the moment of entry, we also include the Herfindahl-Hirschman
concentration index of the industry at the particular region in the year of entry among
the time-invariant endogenous variables (Z2i ). In line with the firm dynamic’s literature,
33In fact, it is plausible that firms with high collateral are more likely to enter during the crisis.
34Because this method relies on X1i,t to build instruments, and because they are all aggregated variables,
we cannot include year dummies, which are perfectly correlated with our instruments.
35This seems to point more to a cleansing rather than a sullying effect of recessions.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pi,t Pi,t Pi,t Pi,t log
Yi,t
Li,t
Ki,t−Ki,t−1
Ki,t
Crisis dummy 0.0877∗∗ 0.0814∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗ 0.0527∗∗
(0.0423) (0.0313) (0.136) (0.0233)
In Crisis 0.0861∗∗
(0.0397)
After Crisis 0.00952
(0.0241)
avg. Entryj,t0 -0.682
∗∗
(0.337)
log Manu. Prod.t 0.125∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0382) (0.0437) (0.113) (0.0471)
Unemp. Ratet 0.211 0.198 0.210 0.229 1.427∗∗∗ 0.0277
(0.147) (0.149) (0.148) (0.150) (0.428) (0.220)
log PPI/WPIt -0.871∗∗ -0.844∗∗ -0.873∗∗ -0.923∗∗ 4.11∗∗∗ 0.886
(0.0408) (0.409) (0.410) (0.453) (1.51) (0.584)
log Labor Costt -0.335∗∗ -0.360∗∗ -0.388∗∗ -0.288 -0.379 -0.266
(0.159) (0.166) (0.161) (0.182) (0.528) (0.231)
log Elec. Con.i,t -0.0804 -0.0786 -0.0732 -0.0891 5.90∗∗∗ -0.690∗∗
(0.256) (0.257) (0.257) (0.273) (0.865) (0.275)
log labori,t -0.113 -0.114 -0.113 -0.118 0.261∗∗∗
(0.0734) (0.0734) (0.0735) (0.0719) (0.0688)
log Capitali,t 0.669∗∗ 0.663∗∗ 0.661∗∗ 0.690∗∗ 3.40∗∗∗
(0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.283) (0.814)
log agei,t 0.103∗ 0.118∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.0799 -0.139 -0.507∗∗∗
(0.0550) (0.0668) (0.0542) (0.0501) (0.170) (0.0431)
HHIj,t0,r 0.451
∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.678 0.0432
(0.137) (0.148) (0.101) (0.0937) (0.524) (0.0713)
log labori,t0 0.453
∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(0.0971) (0.111) (0.0692)
log Capitali,t0 0.119
∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.119) (0.0177)
Ind. Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Relative effect at meansa −31.2% −31.3% − −28.4% −32.5% −29.2%
Sargan-Hansen (p) 0.4545 0.2333 0.1230 0.0476 0.0395 0.7702
Observations 16834 16834 16834 16371 15583 16388
Standard errors in parentheses (bootstrapped (250), clustered by firm)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
a No crisis prediction at means divided by crisis (or pre-crisis) prediction at means minus 1,
evaluated at the most populated region (central) and industry (31). For regression five, it is
the difference between the predictions.)
Table 4: Hausman and Taylor
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larger entrants are more profitable, more productive, and accumulate capital faster than
smaller entrants. Finally, firms that enter into more concentrated industries are more
profitable than firms facing more competition.
Back to our main question: are those fewer firms born in crisis better? The first spec-
ification shows that firms born in crisis are significantly more profitable than firms born
in normal times. In fact, after controlling for initial size, macroeconomic conditions, and
post-entry decisions, firms born during the sudden stop have, on average, a profitabil-
ity index 8.8 percentage points higher. This coefficient is robust to allowing post-crisis
cohorts to differ from before-crisis cohorts (specification 2) and is also robust when we
control for initial capital (specification 4). Table 4 also shows the relative effect evalu-
ated at the means, that is, the predicted profitability of a firm born during normal times
divided by the predicted profitability of a firm born during the crisis, minus one. The
baseline regressions suggest that, if we focus on a fictitious firm, setting every observable
at its mean and changing only the period of entry, we find that being born in normal
times implies 31% lower profitability.36 The third specification is more general in the
sense that it aims to directly unveil a mass-composition trade-off at the entry level. Al-
though the Sargan-Hansen test is barely 5%, the coefficient suggests that firms born in
smaller cohorts have a permanently positive effect in their profitability measure. In par-
ticular, every extra percentage point in entry decreases the profitability of the firm by
0.68%. Note that specifications five and six show that this result is robust to other perfor-
mance measures, as firms born during the crisis are permanently more productive and
more prone to capital accumulation.
One caveat related to post-entry selection can be added to the preceding results. If
firms born during crisis were more likely to die early, then those cohorts would seem
more profitable after that initial selection. Appendix B.4 estimates a proportional hazard
model in order to evaluate this concern. The main empirical question in the Appendix is
36The raw data in Appendix B.3 shows that firms born before the crisis have an average lifetime prof-
itability of 23%, while firms born during the crisis have an average lifetime profitability of 24%.
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whether firms born during the crisis window are more likely to exit. The answer is not
only negative, but, if anything, firms born during crisis have lower hazard rates in each
of their first six years of life. A second concern with the analysis might be due to the
nature of selection. In fact, one might think that those cohorts are better just because of
self-selection: when the interest rate is high, only good firms apply for credit. Although it
is likely that some self-selection arises during these episodes, the hypothesis of complete
self-selection is at odds with the real world. In fact, this argument implies that every firm
that applies for credit is granted a loan. This is clearly not true in the data.37
Summarizing, the Chilean sudden stop had strong macroeconomic consequences. At
the firm level, the effect is relatively more complex. Cohorts born during the crisis, and
in its aftermath, are 40% smaller; nevertheless, firms born in normal times are at least
30% less profitable after controlling for observables. Hence, taking the average quality of
the entrant cohort as a reference to evaluate the forgone entry is extremely misleading, as
the unborn firms are substantially worse than the observed ones. As these unborn firms
are often the excuse for policy interventions, such as indiscriminate government credit, it
is crucial to correctly assess the economic cost of that forgone entry. For this reason, we
proceed to calibrate our model and quantify the long-run cost imposed by a sudden stop.
2.5 Quantitative Exploration: The Role of Financial Selection
This section presents a quantitative exploration of the model. First, we calibrate the
baseline model using Chilean data. To assess the performance of the calibrated model, we
feed it with a smoothed series of the quarterly interest rate observed in the data. Although
the model is stylized, with its single shock it is able to approximate the non-targeted
regularities of Section 2.4. The model can account for roughly 40% of the decrease in
37For instance, according to Eurostat firm level data for 20 countries (showing access to finance for small
and medium-sized enterprises in the European Union), 28% of firms applied for loans in 2007 (before the
2009 crisis), with a success rate of 84%. In 2010, although more firms were applying for loans (31%), the
success rate decreased to only 65%.
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entry and more than 17% of the increase in profitability during the Chilean sudden stop.
Then, in order to assess the role of heterogeneity and selection in shaping the effect of
a sudden stop, we introduce two modified economies: a model with exogenous growth
and a model with endogenous growth but no heterogeneity. We use those alternative
economies to highlight the role of firm entry and financial selection when the economy is
hit by an interest rate shock. For instance, including heterogeneity and selection amplifies
the medium-run effects of a sudden stop in output when compared to the exogenous
growth model. Moreover, the shock generates a long-run permanent loss in output due
to the distortion in the entry market. The composition effect plays a considerable role in
shaping the long-run cost of the crisis. In fact, the model with no heterogeneity doubles
the estimation of the permanent loss. Thus, even at the macro level, the existence of
selection is fundamental when assessing the cost of the forgone entrants.
2.5.1 Calibration to the Chilean Economy
Externally Calibrated Parameters
The twenty parameters of the model are calibrated to Chilean data on a quarterly
basis. A first group of six parameters is externally calibrated according to the real busi-
ness cycle small open economy literature. In particular, the capital share (1 − α), the
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (1/γ), and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
(1/(1− χ)) are set in accordance with Mendoza (1991). The working capital requirement
(η) is set to the value used by Neumeyer and Perri (2005), which implies that the final good
producer needs to keep as working capital 100% of the cost of intermediate goods. The
parameter governing the debt adjustment cost (ψ) is set to a small number that guaran-
tees stationarity in every experiment.38 A second group of eight parameters is calibrated
directly to Chilean data. The depreciation rate of capital (δ) is set at 8% annually, consis-
38The debt adjustment cost is in the same order of magnitude as the one used by Uribe and Yue (2006).
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tent with the study by Bergoeing et al. (2002) of the Chilean economy. The corporate tax
rate (τ) is set to 17%, in line with Chilean legislation of that time; the long-run interest
rate (R¯), the persistence of the interest rate process (ρr) and the dispersion of the shocks
(σr) are estimated using the quarterly real Chilean interest rate on loans performed by
Parameter Symbol Value Source
Capital share 1− α 0.32 Mendoza (1991)
Elasticity of Substitution (1/γ) γ 2 Mendoza (1991)
Frisch Elasticity (1/(1− χ)) χ 1.455 Mendoza (1991)
Working Capital η 1 Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
Debt adjustment cost ψ 0.0001 Low
Depreciation rate δ 1.94% Bergoeing et al. (2002)
Corporate tax rate τ 0.17 Data
Long-run interest rate R¯ 1.015 Chilean Central Bank Data
Persistence of interest rate ρr 0.836 Chilean Central Bank Data
Dispersion of interest rate shock σr 0.33% Chilean Central Bank Data
Long-run debt to GDP ratio b¯ 4 ∗ (−0.44) Chilean Central Bank Data
Low profitability (σL/(1+ σL)) σL 14.5% ENIA
High profitability (σH/(1+ σH)) σH 55.5% ENIA
Table 5: Externally Calibrated Parameters
commercial banks between 1996:I and 2008:IV. Because no debt holding costs are incurred
along the balanced growth path, we set b¯ to the quarterly debt-to-GDP ratio of Chile.
The step sizes (σL, σH) are calibrated to match the 25% and 75% percentiles of the pre-
crisis profitability distribution in Table 15. The calibrated step sizes point to a significant
heterogeneity in mark-ups in the Chilean economy; specifically, drastic ideas are three
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times more productive than incremental ones. These values are in line with the empirical
studies of Navarro and Soto (2006) for the Chilean manufacturing sector. Table 5 presents
the values for every externally calibrated parameter.
Internally Calibrated Parameters
The remaining seven parameters are internally calibrated to match salient features
of the Chilean economy. For a given long-run growth rate (a), there is only one value
of the patience parameter (β) consistent with no payment of debt holding cost along the
balanced growth path.39 Five of the remaining six parameters (λ, κ,Θl , ρ, ν) are set to
match the five moments summarized in Table 6.40 Although every moment is related to
the whole set of parameters, we can point to some strong relationships between targets
and parameters. The success probability (λ) is highly related to the long-run entry rate
of start-ups in the model; we set that target to the average entry of the pre-crisis years
in our sample, 2.71% per quarter. The average cost of starting a firm as a proportion of
the gross national income is obtained from the Doing Business Indicators from the World
Bank database, which pins down the cost of enacting a project (κ). In the model, we
set this target to 12.1% of 2004, the earliest year available. The dis-utility of labor (θl)
is set to match a long-run labor supply of 33%. The novel parameters ρ and ν are more
challenging to calibrate. The accuracy of the financial system (ρ) governs the proportion of
firms in the entrant cohort that are below the threshold set by the financial intermediary.
In the data, a proportion of the entrant cohort dies during their first year; we use that
percentage as a proxy for the firms that were able to enter, although their true type was
below the threshold. We set the former target to 15%, the average of that proportion in the
pre-crisis portion of the data. Moreover, equation (2.27) relates the two step sizes of the
model and the scarcity of drastic ideas (ν) to the long-run growth rate of the economy. We
39See equation (B.23) in Appendix B.1.
40We minimize the sum of the percentage absolute distance between model and data. The calibration is
robust to different starting points.
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follow Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and target a yearly long-run growth rate of real GDP
of 2.5%. Finally, the parameter governing the capital adjustment cost (φ) is set to match
the standard deviation of the real investment growth rate in Chile of 3.7%.41 The model
is able to match the targets successfully. Table 6 presents the performance of the model
regarding the five targets and Table 7 presents the calibration for the seven internally
calibrated parameters in the model.
Target Model Data Expression
Entry 2.71% 2.71% λ (1− z¯)
Entry Cost 12.1% 12.1% κ(w/y)
Working time 33.0% 33.0% L
Fast exit 15.0% 15.0% (1− ρ) z¯
Growth 0.62% 0.62% a =
((
1+ σH
)µH (
1+ σL
)1−µH)λ(1−z¯) − 1
Table 6: Targets: Model and Data
Parameter Symbol Value Main identification
Patience parameter β 0.9975 β = (1+ a)γ /R¯
Success probability λ 5.36% Entry
Enaction cost κ 6.65% Entry cost
Labor dis-utility level Θl 1.73 Working time
Screening accuracy ρ 69.7% Fast exit
Scarcity ν 4.51 Growth
Capital adjustment cost φ 20 Investment volatility
Table 7: Internally Calibrated Parameters
41Because the balanced growth path is independent of φ, we calibrate it separately and match the desired
volatility perfectly.
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The scarcity of good ideas implies that, under random selection, two out of eleven
ideas (18.2%) generate a high step size. Nevertheless, given that the screening accuracy is
70%, the financial intermediary sets its credit standards to z¯ = 49.4%, securing an ex-post
fraction of high types equal to µH = 30%. This points to a non-trivial amount of selection
by financial intermediaries. The fixed cost of enacting a project is 6.65% units of labor;
this implies that 10.2% of the total working hours are used in project implementation.
This is in line with the data from the first entrepreneurship survey for Chile (Encuesta
de Microemprendimiento), where 13% of the Chilean workforce declared themselves to be
entrepreneurs in 2011. In terms of macro moments, the model generates an investment-
output ratio of 23.8% and an annualized capital-output ratio of 2.34, slightly above the
23% and 2.0 averages during the period 1996− 2007, as shown in Table 13 in the Appendix
B.2. Therefore, the calibration is consistent with the macroeconomic aggregates of the
Chilean economy. Before exploring the role of firm heterogeneity and financial selection
during sudden stops, we evaluate the quantitative performance of the calibrated model.
2.5.2 Validation of the Model: The Chilean Sudden Stop
In this section, we test the firm-based implications of the model when compared to
the empirical regularities documented in Section 2.4. In particular, we feed the model
with a smoothed version of the quarterly real interest rate, and we plot several non-
targeted time series between 1998:I and 2002:I. We transform the interest rate of Figure 19
using the following function:
Rt = 0.5Rt−1 + 0.5Rt−2
We chose to use this smoothed series for two reasons. First, decisions such as investment
or labor are not taken every quarter; thus, instead of introducing a time to adjust friction, as
in Uribe and Yue (2006), or a delay in the pass-through between the external shocks and
the domestic variables, as in Neumeyer and Perri (2005), we decided to smooth the effect
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of the financial crisis. The second reason has to do with the empirical analysis in Section
2.4. Because our firm level data is annual, at every observation we have entrants that were
subject to the interest rate of different quarters; hence, a two quarter backward-looking
moving average seems to be a parsimonious alternative. We set the state variables of the
model at their balanced growth path level in 1998:I.42
The model presented in this paper, unlike traditional small open economy real busi-
ness cycle models, has strong predictions for the mass of new firms, the average profitabil-
ity of each cohort, and the average value of incumbents.43 We use those novel features to
validate the calibration of the economy. Therefore, we use the empirical results of Section
2.4 to assess the ability of the model to capture the mass-composition trade-off at the
heart of this paper. Figure 6 shows the implied path for quarterly entry and the average
profitability of the entrant cohort, expressed as percentage deviations from their balanced
growth path level. The third graph in Figure 6 shows the logarithm of the Chilean stock
index (IPSA) in real terms.44 Note that the long-run calibration previously introduced
did not target any of the information in these time series.
As Figure 6a shows, the change in the interest rate can account for roughly a 17.5%
decrease in the entry rate. This is more than 40% of the average decrease observed at the
industry level on Table 18. Figure 6b shows the increase in the average profitability of
the entrant cohort. Cohorts born in the worst part of the crisis are 6.5% more profitable
than an average cohort (1.3 percentage points difference). Therefore, the model is in line
with the raw data in Tables 16 and 17, and it explains 20% of the conditional increase
in profitability documented in Table 4. Moreover, during the crisis, the fraction of high
types in the entrant cohort increases by 18%. This is in line with the logit regressions in
42The model is solved by second order perturbations using Dynare. We choose this solution method for
two reasons. First, as discussed in Aruoba et al. (2006), higher order perturbation methods are appropriate
for smooth systems with strong non-linearity and large shocks. Second, it allows for a meaningful welfare
analysis.
43Appendix B.5 show the results for hours, consumption, trade balance divided by GDP, and investment.
44The corresponding model-generated series for the IPSA is the average value of an intermediate good
producer. We set the economy to its BGP on 1998:I and normalize the initial level.
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(a) Entry (mass) (b) Average cohort profitability (composition)
(c) Stock Index
Figure 6: Model Performance
Table 3, where the probability of a superstar arising during crises increases by roughly
50%. Finally, with only an interest rate shock, the model can mimic the bust and recovery
of the Chilean stock market with reasonable success. In fact, this calibration suggest that
the interest rate shock explains at least 1/3 of the decrease in firm values. Note that this
framework is simple enough to introduce more shocks and frictions in order to close the
gap between model and data in these and other aggregated variables. As the aim of this
paper is to study the effects of an interest rate shock in the medium and long-run, we
79
prefer the parsimony of a model with only one shock and a limited number of frictions.
Having provided evidence to support the quantitative behavior of the model, we finally
focus our attention on quantifying the role of financial selection in shaping the long-run
cost of a sudden stop.
2.5.3 Long-Run Loss, Amplification, and Persistence
In this section, we study the long-run cost imposed by a sudden stop on an economy
where heterogeneous entrants subject to financial selection contribute to the process of
productivity accumulation. To highlight the relevance of endogenous growth and finan-
cial selection when analyzing these episodes, we introduce two modified versions of the
baseline model. The first version (Exo) is a model with exogenous growth, and no finan-
cial intermediation. In particular, Exo has no entry on its intermediate product line; it
experiences a constant growth rate equal to the balanced growth path of the Baseline. We
can think of Exo as Neumeyer and Perri (2005) with intermediate goods, and a constant
mixture of H and L incumbents equal to the BGP level of the Baseline. The second version
(NoHet) is a model with no heterogeneity and with endogenous growth. In this model,
there is neither ex-ante nor ex-post heterogeneity, because every entrant has the same step
size. This unique step size is set so that NoHet exhibits the same long-run growth as the
baseline. Finally, Exo and NoHet share every common parameter with the Baseline model.
Before conducting a quantitative exploration of the models, note that growing variables,
such as output or investment, are normalized by At in all the models. Denoting log-
deviations of a variable H from its last period value by a hat (Hˆt = ln (Ht/Ht−1)), let’s
focus on output to highlight the source of the long-run cost:
yt =
Yt
At
⇒ Yˆt ≈ yˆt + Aˆt (2.33)
Along the non-shocked path, because yt is constant, we get Yˆt = Aˆt ≈ ass. Hence, for
scaled variables, we define the distance at time t between the non-shocked economy and
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the one subject to the shock as x˜Yt :
x˜Yt ≈
i=t
∑
i=1
{
yˆi + Aˆi
}− t ∗ ass (2.34)
The main difference between Exo and the other two models is that, because growth is
exogenous, Aˆt ≈ ass, and then x˜Yt = ∑i=ti=1 yˆi. Because yt is stationary, this term converges
to zero when time goes to infinity. This illustrates why there is no long-run cost of a
sudden stop for a model with exogenous growth. But a model with endogenous growth
has a long-run cost (LRC), in any normalized variable, approximately equal to:
LRC ≈ lim
t→∞
{
t ∗ ass −
i=t
∑
i=1
{
Aˆi
}}
< ∞ (2.35)
Note that, as Aˆt converges to ass, this long-run cost is finite. Moreover, as is clear from
equation (2.34), this long-run cost arises only for variables that exhibit long-run growth.
Therefore, the analysis of a sudden stop in a model with endogenous growth needs to
consider the long-run impact that comes through this TFP-driven loss. Moreover, because
NoHet and Baseline have the same long run growth, the path of Aˆi fully determines their
relative long-run cost. Having defined the long run-cost of a shock, we turn to the quanti-
tative response of the models to a one standard deviation innovation in the interest rate R
(33 basis points). Figures 7, 9, 10, and 11 show the responses of the models to this shock.
The units on the y-axis are the percentage deviation from a counter-factual non-shocked
path.
Figure 7a displays a one-time 33 basis point increase in the interest rate, for the
three economies.45 Figure 7b shows the response of firm entry in the two models that
feature this margin. The decrease in entry is more than two times larger than for NoHet
45The deviations are calculated by averaging 600 simulations with a horizon of 1200 periods. For each
simulation we draw a series of interest rate shocks, drop the first 100 periods to build the stochastic state
of the economy at the moment of the shock. The average across simulations of the difference between the
path with a one time 33 basis point shock and the original path is used to generate the impulse response
functions.
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Figure 7: 33 basis point Increase in Interest Rate.
when compared to the baseline model. The main reason behind this difference lies in
the compositional dynamics displayed in Figure 7c. In fact, the proportion of high type
entrants in each cohort in NoHet is constant, while the baseline economy is able to adjust
this margin. In particular, the entrant cohort contains an extra 4% of high type leaders at
the time of impact. The last panel of Figure 7 shows the change in productivity growth
generated by the disruption in the entry margin. Note thatNoHet exhibits a large decrease
in productivity growth at the time of impact of 15%, while the decrease in the baseline
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model is less than 4%. The reason behind this difference is seen in Figures 7b and 7c; in
fact, when the shock hits the economy, the only margin of adjustment for NoHet is the
mass of the entrant cohort. Because there is only one step size, the contribution of the
forgone entrants to growth is the same as the contribution of the actual entrants. But the
compositional dynamics of the baseline model imply that, on average, the contribution to
productivity of the forgone entrants is lower than the contribution of the selected projects;
hence, the productivity cost is smaller. Figure 7d can also be used to illustrate the long-
run effect of a sudden stop in the three models; we can calculate LRC for each model
using Equation 2.35. In this particular case, the long-run cost is 0.38% for NoHet and
0.18% for the baseline. Therefore, the model with no heterogeneity generates a two times
larger long-run cost. We can also illustrate this result by calculating the consumption
equivalent welfare cost of the interest rate shock. Figure 8a shows the long-run cost of
each model for different shock sizes measured as the permanent distance between the
shocked path and the BGP, in percentage terms. Figure 8b shows the welfare costs for
different shock sizes, the maximal fraction of BGP consumption that the household would
sacrifice to avoid the shock. Note that the long-run cost is a measure that abstracts from
the short-run impact of the shock and the preferences of the representative household,
while the welfare cost measure includes the effects of the shock at every horizon and uses
the inter-temporal preferences of the representative household to quantify the loss.
As expected, in Figure 8a we see that Exo is not subject to a long-run cost. Therefore,
in Figure 8b, the distance between the consumption equivalent welfare cost of Exo and
the models with endogenous growth approximates the welfare cost of the long-run loss.
When using the baseline model as a benchmark, the long-run cost contributes to 30%
of the welfare cost; if NoHet is used, the long-run cost explains 45% of the welfare cost.
Regardless of the size of the shock, NoHet doubles the estimated long-run cost of a sudden
stop, increasing the consumption equivalent welfare cost by 30% when compared to the
baseline model. For instance, a 330 basis point increase in the interest rate implies, under
NoHet, a long-run cost of 3% and a welfare cost of 1.15% of consumption, considerably
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Figure 8: The Impact of Selection.
higher than the 1.5% long-run cost and the 0.93% consumption equivalent welfare cost
suggested by the baseline model. Therefore, modeling heterogeneity and selection is
particularly relevant when studying the absolute effect of large shocks.
In order to understand the role of selection for the financial intermediary’s decision
problem, Figure 9a displays the deviations of the average expected revenue per entrant
under random selection: µ˜VH(st) + (1− µ˜)VL(st). Note that, for the baseline model, the
average value of a randomly enacted project drops five times more on impact than for
NoHet. In this sense, the pure decrease in values for the baseline model is more violent
than for the model without selection. An important part of this difference comes from
the sharp drop in entry exhibited by NoHet. In fact, lower entry implies higher survival
probabilities, and hence more valuable product lines. Going back to Figure 9a, the higher
return of a randomly enacted project in NoHet in comparison to the baseline implies that,
if the financial intermediary in the baseline model had no access to selection, she would
enact even fewer projects.46
46Note that the analysis from the cost side does not reverse this partial equilibrium intuition; as seen in
Figure 11d, the marginal cost of enacting a project decreases more for NoHet.
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Figure 9: The Impact of Selection.
Figure 9b shows how this relationship is reversed when we take into account the
change in the composition of the entrant cohort in the baseline model. In fact, financial
selection allows the financial intermediary to increase the average value of each member
of the entrant cohort and counteract the decrease in the value of product lines. The
difference in the average value of an entrant displayed in the second panel of Figure
9 illustrates why the financial intermediary decreases project enactment in NoHet by a
factor more than two times larger than the decrease implied by the baseline model.
Having characterized the source and magnitude of the long-run cost, we focus our
attention on the response of output. Figure 10a shows the response of output for the three
models. Following equation (2.26), we can distinguish the following three components of
output:
Y(st) =
(
A(st)
)α︸ ︷︷ ︸
A Component
[(
LH(st)
)µ(st) (
LL(st)
)1−µ(st)]α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L Component
(
K(st−1)
)1−α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
K Component
(2.36)
Figures 10b, 10c, and 10d display the evolution of those three components for each model.
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Figure 10: The Sources of Output.
The most striking fact in Figure 10a is the positive contemporaneous response of out-
put under NoHet. This counter-factual response is explained by the relative changes of
labor supply with respect to entry-driven labor demand. In fact, the radical decrease in
entry in NoHet releases much more labor than the quantity that is absorbed by the con-
traction in labor supply. As a result, the use of labor in the intermediate good production
rises in the short run, generating an increase in production. Note that the L component
in Figure 10c increases by more than 0.3%, reversing the decrease in the other two com-
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ponents in the short run. This means that, from the point of view of the intermediate
good producers, the drop in their costs due to the decrease in wages is more powerful
than the drop in their benefit due to the decrease in the demand for intermediate goods
triggered by the working capital constraint. This short-run mitigating effect of labor is
considerably weaker in the baseline model because the reduction in the labor demand
for project enaction is much lower. The effect is in line with economic intuition, as the
interest rate shock mostly affects the entry margin and current output is produced by
incumbents. In this sense, the reallocation of labor from entry to intermediate production
implies a lower short-run effect, but more severe medium and long-run effects due to the
permanent productivity loss. In fact, because labor is a stationary variable, it returns in
the long-run to its balanced growth path level. On the contrary, the K and A components
feature a long-run loss that drives the shocked path of output to be permanently lower in
the long run. In the medium-run horizon, the baseline model exhibits an amplitude that
is roughly 30% larger than that of Exo. Moreover, medium-run persistence is also higher,
as can be seen from the delay in the lower point of the path in Figure 10a.
Comparing the sources of output in both models, we can identify the drivers of both
effects. First, the gradual decrease of the A component, absent in Exo, has a first order
effect on the depth of the crisis. The amplification is also driven by the extra drop in the
K component; this is, in turn, due to the decrease in the return of capital triggered by
the reduction in aggregate productivity.47 Second, the persistence is mostly due to the
hump shape of the L component. This shape is driven by the compositional dynamics
in the intermediate product line. In fact, the slow convergence of µ(st) delays the return
of the L component to its long-run value. The lack of a strong recovery in capital due to
the permanent TFP loss also contributes to the medium-run persistence of the crisis. In
contrast, investment and labor recover quickly in Exo to catch up with the TFP level in the
economy; therefore, Exo features a full neoclassical recovery, not only in labor, but also
47Note that NoHet exhibits a lower decrease in the K component, although the loss in TFP is higher. The
reason lies once again in the rise of the L component in NoHet, as the complementarity between inputs
increases the marginal productivity of capital.
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in physical capital. To complete the macroeconomic picture triggered by this episode,
Figure 11 presents the deviations of capital, consumption, total hours, and wages for the
three models.
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Figure 11: Macroeconomic Aggregates.
Figure 11c shows the response of total hours in the three models. On impact, the
model with exogenous growth has the lower decrease in labor (−0.4%), while labor de-
creases 50% more in the baseline model, and the model with no heterogeneity shows an
even larger decrease (−1%). Two reasons lay behind this amplification. First, the decrease
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in labor productivity in the models with endogenous growth amplifies the decrease in
efficiency-adjusted wages and so, given GHH preferences, unambiguously reduces the
labor supply of the household. Second, without entry, interest rates mostly affect labor
by the working capital channel; in the presence of entry, the financial intermediary acts as
a second channel that links interest rates to the labor market and the real economy. Sum-
marizing, models with endogenous growth exhibit a long-run cost of a sudden stop in
every growing variable, but failing to account for heterogeneity and selection doubles the
estimation of this cost. The baseline model also generates persistence and amplification
of interest rate shocks, while the model with no heterogeneity can deliver counter-factual
predictions due to the violent behavior of entry.
Finally, it is interesting to explore how different accuracy levels of the financial system
shape the long-run cost of a crisis and its medium-run characteristics. Figure 12 compares
the deviation of productivity and output of the baseline calibration with two alternative
calibrations: one where the fraction of entrants with types below the threshold is 5%
along the balanced growth path (instead of the original 15% target that resulted in the
calibration at ρ = 0.71), and one where that fraction is 25%. This corresponds to a high
accuracy calibration with ρ = 0.91 and a low accuracy calibration with ρ = 0.49.48
In line with economic intuition, Figure 12a shows that the long-run cost of a sudden
stop decreases with the accuracy of the financial system. In fact, the better the selection,
the stronger the composition effect, and, hence, the less detrimental the decrease in entry.
Moreover, Figure 12b shows that economies with better selection technology suffer more
in the short run, but endure the crisis much better in the medium run. this is because
output not only drops less, but also recovers faster and is subject to a lower long-run
loss. This result is in line with Cerra and Saxena (2008)’s findings, where the level of
development shapes the magnitude and persistence of extreme crises. Moreover, note that
48Because the long-run growth rate changes with both calibrations, we also modify β to guarantee that no
bond holding costs are incurred in the long run. In particular, in the original calibration β = 0.9975, for the
high accuracy β increases to 0.9977, and in the low accuracy it decreases to 0.9973.
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Figure 12: Financial Development.
more financially developed economies exhibit less volatile trends in response to interest
rate shocks. This sheds some light on the drivers of the relative importance of trend shock
documented across developed and developing countries by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
As a final remark, the long-run cost decreases from 0.18% in the baseline to 0.15% in the
high accuracy case, but it increases to 0.25% in the low accuracy case. This suggests that
the benefits of policy interventions aiming to foster financial development are subject to
decreasing returns.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we revisited the effects of a sudden stop, introducing a new element
into consideration: the effect of the crisis on firm entry. With that aim, we presented an
open economy endogenous growth model subject to interest rate shocks. The engine of
growth in this economy is the creative destruction induced by new entrants. But, as po-
tential entrants are heterogeneous, and promising entrants are scarce, financial selection
introduces a trade-off between the mass (quantity) and the composition (quality) of the
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entrants. In particular, an interest rate shock increases credit standards, giving rise to a
smaller cohort with higher productivity during the crisis. We use the Chilean sudden
stop to test the main intuition of the model. In sum, although fewer firms are born during
the crisis, they are better.
The model is able to convey some interesting insights about the role of firm entry
during a financial crisis. For instance, in the quantitative section, we explore the long-run
cost of a sudden stop driven by the endogenous changes in TFP growth that the crisis
triggers. An increase in the interest rate has a permanent effect on output, investment
and consumption. Not accounting for heterogeneity and selection doubles the estimation
of this long-run cost, which has non-trivial welfare consequences, as the consumption
equivalent welfare cost increases by 30%. As governments often use forgone entry as
an excuse for policy, a correct assessment of that cost is critical. This model provides a
tractable framework where those policies can be analyzed.
A second interesting point from the quantitative analysis is the role of the financial
system in an interest rate crisis. In fact, more developed financial systems are able to
take better advantage of the trade-off between mass and composition, reducing both the
medium-run and long-run impact of a financial crisis, but suffering a larger contempo-
raneous output decrease. In this sense, financial reforms that increase the ability of the
financial system to better allocate resources, such as the reforms empirically studied by
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Galindo et al. (2007), are potentially desirable, not only
from a balanced growth path perspective, but also as a buffer against large crises. This pa-
per provides a framework where the long-run macroeconomic consequences of banking
competition can be quantified.
The scope of this model is far beyond sudden stop episodes, or the particular Chilean
experience. In fact, the mass-composition trade-off at the core of this study can be trig-
gered by any economic shock that disrupts the entry margin. The long-run economic cost
of those fluctuations depends on the ability of the financial system to efficiently allocate
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scarce resources to the most promising projects. Note that interest rate shocks are partic-
ularly suited for this task, as they decrease the benefit of entry and increase the cost faced
by entrants. However, traditional stationary adverse TFP shocks reduce both the cost
and benefits of entry, having a minor impact on the TFP accumulation process. In this
sense, not every stationary shock produces a sizable long-run TFP cost. Future research
is needed to continue closing the gap between the quantitative firm dynamics-innovation
literature and the stochastic open economy models. This is not only relevant for devel-
oping countries, where the distinction between short-run fluctuations and medium to
long-run trends seems rather arbitrary, but also for developed economies. Indeed, the
Great Recession challenged traditional macroeconomic models by exhibiting persistent
effects in aggregate productivity, diminishing potential output even at long horizons.
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Chapter 3
Beyond Cash: Venture Capital, Firm
Dynamics, and Economic Growth
Abstract
This paper presents a new dynamic general equilibrium model of innovation with
heterogeneous firms that incorporates an explicit venture capital (VC) market. The data
show that VC financing accounts for a disproportionate share of sales and employment
in the US compared with its limited share of total investment. VC firms invest heavily
in young and innovative firms, bringing operational knowledge, together with financing, to
their portfolio companies. The goal of this paper is twofold. First, I measure the partic-
ular channels through which VC firms influence their undertakings, using a structural
model. Second, I explore the implications of VC investments for aggregate productivity
and innovation policy. To address these goals, I combine and structurally estimate an
endogenous technical change model with a VC setting that includes (i) the new feature
of expertise, and (ii) the endogenous matching market where firms and VCs meet. In
this model, firms improve the quality of their innovative product through risky R&D. VC
expertise raises the efficiency of product development, and firms obtain VC financing at
the cost of selling an endogenously determined share of the company. The entry cost that
VC companies face also introduces a selection margin: VCs invest in firms that present
a high potential for growth. The estimated model captures certain features of the VC
matches and innovation observed in the US data. Counterfactual experiments imply that
operational knowledge accounts for about 1/3 of VCs’ impact on aggregate growth. Pol-
icy experiments suggest that changes affecting the VC market could result in a 7 basis
point gain in the long-run growth rate of the economy.
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“... We were cash positive. We didn’t have a year where we lost money... We
eventually ... sold 5% of the company for a million dollars ... just to get a
venture capital company to join our board and give us some adult advice...
That money sat in the bank.”
Bill Gates, ex-chairman and co-founder of Microsoft
3.1 Introduction
Investments by venture capital (VC) companies have a disproportionate impact on
the US economy. In 2010, the revenues of firms that had ever received VC support ac-
counted for 21% of GDP, and their employment share was 11% of total private sector
employment, although VC investments to their portfolio companies amount to less than
0.2% of GDP.1 VC financing is of particular relevance for firm creation and innovation be-
cause VC firms strive to find young and innovative firms that lack market experience. VC
firms are unique in that they do not only provide financing: They also actively engage in
management by bringing their operational knowledge to bear in their investments.2 Despite
this distinctive structure, the contribution of operational knowledge to firm productivity
and its implications for aggregate economic growth lack a thorough investigation. This
paper presents a rigorous quantitative framework to explore the distinct mechanisms by
which VC firms influence innovative firms and, through them, aggregate productivity.
Investing in a young company that needs to develop an innovative business idea en-
tails considerable uncertainty and is subject to pervasive moral hazard problems (Gom-
1National Venture Capital Association (NVCA, 2013). Well-known examples include Amazon, Google,
Starbucks, and FedEx.
2By operational knowledge, I refer to a general body of expertises concerning organizational structure,
marketing, product development, and other business domains. This role of venture capital financing reflects
the idea “that the typical founder is an incomplete businessman, with gaps in experience in matters such as
financial management and marketing. An active board of directors, staffed by representatives of the [venture
capital] investors, is expected to help fill these gaps” (Bartlett, 1995). For evidence on different methods, see
Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Sahlman (1990), Gompers (1995), and Hellmann and Puri (2000), among others.
Da Rin et al. (2011b) provide an extensive survey.
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pers, 1995). In such environments, Casamatta (2003) shows that the optimal contract spec-
ifies a “dual role” for the VC firm. The optimal contract bundles financing and advice so
that a VC firm’s financial stake in the company motivates it to provide valuable advice.
By contrast, consulting firms are not preferred by young and innovative firms because
they do not acquire stakes in the latter.3 As a consequence of this lack of “skin in the
game,” entrepreneurs have to pay a very high price in order to obtain valuable advice
from the consultant. Therefore, young and innovative companies prefer VC advising to
consulting advice.
Taking the structure of the optimal contract as given, I develop a structural model
containing an explicit VC market. This model serves two main purposes: Firstly, I use
the model to measure the importance of the VCs’ operational expertise to firm growth.
To identify this channel, it is fundamental to separate it from the provision of financing
and the overall selection of “portfolio” firms by VCs. Establishing a unified structure
that accounts explicitly for different aspects of the VC market, the structural model is
an effective tool to accomplish this task. Quantifying the operational knowledge channel
is useful for evaluating the advantages commonly attributed to VC finance in fostering
firm productivity and growth. To the extent that VC companies add valuable knowledge
to their undertakings, they become a more efficient option for financing innovation than
more traditional financing sources such as bank loans. Secondly, the model provides
a suitable ground to shed light on various policy discussions such as the relationship
between an active public equity market and VC financing.
To address these issues, I propose a new dynamic general equilibrium model of in-
novation with heterogeneous firms, in the tradition of Romer (1990), Grossman and Help-
man (1991), and Acemoglu et al. (2013), among others.4 In this model, entrepreneurs/private
firms produce differentiated goods of heterogeneous quality which they can improve
3The result assumes that the entrepreneurial effort is cheaper and is key for the success of the project.
4The model shares features such as product variety expansion with Romer (1990), quality latter structure
with Grossman and Helpman (1991), and innovation by incumbent firms with Acemoglu et al. (2013), whose
details are explained below.
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through risky research and development. The efficiency of this development process can
only be increased with the help of a VC and is otherwise fixed. I introduce to this model a
detailed venture capital market through (i) the feature of VC expertise and (ii) the endoge-
nous matching market for firms and VCs. Every private firm that is not in a relationship
with a VC can search for VCs and meet them in the matching market. VCs improve the
efficiency of product development through their operational knowledge. They also pro-
vide financing and relax the cost of inputs into the production of goods. This financial
support to a priori unconstrained firms reflects the dual structure of the optimal contract
for VC investment. The heterogeneity in the quality level of private firms determines the
magnitude of the improvement that VC firms can potentially create. VC firms are subject
to entry costs, which induce them to select firms for investment that present more room
for growth. Thus, in addition to financing and operational knowledge channels, the VC
setting also accounts for the effects of selection by VC firms. Because the preferred option
for VC firms to exit their portfolio companies is to sell them via initial public offerings,
the model also includes a public equity market. To complete the general equilibrium
framework, the rest of the structure builds on the shoulders of endogenous technical
change models in which entrepreneurs own intermediate product lines. Entrepreneurs
enter the market with a new product line while intermediate good producers who cannot
develop the quality of their good sufficiently exit the economy. Together with entry and
exit margins, the innovations generated by these intermediate good firms determine the
endogenous rate of growth of the aggregate economy.
The main identification problem in this model is to distinguish the financing channel
from operational knowledge in their relative influence on firms receiving VC investment.
The assumption that disentangles these two channels is that the former mainly affects
the level of the profits while the latter changes its growth rate. The financial help of
VC decreases the cost of inputs in the intermediate good production. Therefore, the en-
trepreneur earns higher profits for a given quality level of the intermediate good that the
firm produces. Operational knowledge, on the other hand, directly affects the efficiency
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of the entrepreneur’s effort in generating innovations that increase the product quality.5
To discipline the size of the financial impact in the model, I target the ratio of VC invest-
ment to GDP. Determining the size of VCs’ contribution to efficiency in the data is a more
delicate task. A well-known concern is selection: VCs might be “cherry-picking” already
good firms instead of improving them in some other way. I address this issue by applying
the method of indirect inference in my estimation. To do so, I utilize the findings of Puri
and Zarutskie (2012). In their empirical study, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) provide statistics
on growth rates of VC-backed and non-VC-backed private firms, controlling for selection
on observable characteristics. In a nutshell, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) create samples of
private firms with and without VC support that are matched on some measurable fea-
tures. Following similar steps, I create the analogues of such samples from the stationary
firm distribution of my model. Finally, I use the model-generated samples to match the
regression statistics on VCs’ effect on firm growth provided in the same paper.
I estimate this model by the method of moments, using US data on the venture capital
market, public equity issuances, and research and development expenditures. The model
does a successful job in matching moments that pertain to venture capital and innovation
aspects of the model, such as the duration of VCmatches, firm age at the issuance of initial
public equity, and aggregate share of R&D. Moreover, the model-generated regression
results accurately predict the coefficient estimate found in Puri and Zarutskie (2012).
Successfully hitting this target via indirect inference is crucial because it determines the
scope of the influence of the operational knowledge channel. Before using the estimated
model for counterfactual analyses, I compare its auxiliary predictions to data moments
in order to obtain out-of-sample validation. This comparison reveals that the model is
5Gonzalez-Uribe (2014) is a recent empirical work that points towards the efficiency enhancing role of
VC. By using the introduction of the Prudent Investor Rule (PIR) across states as a source of exogenous
variation in VC financing, she first documents a 50% rise in the annual citations of patents of a firm after
it obtains VC financing. More interestingly, she shows that the probability of receiving a citation from a
company in the portfolio of the same VC firm increases twice as much as from a company outside the
VC’s portfolio. This result indicates that VCs facilitate the diffusion of knowledge among their portfolio
companies. Similarly, Lindsey (2008) argues that by mitigating informational and contractual problems, VC
firms increase the probability of strategic alliances among their portfolio companies. The empirical estimates
imply a 70% increase in the probability of R&D alliances, a significant constituent of strategic cooperations.
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very precise in capturing the high IPO frequency among VC-backed firms and the share
of IPOs issued by VC-backed companies, both of which are definitive characteristics of
the VC market in the US.
The first set of counterfacual experiments determines the relevance of VCs’ oper-
ational knowledge to firm and aggregate growth. I create hypothetical economies in
which I strengthen particular channels of VC finance in each experiment. Comparing the
responses of the aggregate growth rate to these changes demonstrates that the knowl-
edge channel accounts for 1/3 of VCs’ impact. Hence, the conclusion is that VC support
matters significantly beyond financing. Then I consider a 15% increase in the fixed cost
of IPO to capture the average level of underwriting spreads in the US before their secular
decline after the 1980s.6 As a result, fewer private firms issue IPOs, and the equilibrium
probability of a match with a VC firm decreases. Thus, the increase in the fixed IPO cost
results in a smaller share of VC-backed private firms in the economy. This leads to a 1.5
basis point loss in the long-run growth rate.
As an example for the policy implications of the model, I consider a recent regulation
that the European Union introduced in 2013 regarding European VC firms. In order to
decrease the fundraising costs of VC firms, this policy aims to harmonize the legislative
environment these firms face when investing across the borders of European countries.
I map this change into the model as lower entry costs for VC firms through lump-sum
subsidies. I find that this policy can increase the long-run growth rate by 7 basis points
at a cost of subsidies that corresponds to approximately 8% of the VC investment in the
model. This increase in the growth rate hinges on the reallocation of private firms towards
the VC market. Moreover, a rise in the median duration of the VC-firm relationship
amplifies the effect of the operational knowledge. These results highlight the significance
of the general equilibrium effects for the policy evaluation.
6An underwriting spread, also known as gross spread, measures the fees paid to the underwriter of the
issue in compensation for expenses such as legal expenses, management fees, etc. as a fraction of the total
proceeds raised. This spread is a direct cost associated with the issue, which I model as a fixed cost.
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Related Literature. This paper draws on several strands of the literature. First, by em-
bedding the VC market into the endogenous technical change environment, it contributes
to the literature that concentrates on innovation and firm dynamics (Klette and Kortum,
2004; Akcigit, 2010; Akcigit and Kerr, 2010; Lentz and Mortensen, 2008; Acemoglu et al.,
2013).7 Lentz and Mortensen (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2013) are recent examples that
particularly focus on allocation of resources across firms with heterogeneous capacities
to innovate. This paper contributes to the analysis by introducing a link between this
heterogeneity and the financing decisions of innovative firms. In that regard, this paper
also relates to work on finance of innovation (Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Aghion et al., 2004;
Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Lerner et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2009; Amore et al., 2013).8 As
an example in the setting of endogenous growth, Itenberg (2014) explores the effect of de-
velopments in the US public equity market on R&D decisions of small firms. By contrast,
the focus of this paper is the venture capital market.
This study extends the venture capital literature by analyzing VC financing in a dy-
namic quantitative framework. The theoretical work in this area uncovers the conditions
in a static setting that leaves room for the use of venture capital in the existence of alter-
native financing or in advising agents such as banks and consultants (Amit et al., 1998;
Casamatta, 2003; Ueda, 2004; de Bettignies and Brander, 2007).9 While my work acknowl-
edges these theoretical foundations, and borrows the features of the optimal VC contract
from this literature, it focuses on quantitative analysis of the VC market. In particular,
my model improves the understanding of VC financing in a dynamic general equilibrium
setting that enables the measurement of the distinct channels through which VC firms
affect firm dynamics. A realistic structure for the VC market in a model of endogenous
7For a detailed discussion of innovation and firm dynamics in the context of Schumpeterian growth
theory, see Aghion et al. (2014).
8Hall and Lerner (2009) is a seminal survey on this topic.
9There are a few recent papers that include venture capital in a dynamic setting. Silveira and Wright
(2013) model VC firms in a search and matching environment and analyze its theoretical predictions for the
life cycle of VC firms. Pinheiro (2012) examines the theoretical underpinnings of the optimal duration in
matches between VC firms and their undertakings. Opp (2014) analyzes the cycles in the venture capital
market. None of these studies consider the effects on firm-level innovation and economic growth.
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firm dynamics also allows the analysis of venture capital from the perspective of innova-
tion policy. Due to these characteristics, this work also contributes to answering empirical
questions in VC literature.10 In particular, Kortum and Lerner (2000) show the significant
effect of VC finance on firm-level innovation in terms of both patent counts and cita-
tions, whereas papers such as Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002) examine the effectiveness
of particular management practices applied by VC firms using hand-collected data. My
paper advances these exercises to quantify VCs’ impact by using a new structural model
as a measurement tool that takes into account important margins such as selection and
reallocation. Furthermore, the setting should also be helpful in shedding light on various
policy debates, such as the relationship between public equity and VC markets (Black
and Gilson, 1998; Bottazzi and Rin, 2002).
Finally, a related literature focuses on the role of the financial system in evaluating
and selecting investment projects. For instance, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show empir-
ically that interstate branch reform in the US banking system has led to a tighter selection
in lending through increased competition. This in turn has resulted in higher lending
quality and growth rates in liberalized states. In the context of VC, Casamatta and Har-
itchabalet (2007) provide evidence on how VC firms use syndication practices to obtain a
second opinion when deciding on early rounds of investment. By estimating a theoretical
framework using Bayesian methods, Sørensen (2007) finds important effects of assortative
matching in the VC market. In relation to this literature, my paper formalizes the idea
that VC firms search for high growth potential by embedding an endogenous search and
matching market that accounts for selection. This aspect is integral to identifying the
effect of “value-adding” practices of VC firms in the model. Furthermore, building on
the endogenous growth framework, this paper relates to the literature that analyzes the
effects of selection on economic growth (King and Levine, 1993a; Jaimovich and Rebelo,
2012).11 A recent paper in this strand, Ates¸ and Saffie (2014), argue that financial selection
10For a recent survey, see Da Rin et al. (2011b).
11Levine (2005) provides an excellent survey on this topic, and on the relationship between finance and
growth, in general.
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introduces a trade-off between the mass and the quality in firm entry, and analyzes its
impact on aggregate productivity growth in the context of sudden stops.12 In comparison
to this literature, my work focuses on a specific financial intermediary that is especially
relevant to innovation and growth, namely venture capital finance.
The next section introduces the main ingredients of my model. Section 3.3 explains
the data used in the estimation, and discusses identification. Section 3.4 presents coun-
terfactual and policy experiments, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
In this section, I present the components of the model economy. Entrepreneurs pro-
duce differentiated intermediate goods and sell them to a representative final good pro-
ducer that combines these intermediate goods into a final output. The entrepreneurs
enter the business with an innovative product, the quality of which they can improve
over time by investing in risky research and development (R&D) activities. The efficiency
of the R&D process is a firm characteristic that is fixed unless the firm uses the additional
business expertise of a VC. VC support also entails a reduction in the cost of interme-
diate good production. An intermediate good producer can search for and match with
a VC firm in the endogenous search and matching market. The contribution of the VC
to firm growth stems from increased R&D efficiency that makes product developments
likelier. However, it comes at the cost of firm dilution, and carries an exogenous risk of
running the project idle. Any private firm can issue public equity to expand the size of
its enterprise, but there is an associated fixed cost. By improving the efficiency of product
development, VC firms help their undertakings raise adequate resources faster to afford
the IPO cost.
12In a related paper, Ates¸ and Saffie (2013) provide a theoretical characterization of the nexus between
financial selection and the long-run productivity growth by analyzing the mass-quality trade-off in a closed
economy setting.
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3.2.1 Preferences
Consider the following closed economy in discrete time. The representative house-
hold maximizes the expected discounted sum of the period utility from consumption
with the following preferences
Ut =
∞
∑
τ=t
βτ
C1−ετ − 1
1− ε
where Ct denotes consumption at time t. β is the discount factor and ε is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion. The household consumes a final good, and supplies labor in-
elastically to the final good producer, which I normalize to 1 without loss of generality.
Households own all the firms in the economy, and their budget constraint is
Ct ≤
∫
j∈J
Πjtdj+wt (3.1)
where Πjt is the flow profit of the intermediate firm j in the interval J of actively operating
firms, and wt is the wage level at time t.
3.2.2 Final Good Production
The final good, which is used for consumption, R&D, and intermediate good produc-
tion, is produced in a perfectly competitive market. The production technology combines
labor and differentiated intermediate varieties in the following structure:
Yt =
1
1− αL
α
t
∫
j∈J
qαjtk
1−α
jt dj. (3.2)
Here, Lt denotes the labor input, kjt refers to intermediate good j ∈ J at time t, and qjt is
the associated quality of product j. (1− α) stands for the physical factor share. Yt is the
numeraire good in the economy.
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The representative final good producer chooses a bundle of intermediate goods and
labor in order to maximize its profits. Taking the price of the intermediate product, pjt,
as given, the problem of the final good producer reads as:
ΠY,t = max
Lt,{k jt} j∈ J
{
1
1− αL
α
∫
j∈J
qαjtk
1−α
jt dj−
∫
j∈J
pjtkjtdj−wtLt
}
. (3.3)
The solution of this maximization problem yields in equilibrium the following inverse
demand for intermediate good j:
pjt = q
α
jt
(
kdjt
)−α
(3.4)
where kdjt is the optimal amount of good j demanded by the final good producer.
3.2.3 Intermediate Good Firms
Intermediate firms are distributed across product lines whose measure, Jt, is deter-
mined endogenously. There are three types of intermediate good firms: private firms that
are not matched with a VC, private firms that are matched with a VC, and public firms.
Each firm is characterized mainly by two state variables which are the product quality
and the R&D efficiency. An entrepreneur that has an innovative project enters a product
line as a private firm without a VC. First I introduce decisions that are common to all
intermediate good firms, and then I go into the specific choices of different types of firms.
103
Production
Each intermediate good is a monopolist in producing its differentiated good kjt. To
maximize the operating profits, the monopolist solves the following problem
Πjt
(
qjt
)
= max
k jt
{
pjtkjt − Ck
(
kjt
)}
subject to
pjt = qαjt
(
kdjt
)−α
where Ck
(
kjt
)
denotes the cost of inputs to produce kjt amount of intermediate good in
terms of the final good and has the following form:
Ck
(
kjt
)
= ηjkjt.
In this specification, ηj ∈ {ηH , η} denotes the marginal cost of production with ηH > η.
For any firm that does not have VC support, this parameter has the higher value. There-
fore, this structure captures the financial contribution of VC firms to their undertakings.
An interpretation for this structure is that it reflects cash-in-hand constraints in a reduced
form way. In line with reality, VC relaxes this financial constraint with its monetary
commitment.
In equilibrium, the optimal level of intermediate good production becomes
kjt = α
[
1− α
ηj
] 1−α
α
qjt. (3.5)
With a constant mark-up over price, this optimal quantity generates profits that are linear
in product quality qjt. Thus, Πjt = πjqjt where
πj =


πL if Ck
(
kjt
)
= ηHkjt
πH if Ck
(
kjt
)
= ηLkjt
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is a constant depending on the marginal cost ηj. Hence, the operational profits are higher
if the marginal cost of intermediate good production is lower due to VC support.
Research and Development
Each firm invests in R&D to improve the quality of its product and hence to increase
its operating profits. Let ijt and Z
(
ijt
)
denote the (process) innovation rate and the R&D
effort required to generate this rate, respectively. The R&D cost function in terms of the
final good has the following form:
Z
(
ijt
)
=
h
(
ijt
)
θj
qjt
where h (·) is a convex, strictly increasing function. In this specification, θj denotes the
efficiency in developing the product quality.
In order to analyze the effect of VC firms’ operational knowledge, the parameter θ
can take three different values:
θj =


θL for private firms without VC
θH for private firms with VC
θ
pb
j ∈
{
θL, θM
}
for public firms
In this economy, the private firms conduct R&D with low efficiency, θL, unless they re-
ceive help from a VC firm. Once matched, a VC firm raises the efficiency level of its
portfolio company to θH thanks to its expertise. In turn, a higher efficiency in generating
innovations increases the expected growth rate of the private firm. In addition to this
direct effect, I allow for the possibility that VC firms also cause a permanent effect. Prod-
uct development efficiency after IPO, θpbj , depends on whether the firm used VC finance
or not. The underlying motivation is that, although the entrepreneur separates from the
VC, she retains some of the operational skills brought to the firm by the venture capital-
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ist. Therefore, for a firm that becomes public under the supervision of a VC, I assume
that θpbj = θ
M. Although determined by the data through estimation, it is expected that
θH > θM > θL, as validated in Section 3.3.4. The ordering θH > θM reflects the loss of VC
supervision, whereas θM > θL reflects the VC’s permanent impact on the firm’s opera-
tional knowledge stock. The product development efficiency remains constant unless the
firm changes its type due to a financial decision.
A successful process innovation improves the product quality of the firm by an
amount that is taken to be proportional to the average quality of the firm, q¯t:
qjt+1 = qjt + λq¯t.
where q¯t ≡
∫
j∈J qjtdj. If the R&D is unsuccessful, qjt remains the same. These addi-
tive increments in product quality introduce decreasing returns to innovation, and imply
smaller incentives to innovate for larger firms. Limiting the growth potential of larger
firms, this structure enables the model to generate a stationary size distribution in equi-
librium.
Free Exit
Every intermediate firm has an outside option χot = χ
o q¯t which is proportional to the
average quality q¯t. If the value of the firm goes below this level, the firm exits the econ-
omy. Notice that the option value grows at the rate of the aggregate economy. Therefore,
if a firm fails to innovate for a long period of time, it will necessarily exit the market.
Therefore, in addition to the profit enhancing motive, there is another incentive to moti-
vate, namely to survive in the business.
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Free Entry
The economy has a unit measure of potential entrants. These outside firms need to
generate an innovation to enter the market. An entering firm observes the initial quality
of its product upon successful innovation. This initial quality is drawn from the stationary
distribution of the previous period, but from a range that is small enough such that the
entrant does not go public immediately.13 An entrant opens a new intermediate product
line and starts with the low level of product development efficiency θL.14
The cost of generating a product innovation for entry is quadratic in probability of
innovation, xt:
Ce(x) = χeq¯t f (Jt−1)x2t
where χe denotes the scale of the cost function. There are two important features in
this cost structure. First, it is proportional to aggregate productivity level q¯t. Since the
expected value of an innovation also shares this proportionality the optimal innovation
rate becomes independent of q¯t. Second, the cost depends on the previous measure of the
intermediate firms through a convex and increasing function.15 This structure relates the
measure of firms to the size of entry, and enables the economy to reach a stable size.
Timing of Events
The timing of events is summarized in Figure 13. The period starts with the entrants’
decision to pay the entry fee and draw their productivity. Then, the private intermediate
13Given the median age of US firms at the IPO stage, this assumption is a plausible one. Moreover,
the average size of entry firms in the US are drastically smaller than the average size of incumbent firms
(Scarpetta et al., 2004; Bartelsman et al., 2009).
14The fact that entrants open new product lines introduces a source for growth due to expanding product
markets, à la Romer (1990). However, as explained below, the measure of intermediate product lines, J,
remains constant in a balanced growth path equilibrium.
15In the estimation, f (·) is assumed to have a quadratic form. This type of relationship has the interpre-
tation that the resources to innovate are scarce, and the costlier it is for entrants to use these resources, the
larger the share of incumbent firms becomes.
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good producers make their financial decisions, which are searching for VC and going
public. Then, the final good producer and intermediate good producers decide on pro-
duction. Intermediate good producers also determine their innovation intensities. Lastly,
the R&D outcomes are realized, and intermediate producers make their exit decisions.
t+ 1t
Entrants
draw qjt
start w/ θL
IPO decision
f or
private
VC decision
f or
single private
i) Production
kjt, Yt
ii) R&D, ijt
R&D
outcome
qj,t+1
Exit
decision
Figure 13: Flow of Events
Next, I explain the different types of intermediate firms and their specific financial
choices. In particular, a public firm will consider only the decisions introduced above.
Every private firm considers going public at the onset of a period, in addition to the
aforementioned common decisions. Lastly, a private firm that is not matched with a VC
can search for a VC if it has already chosen to remain private.
Firm Types and Financial Decisions
Public Firm. A private firm can choose to go public by issuing an initial public
offering (IPO) and raise public funds to expand its operations.16 I assume that a firm
cannot look for a VC and cannot raise any public funds once it is public. Therefore,
the only decisions that a public firm needs to consider are production, R&D, and exit
decisions. Specifically, let V pbt denote the value of a public company. Then the problem
16This type of modelling IPO is in line with the investment financing explanation of equity finance. Using
extensive data on initial and seasoned equity offerings across 38 countries during the period 1990-2003, Kim
and Weisbach (2008) show that firms subsequently use proceeds from selling equity for R&D and CAPEX
investments. When I explain the decision to do an IPO below, it will be clear that going public also provides
an exit channel for the VC.
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of the public firm becomes
V pbt
(
qjt, θ
pb
j
)
= max
ijt


πLqjt − h
(
ijt
)
/θpbj · qjt + 11+rt+1×[
ijtW
pb
t
(
qjt + λq¯t, θ
pb
j
)
+
(
1− ijt
)
W pbt
(
qjt, θ
pb
j
)]

 (3.6)
where rt+1 denotes the interest rate. The continuation value is defined as
W pbt
(
qjt+1, θj
)
= max
{
χo q¯t,EV
pb
t+1
(
qjt+1, θ
pb
j
)}
. (3.7)
Every period, the public firm collects flow profits and decides on the optimal size
of process innovation.17 In case of successful R&D, it increases its product quality with
which it starts the next period, unless it chooses to use the outside option and exits. If
R&D efforts do not result in an incremental innovation, the product quality remains the
same. In this regard, product development enables the firm to decrease the likelihood
of exiting the market, besides increasing the profits. Note that the product development
efficiency remains constant in any case.
VC decision. A private firm without VC backing can search for a VC in every
time period. To understand the benefit of becoming matched with a VC, first consider the
problem of a private firm with a VC that decided not to go public. This post-IPO-decision
value is the one that a private firm without VC obtains when it is matched with a VC firm,
because the process of searching for a VC follows the IPO decision. It is defined as
V prt
(
qjt, θH, Ivcj = 1
)
= max
ijt


πqjt − h
(
ijt
)
/θH · qjt + 11+rt+1×
 ijtW prt
(
qjt + λq¯t, θH, 1
)
+(
1− ijt
)
W prt
(
qjt, θH, 1
)




. (3.8)
where Ivcj is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the firm is matched to a VC.
This problem is very similar to the one of the public firm, with three exceptions. First,
17Notice the low level of profits because public firms do not have VC support.
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as the firm gets the expertise of VC, its efficiency increases to level θH > θL, and this is
the operational knowledge channel through which a VC adds value to the firm. Second,
due to its financial support, VC increases the profits of the firm to π > πL for a given
quality level. The third difference reflects the fact that many relationships between the
VC and the firm end up unsuccessfully, i.e. they do not lead to any IPO or acquisition by
another firm where VC can have a profitable exit. To capture this, I assume that the VC
and the firm can separate with an exogenous probability σvc in which case the firm exits
the market. The continuation value W prt (·, 1) incorporates these differences.
A private firm meets with VCs in a random matching environment.18 The endoge-
nous probability that a private firm matches with a VC firm is defined by
m f (Λ) = ρ
Λ
1+ Λ
where nvc and n f denote the number of VC firms and available private firms, respec-
tively, Λ ≡ nvc/n f is the market tightness, and ρ refers to the efficiency parameter (Shi,
2009).19 Then the value of a private firm without a VC, after deciding not to issue an IPO,
becomes:20
V prt
(
qjt, θ
L, Ivcj = 0
)
= m f
(
nvc
n f
)
Isvc>0×V prt
(
qjt, θ
H, 1
)
+[(
1−m f
(
nvc
n f
))
+m f
(
nvc
n f
)
(1− Isvc>0)
]
×
max
ijt


πLqjt − h
(
ijt
)
/θL · qjt + 11+rt+1×[
ijtW
pr
t
(
qjt + λq¯t, θL, 0
)
+
(
1− ijt
)
W prt
(
qjt, θL, 0
)]

 . (3.9)
18The main friction in this market is the process of evaluation by the VC. It is a cumbersome process in
which only one out of a hundred applicants gets funded on average, according to NVCA figures. A directed
search on the firm side is also unlikely given the low probability of acceptance. Moreover, this would
require the applicant to gain information about other companies in the portfolio the VC firm of interest, their
financing stages, the human capital constraints of the VC firm, etc., which is probably not the case with most
of the applications in reality.
19Correspondingly, the total number of matches is given by the so-called telegraph matching function.
20No search costs are assumed in this setting.
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Here, m f (·) denotes the probability that the firm will meet with a VC. The share of the
firm to be left to VC, svc, is determined endogenously via Nash bargaining. The first line
of this value simply tells that, if there is a match that generates a positive surplus the firm,
matches with a VC. Otherwise, it moves on to make production, R&D and exit decisions
where its R&D efficiency remains constant.
Private firms and IPO decision. Any private firm, with or without a VC, can issue an
IPO in any period. The upside of IPO is an increase in the size of operations. Moreover,
it enables the VC firm sell its share in the company and collect the return.21 Let V prt refer
to the value of a private firm that considers going public or remaining private. Then the
IPO decision is determined by the following maximization
V prt
(
qjt, θj, I
vc
j
)
= max
{
V prt
(
qjt, θj, I
vc
j
)
, (1− ∆)V pbt
(
κqjt, θ
pb
j
)
− χipo q¯t
}
.
The first part of this maximization is the value of the firm if it remains private. In the
second part, V pbt
(
κqjt, θ
pb
j
)
denotes the value of the public firm with larger size of oper-
ations, where κ > 1 denotes the increase. Firms that issue an IPO without any previous
relationship with a VC do not experience any change in the efficiency of product devel-
opment.
At last, the firm incurs various costs of issuing an IPO, which are captured by χipo q¯t.
Moreover, a ∆ share of the firm value is sold at IPO. The firm finances its investment in
improving its product quality with the proceeds from this transaction. In addition, if the
firm that goes public is matched with a VC, IPO allows the VC to liquidate its stocks in
the company in order to obtain the return on its initial investment, svcj .
21IPO is considered as the most profitable exit option and a measure of success for VC funds (Brander
et al., 2002; Sørensen, 2007). According to the 2013 Yearbook of National Venture Capital Association, 16%
of portfolio companies end up going public.
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3.2.4 Venture Capital Firms
Venture capital firms are agents that provide operational knowledge and finance to
private firms. There is an outside pool of VC firms. To enter the matching market, a VC
firm has to pay an entry cost. The entry cost is given by χvct ≡ χvcq¯t, and is proportional to
the average productivity in the economy. At any point in time, a VC firm can be matched
with only one firm. When the VC exits its investment, it is assumed to exit the economy.
The value of a VC that is not matched to a private firm is
At = mvc
(
nvc
n f
) ∫
svct
(
q, θL; ·
)
Ψq (dq) +
[
1−mvc
(
nvc
n f
)]
At+1
1+ rt+1
(3.10)
where Ψq denotes the distributions over q of the private firms that are in the matching
market. The first part of equation (3.10) explains that, with probability mvc (·), the VC
meets a private firm and gets a share svc. Otherwise it continues to search next period.
The share of the firm that the VC gains, svct (q, θ) , is the solution of the following
Nash bargaining problem
svct (q, θ) = argmaxs
[
V prt
(
q, θH, 1
)
−V prt
(
q, θL, 0
)
− s
]1−φ [
s− At+1 (·)
1+ rt+1
]φ
(3.11)
where φ is the bargaining power of the VC. Notice that, for a match to form between a VC
firm and a private company, the payment to the VC firm needs to be a positive amount
because the VC firm is subject to an entry cost. This implies that the VC firms invest
in companies only if the expected surplus is larger than zero. This selection margin is
integral for the identification purposes.22
22See Section 3.3.2 for details.
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3.2.5 Equilibrium
Throughout this paper, I will focus on the Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In particular,
the analysis will be based on the balanced growth equilibrium where aggregate variables
grow at a constant rate. To this end, it will be necessary to transform the economy into
a stationary one by normalizing the growing variables by the aggregate productivity q¯t.
First, I denote qˆjt ≡ qjt/q¯t as the normalized quality. Next, I define the Markov Perfect
Equilibrium where the asterisk refers to equilibrium values.
Definition 6 (Equilibrium). Let ξdj ∈ {0, 1}, d ∈ {exit,vc,ipo}, denote the decisions of firm j
regarding exit, VC search, and going public, respectively. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium consists
of aggregate prices {r∗t ,w∗t }; aggregate output, consumption, R&D expenditure, and intermedi-
ate input expenditure {Y∗t ,C∗t ,Z∗t ,K∗t }; intermediate prices and quantities {k∗jt , p∗jt}; R&D, exit,
search, and floating decisions {i∗jt , ξd
∗
j }d∈{exit,vc,ipo}; firm value functions {V f
∗
t ,W
f ∗
t } f∈{pb,pr} and
VC value A∗t ; VC pricing function svc
∗
t ; the normalized quality distribution and the mass of firms
{Ψˆ∗t (qˆ), J∗t } where t ∈ [0,∞), j ∈ J∗t such that
1. {k∗jt , p∗jt} are given by (3.5) and (3.4), and maximize the operating profits,
2. {V f ∗t ,W f
∗
t } f∈{pb,pr} satisfy (3.6), (3.7), (3.9), and (3.8),
3. i∗jt maximize the expected profits, and {ξd
∗
j }d∈{exit,vc,ipo} solves the value functions,
4. Ψˆ∗t (qˆ) is consistent with R&D, entry, exit, VC, and IPO decisions of the firms,
5. J∗t supports the free entry condition to hold with equality,
6. A∗t is given by (3.10),
7. svc
∗
t as in (3.11) is determined by Nash bargaining;
8. {Y∗t ,C∗t } are given by (3.2) and (3.1),
9. and aggregate prices {r∗t ,w∗t } clear the market.
113
Accordingly, a balanced growth equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 7 (Balanced Growth Path). A Balanced Growth Path (BGP) is an equilibrium where
Ψˆ∗(qˆ) defines an invariant distribution, the measure of firms, J∗, has a fixed value, and the average
quality q¯ and the aggregate variables grow at a constant rate g.
Given the invariant distribution of normalized quality levels and the stationary R&D
decisions, I can now derive the constant growth rate of the economy in a BGP:23
g =
∫
j∈J∗
(
1− ξexitj
) {
ijλ+ ξ
ipo
j (κ − 1)
(
qˆj + ijλ
)}
dj
−
∫
j∈J∗
{
ξexitj + I
vc
j σ
vc
(
1− ξexitj
)}
qˆjdj+
∫
j∈Jentry
qˆjdj. (3.12)
There are several factors that contribute to the balanced growth rate. The first integral on
the right-hand side of equation (3.12) captures the effect of surviving firms. Conditional
on remaining in the business, intermediate firm j adds the step size λ if it generates
an innovation, which happens at rate ij. Moreover, if firm j issues public equity in the
beginning of the next period, its quality increases by a factor κ − 1. The second integral
captures the loss due to exiting firms. Notice that exit happens due to both the optimal
decision of the firm and the attrition rate if the firm is matched with a VC. The last
component of equation (3.12) denotes the contribution of entry.24
Finally, the following condition holds for the representative household.
Proposition 8 (Euler Equation). In BGP, the household maximization implies the equilibrium
interest rate r = (1+ g)ε /β− 1.
23See Appendix C.1 for the derivation.
24Note that the entrant firms do not contribute through IPO because the support of the distribution from
which they draw the initial product quality does not extend over values that lead to IPO.
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3.3 Estimation
In order to measure the specific effects of different channels through which VC fi-
nancing affects firm-level innovation and aggregate growth, I estimate the parameters of
the model via the simulated method of moments (SMM). In this section, I first describe
the identification and computation procedures. Then, I present the estimation results and
discuss the goodness of fit. As a brief overview, the model successfully captures the du-
ration of firm-VC matches and the firm age at the time of initial public offering as well
as the aggregate patterns of R&D and growth. The model also replicates the difference in
firm growth patterns between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms observed in the data.
I start by describing the parameters that are determined outside the model.
3.3.1 Pre-determined Parameters
Because the model at hand is a fairly rich one with a large number of parameters,
assigning some of them a priori mitigates the burden of estimation. There are 10 parame-
ters that are chosen externally. The time period in the model corresponds to 1 year in the
data. On the household side, the period utility function is assumed to have logarithmic
form such that the curvature of the CRRA utility function, ε, equals 1, the midpoint be-
tween various estimates surveyed in Mehra and Prescott (1985). The discount rate, β, is
picked to imply a reasonable long run interest rate level, given the targeted rate of growth
of 2%. Setting β = 0.98 implies approximately a 4% real interest rate. On the final good
production, the share of intermediate goods, α, is set to 0.825. This is in the ballpark of
Akcigit et al. (2014), who find a calibrated share of 0.9 for tangible factors of production
using US data on firm profitability. Akcigit et al. (2013) also assign a value of 0.85 to
physical factors in their final good production function. Without loss of generality, the
marginal cost of producing intermediate goods is normalized to (1− α) for private firms
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that do not have VC support.25
The function h(·) that defines the cost of doing R&D is assumed to have the form
γ0xγ1 . The curvature parameter, γ1, is set to 2 so that the function has quadratic shape.
This in turn implies that the R&D elasticity in the innovation production function is 0.5,
a value in line with the empirical literature.26 The lowest product development efficiency,
θL, is normalized to 1.
The parameter that governs the exogenous separation of matches between firms and
VC funds, σvc, is set as follows. In NVCA (2013), the National Venture Capital Association
(NVCA) reports that, among VC-backed firms that received their first round of funding
between 1991-2000, about 16% made it to the IPO stage. Another 18% are reported to
fail. The rest of the matches end in ways that I do not include in my model.27 The ex-
ogenous separation parameter, σvc, captures the yearly attrition rate due to these external
reasons.28 For the average share sold at IPO, ∆, Ritter (1998) reports a range of 20%-40%.
The telegraph matching function introduces a single scale parameter that is normalized
to 1. Lastly, the bargaining power of the VC, φ, is assumed to be 0.5. Table (8) summarizes
the predetermined values.
25This normalization simplifies the derivation of the profit function. The corresponding value for VC-
backed and public firms, η, is determined in the estimation.
26Measuring innovations by patents, the empirical literature on patents and R&D provides estimates for
this elasticity. Griliches (1990) gives a range from 0.3 to 0.6 while Blundell et al. (2002) find 0.5.
27Among these remaining matches, half of them resulted in acquisition of the private firm by another
one. The other half is counted as “still private or not known”, and most of them are believed to have failed.
Because the success of a VC firm is generally measured by its IPO performance, I focus on IPOs.
28The total attrition rate is assumed to be the cumulative hazard rate over 7.5 years. This length of time
represents the median tenure of VC investments, which is estimated to vary from 7 to 10 years in the data.
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Value Description Source
β = 0.98 Discount Rate Real Interest Rate
ε = 1 CRRA curvature Mehra and Prescott (1985)
α = 0.825 Share of physical factor Akcigit et al. (2014)
ηH = 1− α Cost of capital, high normalized
γ1 = 2 R&D cost elasticity Blundell et al. (2002)
θL = 1 Product development efficiency, low normalized
ρ = 1 Scale of telegraph matching imposed
φ = 0.5 Bargaining power imposed
σvc = 8.7% Attrition rate of VC-firm matches Unsuccessful separations
∆ = .28 Share sold at IPO Ritter (1998)
Table 8: Parameters Fixed A Priori
3.3.2 Identification of the Estimated Parameters
There are 10 parameters to be estimated. Perhaps the most crucial parameters are
{θL, θH} because they determine the magnitude of the impact on firm growth of the op-
erational knowledge provided by VCs. Having normalized θL to 1, I make use of Puri
and Zarutskie (2012) in estimating θH. Puri and Zarutskie (2012) make a fundamental
contribution to the empirical literature that investigates the effect of venture capital on
firm dynamics by employing survey data on firms. In particular, they combine the Ven-
tureXpert and Longitudinal Business Database of US Census Bureau so that they are able
to determine the firms that received VC financing. Controlling for the number of em-
ployees, age, geographical location, and the industry at four-digit SIC level, they create a
matched sample of non-VC-backed firms and firms that are at the first round of getting
VC funding.29 The authors observe the firms in these two categories until they exit in
29It should be emphasized that Puri and Zarutskie (2012) do not control for the amount of VC invest-
ment received, and do not uncover particular mechanisms through which VC affects firm dynamics. One
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some form (exit the data, become public, etc.) for a maximum of 10 years. Then, using
these samples, they regress the logarithm of firm sales on a number of covariates and, in
particular, provide the OLS estimate on the interaction term between a dummy for VC
use and the time elapsed after matching.30 This estimate determines the differential im-
pact of VC financing on firm growth. To determine θH , I create analogous samples from
the stationary distribution of my model. I simulate firms in these samples for 10 years,
and conduct the same regression analysis. The estimation procedure tries to match the
model counterpart of the OLS estimate with the one provided Puri and Zarutskie (2012).
The size of VC firms’ financial impact is governed by the difference between η and
ηH, the marginal costs of production for private firms with and without VC backing,
respectively. To discipline this difference, I assume that the decline in the cost of capital
due to VC investment reflects all the pecuniary support of VC companies. Then, including
the ratio of VC investment to GDP as one of the data moments determines the size of this
financial support in my model.31
In order to complete the estimation of the VC market, the entry cost for VC firms
needs to be determined. The entry cost of the venture capitalist, χvc, creates a thresh-
old for the intermediate good qualities above which VC firms would not agree to form
a match with a firm, because they could not generate a great deal of improvement on
already high quality levels due to decreasing returns to innovations. Moreover, this en-
try cost determines the ex-ante value of a venture capitalist before entering the market.
Therefore, once the other parameters that describe the matching function and Nash bar-
gaining are fixed, χvc is closely correlated with the probability of firms obtaining VC
financing. Hence, to discipline χvc, I include as a target the NVCA (2013) estimate that,
roughly, only one out of a hundred applications succeeds in securing VC financing. One
contribution of my paper is to establish this.
30The OLS regression results are presented in Appendix C.2.
31Venture capital investments do not only include funding of early- and growth-stage companies, but also
buyouts, later-stage investments, etc. not relevant to the point of this paper. Therefore, when calculating the
ratio of VC investment to GDP, I take into account only the early- and expansionary-stage investments by
VC.
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caveat: in my model, every meeting in the matching market results in a match. This
happens both because there is no search cost for the firms, and because VC firms are
identical. Any firm that knows that a match would create a positive surplus goes into
the market, and the ones with the expectation of a negative surplus stay out. To map the
NVCA statistic to my model, I interpret the 1% success on applications as the chance of
meeting a VC company that would accept the firm. When solving the model, I fix the
probability of matching with a VC at this level, and solve for the level of entry cost that
supports the equilibrium by looping over χvc.
To complete the cost structure of an IPO, the fixed cost of IPO, χIPO, needs to be
determined. This parameter maps to direct costs of IPO observed in the data, such as
registration fee and underwriting costs. The statistics provided by Ritter (1998) indicate
that, on average, these costs amount to 11% of the total proceeds raised by IPO. Using
this figure, I can directly estimate χIPO.
The benefits of an IPO are determined by two parameters: κ, the abrupt increase
in quality level, and θM, the permanent product development efficiency that VC-backed
firms retain after becoming public. Determining the gains from IPO, these parameters are
crucial for the decision of the optimal time to go public. To pin down κ and θM, I therefore
use the median age across all private firms at the time of IPO, together with the median
length of firm-VC matches that lead to an IPO. Because product development efficiency
is assumed to remain fixed for non-VC-funded private firms after going public, κ is the
only parameter that determines the gains from going public for these type of firms. Then,
the median time to IPO for VC-backed companies is helpful primarily in identifying θM.
Both κ and θM are negatively related to these age moments.
The rest of the parameters are λ, γ0, χo, and χe. The first one determines the quality
gain due to process innovations and is mostly tied to the average growth, for which the
target value is the average US post-war annual growth rate of 2%. The scale parameter
of R&D cost function γ0 is used to match the R&D share of GDP. The outside option for
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intermediate firms, χo, is estimated by targeting a 5.5% equilibrium exit rate. I take this
value from Lee and Mukoyama (2012), who calculate estimates using US plant-level data
from 1972-1997. I set the entry cost, χe, that the potential entrepreneurs face, such that
the equilibrium measure of intermediate good firms is equal to unity. As a result, the set
of 11 parameters to be estimated within the feasible set Ω is
ω ≡
[
η, γ0, χvc, ρ, χIPO, κ, θ
M, θH, λ, χe, χo
]T ∈ Ω.
3.3.3 Algorithm
The computation of general equilibrium given a parameter set ωgiven ∈ Ω consists of
two nested fixed point problems. The outer loop searches for convergence on the growth
rate. Given the growth rate, the inner loop computes the value functions. Computation of
the value function for non-VC-backed firms requires another nested fixed point solution
in the sense that the equilibrium matching rate and the value functions needs to be solved
jointly. At this point, I modify the problem so that I fix the matching rate at the targeted
moment, and solve for the corresponding VC entry cost instead. This step requires cal-
culation of the endogenous (normalized) quality distribution across firms. The reason is
that, given the fixed matching rate, I use the value of the VC firm to update the guess
for χvc, and the value function of the VC firm depends on the endogenous distribution
of firms searching for VC. To yield a smooth distribution, I discretize the possible values
of the normalized quality levels into 1200 points for each firm type. Once I obtain the
general equilibrium, I simulate samples from the stationary distribution to calculate the
moments regarding the age of IPO for private firms, median duration to IPO in firm-VC
matches, and the regression statistic that determines χvc. Given a set of parameters ωguess
the solution routine continues as follows:
1. Guess a growth rate gguess.
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2. Solve for the value functions of
(a) Public firms
(b) VC-backed private firms
3. Solve for the value function of non-VC-backed private firms.
(a) Guess a candidate entry cost, χguess, for VC firms.
(b) Compute the value function of non-VC-backed private firms.
(c) With all value functions at hand, compute the stationary distribution.
(d) Compute the implied χnew using the problem of the VC firm. Update until
‖χguess − χnew‖ < ǫ.
4. Compute the implied gnew. Update until ‖gguess − gnew‖ < ǫ.
3.3.4 Estimation Results
Parameter Estimates
Table 9 reports the values for the parameter estimates obtained via the computation
algorithm introduced above.
A number of parameter estimates in Table 9 merit special attention. The first variable
in the table, η, determines the magnitude of the financial help of VC firms. The estimated
value implies that VC firms decrease the marginal cost of intermediate good production
by 6%. The economic meaning of this estimate is better reflected in the resulting difference
in operation profit levels. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the estimated
reduction in marginal costs translates into 30% higher operational profits for a VC-backed
company compared to a non-VC-backed counterpart with the same product quality.
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Value Description Identification
η = 0.94 · ηH Cost of capital ratio VC investment/GDP
γ0 = 50 R&D cost scale R&D investment/GDP
χvc = 0.435 VC entry cost Success in due diligence
χipo = 0.20 IPO fixed cost Direct cost of IPO
κ = 1.60 Quality jump, IPO Median duration with VC
θM = 4 Efficiency, after VC Median age at IPO
θH = 5 Efficiency, with VC Puri&Zarutskie (2012)
λ = 0.275 Innovation size Growth rate
χe = 2.43∗10−4 Entry cost Fixing measure to unity
χo = 6.06 Outside option Exit rate
Table 9: Estimated Parameters
Two other important parameters are θH and θM, which, respectively, measure the di-
rect and permanent (post-IPO) efficiency gains in product development due to VC firms’
operational knowledge. The former implies that a VC-backed firm is five times more
efficient than its non-VC-backed counterpart in improving a certain quality level with in-
novation intensity. Moreover, the estimate for θM implies that the VC-backed firm retains
80% of this efficiency gain after going public. As the counterfactual experiments reveal
below, this limited loss of efficiency even after separation from the VC firm has important
implications for the effect of VC financing on long-run economic growth.
Goodness of Fit
Table 10 summarizes the moment targets and their counterparts in the model. First
of all, the model is successful in matching the aggregate growth rate and the ratio of R&D
investment to GDP. Because innovation and aggregate growth are integral parts of the
analysis, it is critical that the model reflects these aspects of the data well.
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Looking at the data moments that largely define the VC market, the first result is that
the model accounts for a fair amount of VC investment in the data. Notice that the implied
parameter estimate results in a sizable improvement in operational profits of VC-backed
companies, as explained above. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the estimation allows
the monetary aspect of VC financing to have a significant impact on firm dynamics. The
other channel, operational knowledge, has both a direct and a permanent effect on the
firms that receive VC support. The direct effect is disciplined by the regression statistic
obtained from the analysis of Puri and Zarutskie (2012), and the model proves to be
successful in matching this crucial target.32 Moreover, the median duration of VC-backed
firms until IPO in the model mirrors the data target very closely. Matching this target is
important because it disciplines the permanent effect of VC’s operational knowledge as
well as the IPO cost for VC-backed firms in this regard.
Target Data Model
VC investment/GDP 0.17% 0.12%
IPO direct costs 11% 6.26%
Match probability 1% 1%
R&D investment/GDP 2.8% 2.89%
Median duration with VC 5.5yrs 6yrs
Median age at IPO 12yrs 11yrs
Regression statistic 0.212 0.242
Growth rate 2.0% 1.95%
Exit rate 5.5% 2.75%
1 The regression statistic provided by Puri and Zarutskie
(2012) is highly significant with a t-statistic 11.23.
Table 10: Model Fit
32I discuss the implications for firm growth below.
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Non-targeted Moments
Table 11 reports statistics observed in the data and not targeted in the estimation of
the model, together with their data counterparts.
Data Model
IPO probability of VC-backed firms 16% 20%
VC-backed IPOs 50% 51%
Output share of private firms 46% 48%
Relative firm growth 0.75 0.22
Table 11: Non-targeted Moments
First of all, the model captures the IPO patterns in the data accurately. The model
simulations based on samples of 50,000 firms imply that about 16% of VC-firm matches
end up with an IPO. This number is the ballpark of the value found in the 2013 report
of the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA, 2013). For the private firms without
VC support, the corresponding value is 1.7% in the model. This is well below the value
for VC-backed companies, a pattern also observed in the data. Similarly, the fraction of
IPOs involving VC-backed firms is also closely reflected in the model. The recent IPO
report by WilmerHale (2014), a widely recognized law company in the US, documents
that in 2013, VC-backed IPOs constituted half of all IPOs, whereas the data statistics in
Ritter (2014) indicate that an average of 38% of IPOs were VC-backed between 2006-2013.
A closer look at the firm type composition of the model economy shows that 48%
of output is produced by privately held firms. The most recent figures from the U.S.
Small Business Administration data similarly show that a little less than 50% of the US
GDP is produced by firms with fewer than 500 employees of which almost all are private
124
firms (Kobe, 2012).33,34 Regarding the growth rates of private firms, the estimated model
predicts that the yearly average growth rate of VC-backed firms is 22% higher than the
rate of the non-VC-backed sample.35 The corresponding figure in the data is obtained
from Puri and Zarutskie (2012). As explained in detail, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) explore
growth rates of different samples of private firms with and without VC backing that
are matched based on observable characteristics. They document that, over the first 10
years after the time of matching, the average growth rate of the VC-backed sample is 75%
higher. Although at a smaller magnitude, the model captures this pattern qualitatively.
This smaller magnitude indicates that the model provides a lower bound for the VC
impact observed in the data.36
Figure 14 shows the impact of VC on firm distribution over a 10-year period. Follow-
ing Puri and Zarutskie (2012) I create a model sample of private firms from the stationary
distribution that defines new matches with VC firms. The thin solid line shows this initial
distribution. I then simulate two versions of this sample across 10 years. In one version,
firms are assumed to receive VC financing whereas in the other, firms continue without
VCs and are observed until they obtain VC, issue public equity or exit the market. Start-
ing the simulation with the identical group of firms replicates the matching exercise of
firms in te data based on their sales, as done by Puri and Zarutskie (2012). The resulting
difference between VC-backed and non-VC-backed samples after 10 years is illustrated
by the dashed and thick solid lines, respectively. Among the VC-backed firms that remain
after 10 years, there is a population of firms that survive with lower sales and profits. No-
33It is true that a small fraction of firms in the economy are public, and most of the large firms with more
than 500 employees are private. However, given that my focus is on the dynamics of young and innovative
firms as opposed to very large private firms, matching the output share of firms with less than 500 employees
is a reasonable comparison.
34Asker et al. (2014) report that all private firms account for 59% of sales.
35In this exercise, firm growth is defined as sales growth, in line with Puri and Zarutskie (2012).
36This smaller magnitude can be partially attributed to the exogenous attrition process that hits every
VC match with the same probability,i.e., it destroys successful matches at the same rate as it does relatively
unsuccessful ones. However, in reality, an important share of the exits that the attrition rate accounts for in
the model are unsuccessful firms. Therefore, the figure of 22% generated by the model can be considered as
an attenuated value for the growth rate differential between VC-backed and non-VC-backed samples.
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Figure 14: Evolution of Matched Samples in the Model
tice that, in the model, the value of the outside option, χo q¯t, is the same for any firm type.
This shows that financial support from VCs through lower intermediate production costs
helps some firms with a lower productive capacity remain in the economy. However, as
the last row of Table 11 shows, the yearly average growth rate of the VC-backed sample
is 22% higher in the model. This impact is reflected by the fatter right tail of the resulting
distribution of the VC-backed sample. VC firms’ operational knowledge enables a larger
subgroup of firms to achieve higher levels of production compared to the non-VC-backed
sample. This outcome is in line with the reality that many portfolio companies of VC
funds are relatively unsuccessful, while a few perform exceptionally.
Regarding VC impact on firm growth, one caveat is worth mentioning. Despite the
fact that Puri and Zarutskie (2012) controlled for observable characteristics when creating
matched samples, this procedure did not account for a possible selection of firms by VC
companies according to unobservable features. Suppose that there was sorting of firms
that are superior on some unobservable quality towards VC investment. If the match-
ing procedure does not account for this type of sorting, and if that affects firm growth
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positively, then this would inflate the apparent effect of VC investment through opera-
tional knowledge in my model, since the contribution of this unobserved quality would
be inaccurately assigned to that channel. It is fundamentally important to notice that this
would not bias my estimation because it proceeds on the method of indirect inference,
replicating the same empirical experiment as in Puri and Zarutskie (2012). Nonethe-
less, when interpreting the impact of operational knowledge in both the model and in the
data, the potential effect of selection on unobservables can be included, using the findings
of Sørensen (2007). Using data on IPO rates of VC-backed companies, Sørensen (2007)
shows that the portfolio companies of more experienced VCs are more likely to go public.
Then, he structurally estimates a two-sided matching model to find that sorting, defined
as the fact that more experienced VCs invest in better firms, accounts for 50% to 60% of
the higher IPO rate in companies backed by more experienced VCs. In other words, the
direct influence of VC on the firm is 40-50%. This estimate, however, reflects the differ-
ential effect of VCs’ expertise only across VC-backed firms, and does not account for its
significance in comparison to firms that completely lack VC backing. This means that it
attenuates the relevance of VCs’ direct influence on firms. Nevertheless, if a conservative
path were followed based on Sørensen (2007), the estimate of 22% that my model implies
for VCs’ impact on firm growth would still translate into 10%.
3.4 Quantitative Exploration
Having estimated the parameters of the model and analyzed the model fit, I use
this framework for two purposes. First, I measure the significance of VCs’ operational
knowledge relative to the financing channel, in terms of the aggregate growth of the
economy. To do so, I run counterfactual experiments in which I marginally increase
the parameters that govern financing and the operational knowledge channels. I then
compare the resulting changes in the growth rates of the economy. Next, I replicate
a recent policy measure that the European Union has adopted to make the investment
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environment more hospitable for venture capital firms. In the model, I capture the essence
of the policy by decreasing the entry cost of VC firms, and explore the impact on long-run
economic growth.
3.4.1 Counterfactual Analysis: Strength of Operational Knowledge
To measure the relative impact of the operational knowledge channel in aggregate
growth terms, I first consider a hypothetical economy in which I increase the parameters{
θM, θH
}
by 5% without changing θL.37 I then run a similar experiment where I increase
the size of the marginal cost reduction due to VC help by the same amount, keeping the
other parameters at the estimated levels. These experiments allow me to compare the
elasticity of the growth rate to the distinct channels through which VC firms affect firm
dynamics.
Benchmark
{
θM, θH
}
5% higher
(
ηH − η)
5% higher
No VC
IPO fixed cost
15% higher
Subsidy:
VC entry cost
3.5% lower
Growth 1.95% 2.01% 2.06% 1.39% 1.93% 2.02%
Measure of firms 1 1 1.16 0.99 1 1.01
Table 12: Counterfactual Experiments
The first three columns of Table 12 summarize the response of the economy to
marginal changes in different aspects of VC support in comparison to the estimated econ-
omy. The table also reports the equilibrium measure of intermediate firms because the
changes also affect the endogenously determined size of the economy. Comparing the
growth rates in the second and third columns shows that the marginal increase in the
strength of the operational channel leads to a 0.06% gain in the growth rate, whereas this
37One alternative approach to measure the impact of operational knowledge is to consider its absence by
removing the increase in product development efficiency due to VC support. The reason I do not use this
approach is that in this case no private firm searches for VC. Nevertheless, this endogenous shutting down
of the market happens even when there are small efficiency gains from VC help. In that case, removing the
efficiency gain completely does not measure the exact impact of operational knowledge on aggregate growth.
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number is around 11% when the change in the financial channel is considered. Therefore,
the main message of this comparison is that, in terms of long-run growth, the operational
channel is about half as effective as the financial channel. In other words, the influence of
the operational knowledge channel on growth through its impact on firms accounts for
about 1/3 of VCs’ total contribution to aggregate growth through its impact on firms. The
increase in financial impact also expands the equilibrium measure of products by 16%, in
addition to its effect on long-run growth.
A deeper look into the hypothetical model economies reveals that, in the case of
stronger financial support, most of the impact is generated through the changing compo-
sition of private firms. In the hypothetical world with increased financial impact, the ratio
of output produced by VC-backed firms to the amount produced by all private firms is
about 50%, whereas this number is about 4% in the estimated actual economy.38 One rea-
son for this result is that, due to the higher aggregate growth rate, the fixed cost of IPO,
which is proportional to aggregate productivity, increases faster. This leads to longer
durations of VC matches before VC-backed firms go public.39 In the case of stronger
operational knowledge influence, however, these fluctuations are much more limited. In-
stead, the impact on long-run growth of the economy stems from the increased efficiency
of development, both for the VC-backed firms and for the public firms that received VC
support.
Lastly, the fourth column in Table 12 implies that, in a hypothetical world without
a market for venture capital, the growth rate would go down to 1.40%. Here, I assume
that all firms operate with low efficiency, and there is no means to affect it. This lower
efficiency, in turn, leads to a drastic fall in the growth rate. Regarding this experiment,
one caveat is that all firms operate at the higher marginal cost of production because the
38Notice that the 5% additional reduction in marginal cost translates into more than 25% additional profits
per unit of product quality. The huge responses in the hypothetical economy stem from this fact. Thus, it is
plausible to think that these counterfactual comparisons provide lower bounds for the relative importance of
the operational knowledge channel.
39The resulting median age is around 9 years, whereas in the benchmark economy this was 6 years.
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only financial intermediary in the model is removed. This has an indirect growth impact
because higher profits due to VCs’ financial support create an indirect incentive for inno-
vation due to a larger return per unit of product quality. The drastic fall in the aggregate
growth rate would potentially be smaller if there were an alternative intermediary with a
similar financial impact. Therefore, this result should be interpreted cautiously.
3.4.2 Counterfactual Analysis: Higher Cost of IPO
A widely held belief is that there are strong complementarities between VC finance
and an active public equity market (Black and Gilson, 1998; Michelacci and Suarez,
2004).40 The intuition is the following: on the one hand, VC firms accelerate new ventures
towards issuing IPO, through the aforementioned influences. On the other hand, liquid
stock markets provide an attractive and affordable IPO option for private firms, and a
profitable way for VC firms to separate from portfolio companies.
To analyze the linkages between public equity issuance and VC financing in my
model, I now consider an economy in which the fixed cost of IPO is 15% higher. I obtain
this value from Kim et al. (2003). In their study of equity and debt issues from 1970s
to 2000s, Kim et al. (2003) document that average underwriting spreads for IPOs in the
US were 8.5% and 7.4% over the periods 1976-1985 and 1996-2005, respectively.41 Having
used data from the latter period in my estimation, I now analyze the counterfactual set-
ting where I set the fixed cost of IPO to its earlier value. As shown in the fifth column of
Table 12, the growth rate falls by about 1.5 basis points.
Figure 15 shows the resulting changes in the IPO decisions. The increase in the fixed
cost affects the IPO threshold on the firm size negligibly for VC-backed firms whereas
the threshold for non-VC-backed firms rises discernibly. The difference stems from the
40Bottazzi and Rin (2002) report supporting evidence on the positive impact of Euro.nm, the European
counterpart of Nasdaq, on European VC activity in 1990s. Euro.nm, opened in 1997, is the alliance of new
European stock markets that focuses on growth companies.
41The underwriting costs are one of the main determinants of the fixed costs associated with IPOs.
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Figure 15: IPO decisions
higher profit levels that VC-backed firms generate with the same quality level due to VCs’
financing support. The higher threshold in turn implies a 3% fall in the non-VC-backed
equity issuances. Therefore, it expands the group of private firms available to match
with a VC. Together with the VC firms’ willingness to search longer due to the higher
equilibrium discount factor, this change means a 10% lower probability that a private firm
will match with a VC..42 In turn, the share of VC-backed firms in the economy decreases
by 11%, which also lowers the share of public firms that had received VC support when
they were private. In combination, all these responses result in a 1.5 basis point loss in
the long-run growth rate of the economy.
3.4.3 Policy Analysis: VC Entry Cost
In 2013, the European Union adopted a new regulation on venture capital funds to
enhance funding to small and medium businesses through venture capital financing.43
42A lower growth rate implies a lower interest rate; therefore, VC firms discount the future value less.
43The legislative act by the European Commission (2013) explicitly recognizes that “venture capital funds
provide undertakings with valuable expertise and knowledge, business contacts, brand equity and strategic
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As a main obstacle to adequate VC funding, the European Commission recognized the
lack of a harmonized VC market across the Union. According to the Commission, the
fragmented structure of the VC market across national borders increases VC firms’ costs
due to changing national regulatory environments, especially regarding the raising of
capital. To help VC firms expand their operations by easing fundraising, the EU passed
a new regulation that introduces a designation called the “European Venture Capital
Fund”. VC managers whose funds meet certain requirements, such as high concentration
on investment in young and innovative companies, can raise capital under this rubric and
be subject to a single rulebook across all EU countries.44
To analyze the potential effects of this regulation, I interpret the lower fundraising
cost for VC firms through the lens of my model as lower entry costs. In the experiment,
I assume that 3.5% of the entry cost is subsidized through a lump-sum tax on the repre-
sentative household.45 As the last column of Table 12 shows, this subsidy increases the
long-run growth rate by around 7 basis points. A back-of-the-envelope calculation illus-
trates that, in equilibrium, the cost of this policy is 0.09‰ of output. Correspondingly,
the subsidized amount is about 8% of the total investment made by VCs into portfolio
companies in the benchmark economy.
The details of how the economy responds to the subsidy show similarities to the
counterfactual experiment in which the financial support of VC was expanded. Through
the general equilibrium effects, there is a reallocation of private firms towards being VC-
backed companies, and these stay with the VC firm for a greater period of time. This
longer match duration amplifies VCs’ effect on the aggregate growth rate through the
influence of superior operational knowledge. This happens due to two factors. First,
as illustrated in Figure 17b for both VC-backed and non-VC-baked firms, there is an
advice”.
44The law requires qualifying funds to channel at least 70% of their capital to small and medium enter-
prises (SME).
45This value has been picked such that, in the new equilibrium, a reasonably low share of output is used
to finance the subsidy.
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Figure 16: Response to Lower VC Entry Cost
increase in the (normalized) quality thresholds above which the two types private firms
issue IPO. This shift emerges, again, due to a combination of the proportionality of the
fixed IPO cost to average productivity, and the higher resulting equilibrium aggregate
growth rate. As a result, firms need to develop their product quality further to afford
IPO issuance costs. The second factor for increased match durations is that VC firms
match with companies of smaller quality levels, which have larger potential for growth.
For a given IPO threshold, this implies that, on average VC-backed firms have to innovate
more to reach the IPO stage. Figure 17a delineates this point. The curves show the present
discounted value of the surplus of a potential match between a VC firm and private firms
with quality qˆj. In this economy with subsidies, this curve shifts towards the left so that a
positive surplus, and thus a profitable match, is possible with firms of smaller size. These
combined changes result in a 7 basis point higher long-run growth rate of the economy.46
46In this economy, all private firms available for VC matches have a certain identical efficiency level. A
heterogeneity in this margin could dampen the effect of the policy change because some of the new VC
firms had to meet with firms that already have higher efficiency. A parallel impact could arise if there were
heterogeneity across VC firms in their potential to affect product development efficiency (Hsu, 2004; Bottazzi
et al., 2008). A similar concept of heterogeneous firm entry and its aggregate productivity implications is
investigated by Ates¸ and Saffie (2014). Incorporating these margins of heterogeneity by deriving the relevant
empirical distributions in the data and deploying them in the estimation procedure is an attractive area for
future research.
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3.5 Conclusion
Motivated by the disproportionate investment of venture capital finance in young
and innovative businesses, I study in this paper the quantitative impact of VC financing
on firm dynamics and economic growth. I propose a new dynamic general equilibrium
model of innovation with heterogeneous firms by introducing an explicit venture capital
(VC) market. The model allows me to conduct counterfactual experiments which I use to
quantify the impact of VC financing and examine relevant policies. I pay particular atten-
tion to a unique feature of VC firms that is largely overlooked by current macroeconomic
analysis: the operational knowledge that VC firms bundle with their cash investment. In
the model, technologically heterogeneous firms engage in innovative activities to improve
their product quality and increase their profits. The efficiency of this product develop-
ment process can be enhanced through the operational knowledge of VC firms. The
model also includes an endogenous search and matching setting where VC companies
and firms meet. In this way, the model accounts for the selection aspect of the VC mar-
ket in addition to the cash investment and the operational knowledge. This is crucial to
capture general equilibrium effects.
I structurally estimate this model using US data on VC finance, public equity is-
suances, and research and development expenditures. I identify the operational knowl-
edge channel through its distinct impact on firm growth. Out-of-sample tests demonstrate
that the estimated model successfully captures the non-targeted data moments such as
IPO frequency of VC-backed firms, and the differences in growth rates of VC-backed and
non-VC-backed firms, among others.
I then use the estimated model to conduct counterfactual and policy analyses. First, I
measure the impact of the operational knowledge channel in terms of aggregate economic
growth. The analysis indicates that a sizeable fraction, 1/3, of VCs’ impact on economic
growth is generated through operational knowledge channel. This result implies that, for
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financing innovation, VC has significant value beyond capital investment alone. Next, I
evaluate a recent policy adopted by the European Union. The regulation aims to decrease
fundraising costs for VC firms and expand VC investment across borders by harmonizing
the relevant regulatory environment throughout the Union. I examine effects of a subsidy
on VC entry cost that simulates the policy and find that this change can generate a 7 basis
point gain in the long-run growth rate of the economy.
This paper provides fruitful ground for several directions of future research. One
immediate step could be to explore the implications of heterogeneity across VC firms and
the sensitivity of VC impact on firm growth to this aspect. A broader research question
would be how the VC market arises endogenously. The optimal provision of operational
expertise by VC requires managers who possess both sufficient operational knowledge
and financial wealth. Explaining the reasons why and how venture capitalists emerge
could help us understand the vast differences in the size of VC markets across different
regions, such as the US and continental Europe.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proposition 1
Proof. First note that, for any θ¯ ∈ [0, 1], the probability of a randomly drawn project
e ∈ [0, 1] having a probability θ(e) ≤ θ¯ is given by:
F(θ¯) =
(
θ¯
) 1
ν
Then, F(θ) is the cumulative density function of θ, and we can use it to find its probability
density function:
f (θ) =
∂F(θ)
∂θ
=
1
ν
(θ)
1
ν−1
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More algebra delivers:
E [θ] =
∫ 1
0
θ
ν
(θ)
1
ν−1 dθ =
1
ν+ 1
V [θ] = E
[
(θ − E [θ])2
]
=
ν2
(ν+ 1)2 (2ν+ 1)
S [θ] =
E
[
(θ − E [θ])3
]
(
E
[
(θ − E [θ])2
]) 3
2
=
2(ν− 1)√1+ 2ν
1+ 3ν
Note that ν = 1 corresponds to a uniform distribution. For ν ≥ 1 this distribution
resembles a Truncated Pareto distribution, but it behaves better on the neighborhood of
0.
A.2 Proposition 2
Proof. Denote by P(H|e˜) the expected probability of a project generating a drastic inno-
vation conditional on delivering a signal e˜. Then:
P(H|e˜) = ρe˜ν + (1− ρ) 1
ν+ 1
P(H|e˜) is increasing in the signal e˜. Then if VHt > VLt , the expected benefits of enacting
a project is also increasing in e˜. As the cost of enacting a project is independent of the
signal, the optimal strategy is to pick the desired mass M of projects with the highest
signal. Finally, in order to get a mass M, the cut-off e¯ must satisfy:
∫ e¯
0
(1− ρ) (1− e¯) de+
∫ 1
e¯
{(1− ρ) (1− e¯) + ρ} de = M ⇔ e¯ = 1−M
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A.3 Proposition 4
Proof. We start solving for the profits of the intermediate good sector. Given (1.7), (1.9),
and (1.16) the profits of a type d firm are given by
πdj,t = l
d
j,tqj,t
(
wt
q˜j,t
− wt
qj,t
)
= ldj,twtσ
d =
σd
(1+ σd)
Yt. (A.1)
Thus, ∀j ∈ [0, 1] , πdj,t = πdt . Then, by (1.10), we have ∀j ∈ [0, 1] , Vdj,t = Vdt . Also, as
σH > σL, we have πHt > π
L
t , and then V
H
t > V
L
t . This rationalizes the equilibrium cut-off
strategy of the financial intermediary. Moreover, σd determines the constant markup of
type d leader in any product line.
The last part of equation (A.1) reveals that ldj,t = l
d
t for all industries. Using (1.14) and
(A.1) we can find the expression for the labor demand that only depends on the type of
the leader, d:
lLt =
(1+ σH) [L− (1− e¯t)κ]
1+ σH − µHt (σH − σL)
; lHt =
(1+ σL) [L− (1− e¯t)κ]
1+ σH − µHt (σH − σL)
. (A.2)
Note that lLt > l
H
t .
A.4 Dynamic System
From (A.1) and (A.2) we get the following expression for wages:
wt =
[
1+ σH − µHt (σH − σL)
]
(1+ σL)(1+ σH) [L− (1− e¯t)κ]Yt. (A.3)
Now, we are able to characterize the output growth in the model:
(1+ gt) =
Yt+1
Yt
= e
(∫ 1
0
{
ln
lj,t+1
lj,t
}
dj+
∫ 1
0
{
ln
qj,t+1
qj,t
}
dj
)
. (A.4)
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Recall that Qt ≡ exp(
∫ 1
0 ln qj,tdj). Then:
ln(Qt+1) = λMt+1
{
µ˜Ht+1
∫
ln[qjt(1+ σ
H)] dj+
(
1− µ˜Ht+1
) ∫
ln[qjt(1+ σ
L)] dj
}
+
(1− λMt+1)
∫
ln qjt dj
⇒ ln
(
Qt+1
Qt
)
= λMt+1
{
µ˜Ht+1 ln(1+ σ
H) +
(
1− µ˜Ht+1
)
ln(1+ σL)
}
(A.5)
We also have:
∫ 1
0
ln
(
lj,t
)
dj = µHt ln
(
lHt
)
+ (1− µHt ) ln
(
lLt
)
(A.6)
Using (A.5) and (A.6) on (A.4) we get:
(1+ gt+1) =
(
(lHt+1)
µHt+1(lLt+1)
1−µHt+1
(lHt )
µHt (lLt )
1−µHt
)([
(1+ σH)µ˜
H
t+1(1+ σL)1−µ˜
H
t+1
]λ(1−e¯t+1))
.(A.7)
Finally, combining equations (1.4) and 1.17 we get the following quilibrium relationship
between output growth and interest rate:
(1+ gt+1)
γ
β
= 1+ rt+1 (A.8)
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The following nine equation dynamic system fully characterizes the equilibrium of this
economy. The system is written in its stationary form.
1+ rt+1 =
(1+ gt+1)
γ
β
(A.9)
µHt = µ
H
t−1 + λ(1− e¯t)
[
1
ν+ 1
(
1− ρ+ ρ
1− e¯t
(
1− e¯ν+1t
))
− µHt−1
]
(A.10)
lHt =
(1+ σL)(L− (1− e¯t)κ)
1+ σH − µHt (σH − σL)
(A.11)
lLt =
(1+ σH)(L− (1− e¯t)κ)
1+ σH − µHt (σH − σL)
(A.12)
1+ gt+1 =
[(
1+ σH
)µHt+1−µHt (1−λ(1−e¯t+1)) (
1+ σL
)λ(1−e¯t+1)−(µHt+1−µHt (1−λ(1−e¯t+1)))]
[
(lHt+1)
µHt+1(lLt+1)
1−µHt+1
(lHt )
µHt (lLt )
1−µHt
]
(A.13)
wt
Yt
=
(1+ σH − µHt (σH − σL))
(1+ σL)(1+ σH)(L− (1− e¯t)κ) (A.14)
VHt
Yt
=
(1− τ)σH
1+ σH
+
1− λ(1− e¯t+1)
1+ rt+1
(1+ gt+1)
(
VHt+1
Yt+1
)
(A.15)
VLt
Yt
=
(1− τ)σL
1+ σL
+
1− λ(1− e¯t+1)
1+ rt+1
(1+ gt+1)
(
VLt+1
Yt+1
)
(A.16)
e¯t =

 κλ wtYt (1+ rt)− VLtYt
ρ
(
VHt
Yt
− VLtYt
) − 1− ρ
ρ(ν+ 1)


1
ν
(A.17)
Note that, since the model has no capital, the composition µHt drives all the dynamics.
A.5 Lemma 1
Proof. First we characterize the system of two equations that defines an interior BGP.
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A.5.1 The System on BGP
Note that, (A.8) implies that the interest rate is constant along the BGP. Then, as
γ ≥ 1, we can collapse (1.10) using (A.1) and (A.8):
Vdt =
(1− τ)σd
β
[
(λ(1− e¯t)− 1) (1+ g)1−γ + 1β
]
(1+ σd)
Yt. (A.18)
In an interior BGP (1.13) must hold, so, using (A.3) and (A.18), we obtain the following
relationship:
ρe¯νt =
(1+ g)γ
[
1+ σH − ∆µ˜H] [(1− e¯− 1λ ) (1+ g)1−γ + 1λβ]
Γ0
[ L
κ − (1− e¯)
] −
(1+ σH)(1− τ)σL
Γ0
− 1− ρ
(ν+ 1)
(A.19)
where Γ0 = (1− τ)∆ and ∆ = σH − σL. The last formula proves that indeed, e¯t is constant
on BGP, and so is µ˜Ht , hence, µ˜
H = µH. Then, from (A.2), it follows that ldt is also constant.
Hence, (A.7) becomes
1+ g =
[(
1+ σH
)µH (
1+ σL
)1−µH]λ(1−e¯)
. (A.20)
Then, the system is characterized by (A.19), (A.20), and
µH(e¯) =
1
ν+ 1
[
1− ρ+ ρ
1− e¯
(
1− e¯ν+1
)]
.
Now we find sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a solution to that
system.
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A.5.2 Existence and Uniqueness
Preliminary Derivations
∂[1+ g(e¯)]
∂e¯
= λ[1+ g(e¯)]×[[
ln(1+ σH)− ln(1+ σL)
] [
(1− e¯)∂µ
H(e¯)
∂e¯
− µH(e¯)
]
− ln(1+ σL)
]
∂µH(e¯)
∂e¯
=
ρ
ν+ 1
[
1− e¯ν+1 − (ν+ 1)(1− e¯)e¯ν
(1− e¯)2
]
> 0.
This implies:
∂[1+ g(e¯)]
∂e¯
= −λ[1+ g(e¯)]
[[
ln(1+ σH)− ln(1+ σL)
] (
ρe¯ν +
1− ρ
ν+ 1
)
+ ln(1+ σL)
]
< 0.
Uniqueness
Define the following function of e¯:
A(e¯) =
(1+ g)γ
[
1+ σH − ∆µH] [(1− e¯− 1λ) (1+ g)1−γ + 1λβ][ L
κ − (1− e¯)
]
Then we can rewrite (A.19) as:
ρe¯ν =
1
Γ0
(
A(e¯)− (1+ σH)(1− τ)σL
)
− 1− ρ
(ν+ 1)
(A.21)
Note that, the left hand side of (A.21) is increasing in e¯. Then, if the right hand side of
(A.21) is decreasing in e¯ any interior solution must be unique. The right hand side of
(A.21) is decreasing if and only if A(e¯) is decreasing.
Note that, as γ ≥ 1 and as equation (A.8), we have ∀e ∈ [0, 1] all the multiplicative terms
142
are positive. So, we can study the derivative of ln(A(e¯)):
ln(A(e¯)) = γ ln[1+ g(e¯)] + ln[1+ σH − ∆µH(e¯)] +
ln
[
(1− e¯− 1
λ
) (1+ g)1−γ +
1
λβ
]
− ln [L− (1− e¯)κ]
Differentiating we get:
∂ ln(A(e¯))
∂e¯
= γ
∂ ln[1+ g(e¯)]
∂e¯
−
∂µH(e¯)
∂e¯ ∆
1+ σH − µH(e¯)(σH − σL)
− (1+ g)
1−γ − (1− e¯− 1λ )(1− γ)(1+ g)−γ ∂(1+g(e¯))∂e¯
(1− e¯− 1λ ) (1+ g) + 1λβ
− κ
L− (1− e¯)κ
As 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and γ ≥ 1 we have ∂ ln(A(e¯))∂e¯ < 0. Then if the system composed by (A.19)
and (A.20) has an interior solution, it is unique.
Existence
Now we need to find sufficient conditions for the existence of e¯ ∈ [0, 1] that solves
(A.21). Note that (A.21) is continuous in e¯, then if the right hand side of (A.19) is smaller
than ρ when e¯ → 1, and positive at e¯ = 0, the existence of an interior solution is guaran-
teed.
The first condition will hold if:
ρ > − 1− ρ
(ν+ 1)
+
1
Γ0
[
A(1)− (1+ σH)(1− τ)σL
]
Note that, lime¯→1 µH(e¯) = µ¯H =
1+νρ
ν+1 , and g(1) = 0. Then:
A(1) =
[
1+ σH − 1+ νρ
ν+ 1
∆
] [
1− β
λβ
]
κ
L
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We can then find the following condition on κL , the percentage of the labor force needed
to enact all the projects of the economy:
b =
λβ
1− β

Γ0
(
ρ+ 1−ρ
(ν+1)
)
+ (1+ σH)(1− τ)σL
1+ σH − (1+νρ)∆ν+1

 > κ
L
Let’s study now the case where e¯ = 0. We need:
1− ρ
(ν+ 1)
Γ0 < A(0)− (1+ σH)(1− τ)σL
Note that, µH(0) = µH = 1ν+1 , and 1+ g(0) =
[(
1+ σH
)µH (
1+ σL
)1−µH]λ
. Then:
A(0) =
[
1+ σH − ∆1+ν
] [
(1− 1λ) (1+ g(0)) + (1+g(0))
γ
λβ
]
[ L
κ − 1
]
We can then find the following condition on κL :
a =
κ
L
>
1−ρ
(ν+1)Γ0 + (1+ σ
H)(1− τ)σL[
1+ σH − ∆1+ν
] [
(1− 1λ) (1+ g(0)) + (1+g(0))
γ
λβ
]
+ 1−ρ(ν+1)Γ0 + (1+ σ
H)(1− τ)σL
.
Then ∀ κL ∈ [a, b] we have existence and uniqueness of an interior solution. Finally, after
solving for {e, g} in equations (A.19) and (A.20), all the other variables can be recovered.
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A.5.3 Recovering all Variables
(
µHt
)
bgp
= µH =
1
ν+ 1
[
1− ρ+ ρ
1− e¯
(
1− e¯ν+1
)]
(rt+1)bgp = r =
(1+ g)γ
β
− 1
(
lHt
)
bgp
= lH =
(1+ σL) [L− (1− e¯)κ]
1+ σH − µHt (σH − σL)(
lLt
)
bgp
= lL =
(1+ σH) [L− (1− e¯)κ]
1+ σH − µH(σH − σL)(
VHt
Yt
)
bgp
= vH =
(1− τ)σH
β
[
λ(1− e¯) + 1β − 1
]
(1+ σH)(
VLt
Yt
)
bgp
= vL =
(1− τ)σL
β
[
λ(1− e¯) + 1β − 1
]
(1+ σL)(
wt
Yt
)
bgp
= w =
[
1+ σH − µH(σH − σL)]
(1+ σL)(1+ σH) [L− (1− e¯)κ](
Ct
Yt
)
bgp
= c = 1
A.6 Proposition 5 and Proposition 6
A.6.1 Entry
Preliminairies
Define the parameter set of the model as Ω ≡ {ρ, τ, σH , σL,γ, ν, β,λ, κ, L}. We can
rewrite equation (A.21) as:
A(e¯,Ω) = C(e¯,Ω) (A.22)
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Where A(e¯,Ω) is A(e¯) from Appendix A.5 and:
C(e¯,Ω) = (1− τ)
[(
ρe¯ν +
1− ρ
ν+ 1
)
∆ + (1+ σH)σL
]
Denoting the partial derivatives by sub indexes we have, for any fixed plausible set Ω
satisfying the condition of Lemma 1, ∀e¯ ∈ (0, 1):
A(e¯,Ω) > 0 ; Ae¯(e¯,Ω) < 0
C(e¯,Ω) > 0 ; Ce¯(e¯,Ω) > 0
Then, using implicit derivative on equation A.22 for e¯ and any parameter p ∈ Ω we get:
∂e¯
∂p
=
Ap(e¯,Ω)− Cp(e¯,Ω)
Ce¯(e¯,Ω)− Ae¯(e¯,Ω) ⇒ sign
(
∂e¯
∂p
)
= sign
(
Ap(e¯,Ω)− Cp(e¯,Ω)
)
Enacting cost κ
sign
(
∂e¯
∂κ
)
= sign (Aκ(e¯,Ω)− Cκ(e¯,Ω)) = sign (Aκ(e¯,Ω))
= sign
(
∂ ln (A(e¯,Ω))
∂κ
)
= sign
(
1− e¯
L− (1− e¯)κ
)
We know by labor market clearing condition that L − (1 − e¯)κ > 0. Hence, we have
de¯
dκ > 0, and entry decreases in the enacting cost κ.
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Discount factor β
sign
(
∂e¯
∂β
)
= sign
(
Aβ(e¯,Ω)− Cβ(e¯,Ω)
)
= sign
(
Aβ(e¯,Ω)
)
= sign
(
∂ ln (A(e¯,Ω))
∂β
)
= sign

 − 1λβ2
(1− e¯− 1λ ) (1+ g)1−γ + 1λβ


As γ ≥ 1 and given equation (A.8) we have: (1− e¯− 1λ ) (1+ g)1−γ + 1λβ > 0. Hence, we
have de¯dβ < 0, and entry increases in the discount factor β.
Corporate tax rate τ
sign
(
∂e¯
∂τ
)
= sign (Aτ(e¯,Ω)− Cτ(e¯,Ω)) = sign (−Cτ(e¯,Ω))
= sign
(
−∂ ln (C(e¯,Ω))
∂τ
)
= sign
(
1
1− τ
)
> 0
Hence, we have de¯dτ > 0, and entry decreases in the corporate tax rate τ.
Accuracy ρ
sign
(
∂e¯
∂ρ
)
= sign
(
Aρ(e¯,Ω)− Cρ(e¯,Ω)
)
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Note first the following auxiliary results:
∂µH
∂ρ
=
1
ν+ 1
[
1− e¯ν+1
1− e¯ − 1
]
> 0
∂g
∂ρ
=
∂g
∂µH
∂µH
∂ρ
= (1+ g)λ(1− e¯) ln
(
1+ σH
1+ σL
)
∂µH
∂ρ
> 0.
Now, we have:
Aρ(e¯,Ω) =
(1+ g) ∂µ
H
∂ρ[ L
κ − (1− e¯)
] ((1− e¯− 1
λ
)(
λ(1− e¯) ln
(
1+ σH
1+ σL
) [
1+ σH − ∆µH
]
− ∆
)
+
(
(1+ g)γ−1
λβ
(
γλ(1− e¯) ln
(
1+ σH
1+ σL
)) [
1+ σH − ∆µH
]
− ∆
))
=
(1+ g) ∂µ
H
∂ρ[ L
κ − (1− e¯)
]B(e¯,Ω))
Then sign (A(e¯,Ω))) = sign (B(e¯,Ω))).
Bρ(e¯,Ω) =
(
1− e¯− 1
λ
+
γ(1+ g)γ−1
λβ
)
λ(1− e¯) ln
(
1+ σH
1+ σL
) [
1+ σH − ∆µH
]
−
(
1− e¯− 1
λ
+
(1+ g)γ−1
λβ
)
∆
Note that f (x) = x− ln(1+ x) is increasing in x. This means that ∆ > ln
(
1+σH
1+σL
)
. Hence,
a sufficient condition for Aρ(e¯,Ω) < 0 is:
e¯ ≥ e¯A = 1− 1
λγ
[
1+ σ
L+νσH
ν+1
]
Also note that:
Cρ(e¯,Ω) = (1− τ)∆
(
e¯ν − 1
ν+ 1
)
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Cρ(e¯,Ω) is positive for e¯ ≥ e¯C =
( 1
ν+1
) 1
ν . Then we know that
e¯(ρ) ≥ min {max (e¯A, e¯C) , 1} ≡ s¯ ⇒ ∂e¯
∂ρ
< 0.
For e¯ < max (e¯A, e¯C), the sign of ∂e¯∂ρ is not clear. For example, for e¯(ρ) = 0 we have
∂µH
∂ρ = 0,
and hence ∂e¯∂ρ > 0. This is quite intuitive, in fact, an economy performing no selection will
have increasing incentives to select when they gain access to better screening technology.
Nevertheless, we can also find a sufficient condition for ∂e¯∂ρ > 0. First, a sufficient condition
for Bρ(e¯,Ω) > 0 is given by:
e¯ ≤ eA = 1−
∆
λγ ln
(
1+σH
1+σL
) [
1+ νσ
H+σL−∆ρν
ν+1
]
Note that eA < e¯A. Then we know that
e¯(ρ) ≤ max {0,min (eA, e¯C) ≡ s} ⇒
∂e¯
∂ρ
> 0.
Note that κ does not enter in s¯ or s but it affects e¯ monotonically. So, economies with
high κ, characterized by a high e¯ and a low entry rate, are likely to increase entry when ρ
increases, but economies with low κ do just the opposite. We explore this margin on the
quantitative illustration of the mechanism.
A.6.2 Growth
1. Given the former results and that ∂g∂e¯ < 0, we can easily show:
∂g
∂κ
=
∂g
∂e¯
∂e¯
∂κ
< 0
∂g
∂β
=
∂g
∂e¯
∂e¯
∂β
> 0,
∂g
∂τ
=
∂g
∂e¯
∂e¯
∂τ
< 0
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2. We can also study:
∂g
∂ρ
=
∂g
∂e¯︸︷︷︸
<0
∂e¯
∂ρ︸︷︷︸
?
+
∂g
∂µH
∂µH
∂ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
Note that ∂e¯∂ρ < 0⇒ ∂g∂ρ > 0.
A.6.3 Composition
1. From previous results:
∂µH
∂κ
=
∂µH
∂e¯
∂e¯
∂κ
> 0
∂µH
∂β
=
∂µH
∂e¯
∂e¯
∂β
< 0,
∂µH
∂τ
=
∂µH
∂e¯
∂e¯
∂τ
> 0
2. We can also study:
∂µH
∂ρ
=
∂e¯
∂ρ︸︷︷︸
?
∂µH
∂e¯︸︷︷︸
>0
+
1− e¯ν+1
1− e¯ − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
Note that ∂e¯∂ρ > 0⇒ ∂µ
H
∂ρ > 0
150
A.7 Corporate Tax, Entry, and Growth
As argued on the main text, empirical research points to a strong and significant
effect of taxation in firm entry, nevertheless, the effect of taxation in long-run growth is
practically insignificant. Figure (17) uses cross country data to illustrate this puzzle: Left
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Figure 17: Corporate Taxes, Entry and Growth
panel of figure (17) plots the natural logarithm of entry density against the logarithm
of effective first year corporate tax rates in 2004 for a set of 60 countries.1 The right
panel shows the relationship between the average growth rates of the next five years
and effective first year corporate tax rates. It is easily discernible that higher corporate
tax rates are associated with lower entry rates whereas there is no clear effect on the
5-year average of growth rates. According to our model, the explanation lies on project
heterogeneity and financial selection: higher taxation induces stronger selection which
reduces entry significantly decreasing the direct effect of a larger cohort, nevertheless,
tighter selection also implies a better composition of the incoming cohort which might
offset an important part of the negative effect on growth.
1The data for effective rates of corporate taxes in the first year of a firm is available in Djankov et al.
(2010).
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A.8 Skewness
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Figure 18: Financial Development and Private Credit
152
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Model Solution
In this section, we derive the system of equations that characterizes the normalized
model. We follow the same order as in the main text, but here we report only the main
equations. Then we derive the system that characterizes the balanced growth path, and
finally we prove the Lemma that is shown in the main text.
B.1.1 Normalized Model: System of Equations
Final Good Producer
y(st) =
(
(LH(st))µ(s
t)(LL(st))1−µ(s
t)
)α ( k(st−1)
1+ a(st−1, st)
)1−α
(B.1)
xj(s
t) =
αy(st)
pj(st) (1+ η(R(st)− 1))
. (B.2)
k(st−1) = (1− α)y(s
t)
r(st)
(
1+ a(st−1, st)
)
(B.3)
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Intermediate Good Producer
Ld(st) =
αy(st)
w(st)(1+ σd) (1+ η (R(st)− 1)) ⇒
LH(st)
LL(st)
=
1+ σL
1+ σH
(B.4)
πdj (s
t) =
ασd(
1+ σd
)
(1+ η(R(st)− 1)) y(s
t) (B.5)
vd(st) = (1− τ)πd(st) + E
[
m(st, st+1)
(
1− λM(st, st+1)
)
vd(st, st+1)|st
]
(B.6)
Financial Intermediary and Composition
µ˜(z¯(st)) = µ˜H(z¯)(st) =
1
ν+ 1
[
1− ρ+ ρ1−
(
z¯(st)
)ν+1
1− z¯(st)
]
(B.7)
ρ(z¯t(st))ν =
w(st)κ
λ (R(s
t))− vL(st)
(vH(st)− vL(st)) −
1− ρ
(ν+ 1)
(B.8)
µ(st) = µ(st−1) + λ(1− z¯(st))
(
µ˜(z¯(st))− µ(st−1)
)
(B.9)
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Representative Household
1 = E
[
m(st, st+1)|st
]
R(st)− ψ
(
b(st)
y(st)
− b¯
)
(B.10)
E

m(st, st+1)
r(st, st+1) + (1− δ)− φ2
([
1+ gbgp
]2 − [ k(st,st+1)k(st) (1+ a(st, st+1))]2
)
1+ φ
[
k(st)
k(st−1) (1+ a(s
t−1, st))−
(
1+ gbgp
)] |st


= 1 (B.11)
L(st) =
(
w(st)
Θlχ
) 1
χ−1
(B.12)
with:
m(st+1) =
E
[
β
(1+a(st,st+1))
γ
{(
c(st+1)−Θl
(
L(st+1)
)χ)−γ} |st](
c(st)−Θl (L(st))χ
)−γ
Open Economy Variables
ln
(
R(st)
R¯
)
= ρr ln
(
R(st−1)
R¯
)
+ σrǫt where ǫt
iid∼ N(0, 1) (B.13)
nx(st) = y(st)− c(st)− i(st)− ψ
2
y(st)
(
b(st)
y(st)
− b¯
)2
(B.14)
d(st) =
b(st−1)
1+ a(st−1, st)
− η αy(s
t)
1+ η(R(st)− 1) − (1− z¯(s
t))κw(st) (B.15)
Labor Market Clearing
(
w(st)
Θlχ
) 1
χ−1
=
αy(st)
(
µ(st) + (1− µ(st)) 1+σH1+σL
)
w(st)(1+ σH) (1+ η (R(st)− 1)) + (1− z¯(s
t))κ (B.16)
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Output Growth
ln(1+ g(st−1, st)) = α
∫ 1
0
ln
(
Lj(st)
Lj(st−1)
)
+ ln
(
qj(st)
qj(st−1)
)
dj+
(1− α) ln
(
K(st−1)
K(st−2)
)
(B.17)
Let’s work term by term:
∫ 1
0
ln
(
Lj(st)
Lj(st−1)
)
dj = µ(st) ln
(
LH(st)
LL(st)
)
− µ(st−1) ln
(
LH(st−1)
LL(st−1)
)
+ ln
(
LL(st)
LL(st−1)
)
= (µ(st)− µ(st−1)) ln
(
1+ σL
1+ σH
)
+ ln
(
LL(st)
LL(st−1)
)
Second term:
∫ 1
0
ln
(
qj(st)
qj(st−1)
)
dj = λ(1− z¯(st))
(
µ˜(st) ln(1+ σH) + (1− µ˜(st)) ln(1+ σL)
)
Third term:
ln
(
K(st−1)
K(st−2)
)
= ln
(
k(st−1)
k(st−2)
(1+ a(st−2, st−1))
)
B.1.2 Balanced Growth Path
First note that the three components of equation (B.17) imply that the long-run growth
rate is given by:
1+ g(z¯) =
(
(1+ σH)µ(z¯)(1+ σL)1−µ(z¯)
)λ(1−z¯)
= 1+ a(z¯)
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From equation (B.11), we get:
(1+ a(z¯))γ
β
= 1+ r− δ (B.18)
From equation (B.4), we get:
Ld(y,w) =
αy
w(1+ σd) (1+ η (R¯− 1)) (B.19)
And we characterize k(y, z¯) using (B.3) and (B.18):
k(y, z¯) =
(1− α) (1+ a(z¯))
(1+a(z¯))γ
β − 1+ δ
y (B.20)
Replacing equations (B.20), and (B.19) in equation (B.1), we write w(z¯) as:
w(z¯) =
(
α (1+ a(z¯))
1
λ(z¯−1)
(1+ η (R¯− 1))
) (1− α)
(1+a(z¯))γ
β − 1+ δ


1−α
α
(B.21)
We characterize y(z¯) using (B.16):
y(z¯) =
(1+ σH) (1+ η (R¯− 1))
(
(w(z¯))
χ
χ−1 (Θlχ)
1
1−χ − (1− z¯)κw(z¯)
)
α
(
1+σH
1+σL − µ(z¯) σ
H−σL
1+σL
)
Given y(z¯), we write Ld(z¯) and k(z¯) using equations (B.20) and (B.19). Moreover, as
normalized profits are constant over the BGP, we write vd(z¯) as:
vd(z¯) =
α(1− τ)σd
(1+ σd) (1+ η(R¯− 1)) (1− (1− λ(1− z¯)) β(1+ a(z¯))1−γ)y(z¯)
Finally, z¯ must also be the unique solution to the Financial Intermediary problem:
ρ(z¯)ν =
w(z¯)κ
λ (R¯)− vL(z¯)
(vH(z¯)− vL(z¯)) −
1− ρ
(ν+ 1)
(B.22)
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The former equation pins down z¯, and hence the complete balanced growth path of
this open economy model. The long-run level of bond holding b(z¯) is characterized by
equation (B.10):
R¯
1+ ψ
(
b(z¯)
y(z¯) − b¯
) = (1+ a(z¯))γ
β
⇒ b(z¯) =

 βR¯(1+a(z¯))γ − 1
ψ
+ b¯

 y(z¯) (B.23)
This is the only level of debt consistent with the exogenous interest rate and the endoge-
nous growth rate of the economy. Hence, it uniquely pins down household consumption,
as the budget constraint holds with equality. Also note that setting b¯ = b(z¯)y(z¯) , so that no
cost is paid along the BGP, implies βR¯ = (1+ a(z¯))γ.
B.1.3 Existence and Uniqueness
Uniqueness of an Interior Solution
Recall that χ > 1 and γ > 1. Let’s first find an expression for the right hand side of
(B.22). Let’s work term by term, first noting that:
vH(z¯)− vL(z¯) =
(1− τ)
(
(w(z¯))
χ
χ−1 (Θlχ)
1
1−χ − (1− z¯)κw(z¯)
)
(1− (1− λ(1− z¯)) β(1+ a(z¯))1−γ)
(
1+σH
σH−σL − µ(z¯)
)
Then we get:
vL(z¯)
vH(z¯)− vL(z¯) =
1
vH(z¯)
vL(z¯) − 1
=
σL(1+ σH)
σH − σL
Note that:
w(z¯)κ
λ
vH(z¯)− vL(z¯) =
κ
λ(1− τ)
(
1− (1− λ(1− z¯)) β(1+ a(z¯))1−γ) ( 1+σH
σH−σL − µ(z¯)
)
((
w(z¯)
Θlχ
) 1
χ−1 − (1− z¯)κ
) (B.24)
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Then, the right hand side of equation (B.22) is decreasing in z¯ if and only if equation
(B.24) also decreases in z¯. Taking the natural logarithm of equation (B.24) and dropping
the constant, we define the following function:
S(z¯) = ln
(
1− (1− λ(1− z¯)) β(1+ a(z¯))1−γ
)
+ ln
((
1+ σH
σH − σL − µ(z¯)
))
−
ln
((
w(z¯)
Θlχ
) 1
χ−1
− (1− z¯)κ
)
Some preliminary derivatives are given by:
µ(z¯) =
1
ν+ 1
[
1− ρ+ ρ
1− z¯
(
1− z¯1+ν
)]
d(µ(z¯))
dz¯
=
ρ
1+ ν
1+ z¯ν (νz¯− (ν+ 1))
(1− z¯)2 > 0 and limz¯→1
d(µ(z¯))
dz¯
=
ρν
2
d(1+ a(z¯))
dz¯
= −(1+ a(z¯))λ
[(
1− ρ
ν+ 1
+ ρz¯ν
)
ln
(
1+ σH
1+ σL
)
+ ln(1+ σL)
]
< 0
d(w(z¯))
dz
=

γλ(1− α)
α
[(
1−ρ
ν+1 + ρz¯
ν
)
ln
(
1+σH
1+σL
)
+ ln(1+ σL)
]
1− (1−δ)β
((1+a(z¯))γ
−
dµ(z¯)
dz¯
ln
(
1+ σH
1+ σL
))
w(z¯) ≡ Γ0w(z¯)
It is easy to show that the first two components of S(z¯) are decreasing in z¯. Now we find
a condition that guarantees that the third component is also decreasing in z¯.
sign


d ln
((
w(z¯)
Θlχ
) 1
χ−1 − (1− z¯)κ
)
dz¯

 = sign
(
Γ0
χ− 1
(
w(z¯)
Θlχ
) 1
χ−1
+ κ
)
Let’s focus on the problematic region where Γ0 ≤ 0. Note that:
Γ0 ≥

γλ(1− α)
α
[(
1−ρ
ν+1
)
ln
(
1+σH
1+σL
)
+ ln(1+ σL)
]
1− (1− δ)β −
νρ
2
ln
(
1+ σH
1+ σL
) ≡ Γ1 ≤ 0
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So, a sufficient condition is given by:

 w(z¯)
χ
(
κ(1−χ)
Γ1
)χ−1

 ≤ Θl
Note also that:
w(z¯) ≤

 α(
1+ η
(
1
β − 1
))

( (1− α)
1
β − 1+ δ
) 1−α
α
= Γ3
So, a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique solution to the above problem is
given by:
Γ3
χ
(
κ(1−χ)
Γ1
)χ−1 ≤ Θl
Note that the third term of S(z¯) is the labor used in intermediate production. Moreover, in
the region where Γ0 < 0 wages decrease in z¯, given GHH preferences, this implies that the
supply of labor decreases in z¯. Hence, a higher level of Θl decreases the response of labor
supply to wages, so that part of the labor released by the decrease in project enactment
is absorbed by intermediate producers. This translates into higher y(z¯), increasing the
value of each product line, and hence, increasing the incentives to enact projects.
160
Existence and Uniqueness of an Interior Solution
We need to find conditions such that equation (B.22) for z¯ = 0 becomes:
ρ(0)ν <
w(0)κ
λ (R¯)− vL(0)
(vH(0)− vL(0)) −
1− ρ
(ν+ 1)
w(0)
vH(0)− vL(0) > λ
1−ρ
(ν+1) +
σL(1+σH)
σH−σL
κR¯
1− (1− λ) β(1+ a(0))1−γ((
w(0)
Θlχ
) 1
χ−1 − κ
) > (1− τ)λ 1−ρ(ν+1) + σ
L(1+σH)
σH−σL
κR¯
(
1+σH
σH−σL − 1ν+1
)
A sufficient condition for this to hold is given by:
1− (1− λ) β((
Γ3
Θlχ
) 1
χ−1 − κ
) > (1− τ)λ 1−ρ(ν+1) + σ
L(1+σH)
σH−σL
κR¯
(
1+σH
σH−σL − 1ν+1
)
κ >
(
Γ3
Θlχ
) 1
χ−1
(1− τ)
[
λ
1−ρ
(ν+1) +
σL(1+σH)
σH−σL
]
(1− (1− λ) β) R¯
(
1+σH
σH−σL − 1ν+1
)
+ (1− τ)λ
[
1−ρ
(ν+1) +
σL(1+σH)
σH−σL
]
For the z¯ = 1 case, we have:
ρ(1)ν >
w(1)κ
λ (R¯)− vL(1)
(vH(1)− vL(1)) −
1− ρ
(ν+ 1)
λ
R¯
(
ρ+
1− ρ
(ν+ 1)
+
σL(1+ σH)
σH − σL
)
> κ
w(1)
vH(1)− vL(1)
λ
R¯
(
ρ+
1− ρ
(ν+ 1)
+
σL(1+ σH)
σH − σL
)
> κ
(
1− β(1+ a(1))1−γ) ( 1+σH
σH−σL − µ(1)
)
(
w(1)
Θlχ
) 1
χ−1
(1− τ)
κ <
λ
R¯
(
ρ+ 1−ρ(ν+1) +
σL(1+σH)
σH−σL
) (
w(1)
Θlχ
) 1
χ−1
(1− τ)
(1− β(1+ a(1))1−γ)
(
1+σH
σH−σL − µ(1)
)
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We can state a sufficient condition as:
κ <
λ
R¯
(
ρ+ 1−ρ(ν+1) +
σL(1+σH)
σH−σL
)


(
α
(1+σH)(1+η(R¯−1))
)(
(1−α)
1
β
−1+δ
) 1−α
α
Θlχ


1
χ−1
(1− τ)
(1− β)
(
1+σH
σH−σL −
1+νρ
ν+1
)
Intuitively, there is a lower and an upper bound on the enactment cost κ that guarantees
an interior solution. In fact, when the cost is too low, every project is enacted; when it is
too high, no project is realized.
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B.2 Macroeconomic Data
In this section, we present the sources of the macroeconomic data used in this paper
and the behavior of the aggregated time series during the crisis. We first present a general
description of the Chilean economy from the World Bank Database, in Table 13.
To start, note that Chile is a small economy, both in terms of population and aggregate
output. It has also experienced spectacular growth, which led it to be the first OECD
member in South America (2010). Its trade and debt ratio justify the small open economy
framework adopted in this paper. In particular, while its trade to GDP ratio is quite high,
according to theWorld Trade Organization database, in 2011 Chile had 0.45% of the world’s
exports and 0.41% of the world’s imports. Chile is also the 7th freest economy in the world
(2013 International Economic Freedom Ranking).
The main source of data for the macroeconomic analysis in Section 2.4 is the Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (IFS) database from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
From that source, we use the following series between 1996:I and 2011:II: GDP vol-
ume index (22899BVPZF...), nominal GDP (22899B..ZF...), gross fixed capital formation
(22893E..ZF...), changes in inventory (22893I..ZF...), exchange rate (228..RF.ZF...), exports
(22890C..ZF...), imports (22898C..ZF...), financial accounts (22878BJ DZF...), direct invest-
ment abroad (22878BDDZF...), direct investment in Chile (22878BEDZF...), net errors and
omissions (22878CADZF...), household consumption (22896F..ZF...), and government con-
sumption (22891F..ZF...). We use employment data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadís-
tica (INE, National institute of Statistics) of Chile and hours worked per week from the
Encuesta de Ocupación y Desocupación from the Economics Department of Universidad de
Chile. We also use the average interest rate charged by commercial banks for one to three
month loans from the Chilean Central Bank database. All the data is seasonally adjusted
with the X-12 procedure of the US Census. We follow the procedure of Bergoeing et al.
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(2002) to build real aggregate macroeconomic variables.1
Figure 19 shows the evolution of the annualized real lending interest rate between
1996 and 2005, where the grey area spanning the period between 1998:II and 2000:III
highlights the crisis period. Figure 20 explores some of the macroeconomic consequences
of the Russian default in the Chilean economy.2Figure 20a shows a drop of more than
30% in real investment over just one quarter. In that same period, Figure 20b points to a
drop of more than 6% in hours worked. Figures 20c and 20d show that both output and
consumption decreased by 5% and took more than a year to return to the pre-crisis level.
1995 2012
Population 14, 440, 103 17, 464, 814
GDP per capita 7, 400.8 22, 362.5
Trade to GDP 56.4% 66.6%
Gross capital formation to GDP 26.2% 25.6%
External debt to GNI 32.1% 41.0%
Table 13: Chilean Economy
Figure 19: The Chilean Sudden Stop
1We build capital series using the perpetual inventory method; we assume an annual depreciation rate
of 8%, and we solve for the initial stock that delivers an average annual capital to output ratio of 1.96.
2The data of Figure 20 is seasonally adjusted, in real terms, and in logarithms.
164
(a) Real Investment (↓ 30%) (b) Total Hours (↓ 6%)
(c) Real GDP (↓ 5%) (d) Household Consumption (↓ 5%)
Figure 20: Macroeconomic Impact of the Crisis.
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B.3 ENIA and Empirical Analysis
The Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA, Annual National Industrial Survey)
conducted the by the INE covers all manufacturing plants in Chile with more than 10
workers. Our version extends from 1995 to 2007.
B.3.1 Data Cleaning
We eliminate observations with one or more of the following inconsistencies, with
original variable names provided in parenthesis: negative electricity consumption (ele-
cons), worked days less than or equal to 0 (diatra), gross value of the production less than
value added (vpn<va), value added less than 0 (va), remuneration of workers equal to 0
(rempag), size equal to 0 (tamano), ISIC code less than 3000 (bad coding in sector), and sales
income less than income from exports (ingtot<ingexp). Finally, as mentioned in the text,
we dropped industries 314 (Tobacco), 323 (Leather), 353 (Oil and Gas 1), 354 (Oil and Gas
2), 361 (Pottery), 362 (Glass), 371 (Metals 1), 372 (Metals 2) and 385 (other) due to an in-
sufficient number of observations or inadequate entry dynamics. To minimize problems
due to the 10 workers threshold, we count as the first observation of a firm the first time
it appears in the data with 11 or more workers. The restricted sample still contains more
than 90% of the original observations and total workers in the sample.
B.3.2 Variable Construction and Other Controls
We calculate entry rates at year t at the industry level for each cohort, dividing
the number of new plants in year t by the average of the total plants in years t and
t− 1. The revenue (ingtot-revval-reviva) used to calculate the profitability measures and
the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration Index (HHI) excludes non-manufactured prod-
ucts (re-selling products and their tax shield); the costs include wages and exclude the
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costs and taxes associated to non-manufactured products (costot-mrevval-mreviva+rempag).
The production used to build the labor productivity proxy used in Table 4 includes
the changes in inventories as a fraction of the sales of manufactured products (vpf-
provap+provaf-acavap+acavaf ). We define capital as the end-of-period value of land, ma-
chinery, buildings and vehicles (salter+saledi+salmaq+salveh). We use the net increase in
physical capital (abaf ) to build the capital accumulation variable used in Table 4. We de-
flate monetary variables using the industry level deflators provided by the INE. The index
of manufacturing production (22866EY.ZF...), the unemployment rate (22867R..ZF...), and
the producer price and wholesale price index (PPI/WPI, 22863...ZF...) are taken from the
IFS database. The labor cost index is from the Chilean Central Bank.
B.3.3 Descriptive Tables
The following table presents the mean, standard deviation, number of observations,
and the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the key variables used in the empirical analysis
and for calibration purposes. For firm level observations, top and bottom 1% have been
removed to control for outliers. Firms born prior to 1996 are excluded from the tables and
regressions, because we cannot infer their cohort. Firms born in 2007 are also excluded
because we observe them only at age 0. Note that the raw data reflects the main message
of the empirical section. In fact, the simple average industry level entry rate is 11% before
the crisis, 7% during the crisis, and 9% after the crisis. Moreover, the average lifetime
profitability of the cohorts born during the crisis is also higher in the raw data.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. N P25 P50 P75
Profitability 0.231 0.209 17868 .126 .242 .359
Labor productivity proxy (log) 4.68 1.042 16945 4.092 4.613 5.237
Capital accumulation rate 0.128 0.243 17179 0 .021 .164
Electricity consumption (log) -0.666 1.769 17874 -1.843 -.88 .32
Total workers 58.998 131.307 18234 16 24 49
Capital (log) 6.467 2.013 17347 5.199 6.439 7.715
Workers at entry 52.002 12.991 4089 42.817 48.031 57.319
Capital at entry (log) 6.29 0.259 4089 6.08 6.212 6.543
Average exit age 2.407 2.536 2241 0 2 4
HHI 0.057 0.103 220 .011 .021 .054
Average industry level entry 0.086 0.052 220 .051 .076 .112
Fraction dying at age= 0 0.172 0.15 220 .077 .15 .25
Cohort size 371.727 166.339 11 252 302 454
Fraction of the cohort not dying in the sample 0.474 0.163 11 .312 .434 .635
Unemployment rate 0.076 0.013 12 .072 .077 .082
PPI/WPI 84.113 17.932 12 66.015 84.065 97.445
Labor cost index 92.697 5.916 12 88.535 92.86 97.545
Manufacturing production (log) 4.465 0.121 12 4.38 4.409 4.579
Table 14: Summary Statistics: All Cohorts.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. N P25 P50 P75
Profitability 0.23 0.203 6794 .127 .243 .357
Labor productivity proxy (log) 4.521 0.986 6552 3.984 4.453 5.049
Capital accumulation rate 0.106 0.219 6497 0 .012 .13
Electricity consumption (log) -0.783 1.684 6729 -1.918 -1 .125
Total workers 55.902 135.665 6863 16 23 45
Capital (log) 6.416 1.926 6577 5.21 6.423 7.563
Workers at entry 47.589 6.817 1170 42.817 42.817 57.319
Capital at entry (log) 6.203 0.177 1170 6.08 6.08 6.456
Average exit age 3.426 3.089 843 1 3 6
HHI 0.03 0.045 40 .009 .016 .034
Average industry level entry 0.113 0.069 40 .076 .102 .127
Fraction dying at age= 0 0.151 0.093 40 .096 .148 .186
Cohort size 585 282.843 2 385 585 785
Fraction of the cohort not dying in the sample 0.288 0.034 2 .264 .288 .312
Unemployment rate 0.054 0.001 2 .053 .054 .054
PPI/WPI 62.63 0.721 2 62.12 62.63 63.14
Labor cost index 83.895 1.478 2 82.85 83.895 84.94
Manufacturing production (log) 4.36 0.034 2 4.336 4.36 4.384
Table 15: Summary Statistics: Before Crisis Cohorts.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. N P25 P50 P75
Profitability 0.239 0.214 4169 .132 .247 .366
Labor productivity proxy (log) 4.768 1.044 4029 4.136 4.67 5.345
Capital accumulation rate 0.115 0.228 3976 0 .011 .142
Electricity consumption (log) -0.698 1.83 4188 -1.91 -.878 .36
Total workers 58.532 129.278 4306 15 24 48
Capital (log) 6.388 2.12 4021 5.121 6.341 7.772
Workers at entry 48.737 2.733 839 44.667 49.798 51.211
Capital at entry (log) 6.03 0.167 839 5.782 6.089 6.181
Average exit age 2.647 2.333 529 0 2 5
HHI 0.064 0.11 60 .012 .023 .062
Average industry level entry 0.067 0.035 60 .041 .061 .078
Fraction dying at age= 0 0.152 0.123 60 .063 .162 .223
Cohort size 279.667 25.423 3 252 285 302
Fraction of the cohort not dying in the sample 0.366 0.064 3
Unemployment rate 0.081 0.009 3 .072 .083 .089
PPI/WPI 69.147 5.677 3 64.34 67.69 75.41
Labor cost index 89.207 1.726 3 87.26 89.81 90.55
Manufacturing production (log) 4.368 0.021 3 4.344 4.379 4.382
Table 16: Summary Statistics: Crisis Cohorts.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. N P25 P50 P75
Profitability 0.226 0.211 6905 .122 .237 .356
Labor productivity proxy (log) 4.787 1.076 6364 4.201 4.735 5.381
Capital accumulation rate 0.158 0.269 6706 0 .04 .22
Electricity consumption (log) -0.534 1.803 6957 -1.72 -.762 .485
Total workers 62.289 128.134 7065 17 27 55
Capital (log) 6.563 2.027 6749 5.241 6.505 7.856
Workers at entry 55.802 16.522 2080 43.55 48.031 69.957
Capital at entry (log) 6.443 0.22 2080 6.219 6.543 6.598
Average exit age 1.274 1.304 869 0 1 2
HHI 0.082 0.158 120 .011 .026 .079
Average industry level entry 0.086 0.048 120 .054 .076 .114
Fraction dying at age= 0 0.189 0.174 120 .064 .146 .286
Cohort size 346.667 122.662 6 221 352.5 454
Fraction of the cohort not dying in the sample 0.589 0.12 6 .497 .597 .678
Unemployment rate 0.08 0.009 7 .074 .078 .08
PPI/WPI 96.666 11.359 7 86.84 94.89 106.97
Labor cost index 96.707 3.483 7 93.88 96.61 100.26
Manufacturing production (log) 4.537 0.11 7 4.418 4.552 4.637
Table 17: Summary Statistics: Post Crisis Cohorts.
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B.3.4 Industry Level Entry Rates
Cohorts 311 312 313 321 322 324 331 332 341 342
96− 97 11.6% 13.4% 11.3% 9.6% 15.5% 7.1% 10.1% 18.2% 12.7% 7.0%
98− 99 5.3% 3.6% 7.7% 3.6% 6.1% 5.1% 6.8% 7.7% 5.3% 5.2%
00− 01 4.2% 6.3% 9.1% 4.1% 5.5% 4.1% 6.3% 11.2% 6.9% 8.1%
02− 03 10.2% 10.0% 12.6% 6.9% 12.9% 5.7% 13.7% 13.1% 9.0% 20.2%
04− 05 7.3% 8.5% 19.7% 6.3% 5.7% 3.0% 6.9% 12.3% 8.2% 6.4%
Cohorts 351 352 355 356 369 381 382 383 384 390
96− 97 9.7% 10.3% 5.5% 8.0% 11.7% 13.1% 10.8% 9.2% 9.5% 22.2%
98− 99 8.9% 5.0% 7.0% 4.9% 13.1% 4.4% 5.3% 6.0% 4.5% 4.7%
00− 01 7.1% 5.1% 2.5% 5.2% 9.9% 8.8% 7.8% 8.7% 3.6% 10.5%
02− 03 7.4% 10.7% 8.9% 12.8% 7.1% 13.6% 17.3% 13.9% 9.7% 7.5%
04− 05 14.8% 5.8% 8.8% 8.6% 8.4% 9.8% 11.4% 7.0% 10.4% 8.9%
Table 18: Two year average entry rates by industry.
B.3.5 Hausman and Taylor (1981)
The method can be summarized as a four-step procedure. First, a fixed effects regres-
sion delivers consistent estimators βˆ1 and βˆ2 that are used to retrieve estimators uˆi,t and
σˆu. The second step is an instrumental variables (IV) regression with uˆi,t as dependent
variable, Z1 and Z2 as independent variables, and Z1 and X1 as instruments; this delivers
a consistent estimator for σ˜ (the dispersion of the residual). Third, an estimator for the
variance of the unobserved fixed effect component can be built as σˆ2µ = σ˜
2 − σˆ2uT , in order
to form the usual generalized least squares (GLS) correction. Finally, the GLS correction is
used to transform the original equation and estimate all the coefficients simultaneously in
equation (2.32), using an IV procedure where the instruments are given by Z1, the mean
of X1 and the deviations from the mean of X1 and X2. After every estimation we perform
the Sargan-Hansen test to assess the validity of the instrumental variables procedure.
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B.4 Cox Estimation
This section shows that the higher profitability of the cohorts born during the sudden
stop is not due to ex-post selection. In particular, we perform the following stratified
proportional hazard estimation in order to show that firms born during the crisis are not
more likely to die at any horizon.
hr,c (t|X i) = h0,r,c (t) exp [β1 ln(Li,t) + β2 ln(Li,0) + β3 ln(eleci,t) + β4 ln(eleci,0)
+ β5 ln(Ki,t) + β6 ln(Ki,0) + β7P¯j,t + β8HHIj,0 + γj
]
The two strata are geographical region (r) and time period (c). This means that
the baseline hazard hr,c varies across these two dimensions. We divide Chile into five
geographical regions. The time periods correspond to the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis
period of the second specification in the Hausman and Taylor estimation of Section 2.4.
The Cox-Snell test cannot reject the proportional hazard structure with 95% confidence.
Sub-index t refers to time, while i refers to a plant, and j to an industry. The following
table shows the estimates of the common covariates.
Note that bigger plants have less probability of exiting (for both electricity consump-
tion and number of workers), while the initial size increases the probability of exiting (for
number of workers and electricity consumption). The specification controls for the indus-
try cycle (using the average varying profitability of the industry P¯j,t) and industry specific
effects. Figure 21 plots the survival rates at different horizons for cohorts born during
the three different time periods in the central zone of Chile. We pick this zone because it
concentrates most of the plants in the sample; the main message does not change when
considering the other four regions.
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_t
ln (Li,t) -0.547∗∗∗
(0.0708)
ln (Li,0) 0.445∗∗∗
(0.0709)
ln (eleci,t) -0.0783∗∗∗
(0.0262)
ln (eleci,0) 0.0543∗∗
(0.0252)
ln (Ki,t) -0.0237
(0.0246)
ln (Ki,0) -0.0373
(0.0237)
P¯j,t 0.0403
(0.187)
HHIj,t -0.0796
(0.356)
Industry control Yes
Observations 16554
Plants 3778
Exits 2024
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 19: Proportional Hazard
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Figure 21: Survival Rates, Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Note that firms born during the crisis do not exit more than other cohorts. More-
over, they even seem stronger in this dimension, in that, until year 6, they have a higher
predicted survival probability than firms born either before or after the episode. Hence,
ex-post selection does not explain the higher profitability of cohorts born during the sud-
den stop.
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B.5 Macroeconomic Aggregates: Model and Data
Figure 22 compares the model generated series for the logarithm of total hours, the
logarithm of household consumption, trade balance divided by GDP, and the logarithm
of investment with the actual series. The model is assumed to be on its BGP on 1998:I
and the levels are adjusted so that model and data coincide at that date.
(a) Total Hours (log) (b) Household Consumption (log)
(c) Trade Balance over GDP (d) Investment (log)
Figure 22: Model Macro Performance
Abstracting from the timing, if we evaluate the model on the magnitude of the con-
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temporaneous response we see that the model captures 60% of the decrease in hours,
overshoots by 1% the decrease in consumption, captures almost 90% of the reversal on
trade balance, and predicts 50% of the contraction in investment. The recovery of the
model is significantly faster than in the data. In fact, as Figure 19 shows, the interest rate
recovers quickly. This suggest that the financial conditions faced by the firms are not fully
reflected by the interest rate data.
B.6 The Working Capital Channel
This section studies the role of working capital friction in the model. In particular,
Figure 23 displays the responses of TFP growth, GDP, labor, and investment to a 100 basis
point shock to the interest rate for three different levels of η, i.e., baseline (η = 1), low
(η = 0), and high (η = 2).3
First, note that most of the impact of the working capital constraint takes place in
the short run. In fact, a higher working capital constraint amplifies the effect on output
through a labor channel. As shown in Figure 23c, labor decreases almost 50% more on
impact when comparing the high η case with the baseline. Also note that Figure 23d
shows no major differences in term of investment. Thus, η provides amplification in the
short run by exacerbating the labor channel. Second, and more importantly for the main
point of this paper, Figure 23a does not display strong differences in terms of TFP growth.
Moreover, Figure 23b can be used to assess the long-run effect of η. Note that higher η
reduces the demand for intermediate goods, and, hence, intermediate good producers
scale down their production and reduce their labor demand. But η does not have a direct
effect on the cost of enacting new projects; in fact, it affects the problem of the financial
intermediary only through general equilibrium effects, i.e., reduction in wages and in
the value of each product line type. In this sense, the higher η, the more the reduction in
3In order to avoid bond holding costs in the long run, we also re-calibrate β. The low value of η is
associated with a higher β (0.9977). Higher η implies less long-run growth and therefore a lower β (0.9972).
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Figure 23: The Role of Working Capital
labor is directed to intermediate good production, and the less is absorbed by the financial
intermediary. Hence, the higher the working capital friction, the lower the effect on entry,
and, thus, the lower the long run cost of the crisis. Quantitatively, the long-run loss
changes are on the order of 0.001%, thus this parameter does not play a role in the main
mechanism of the paper. The reason is simple: η affects the benefit of entry (decreases
values) and the cost of entry (decreases wages) in virtually the same magnitude, so the
entry margin is practically unaffected. As in Neumeyer and Perri (2005), this parameter
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is useful in matching the immediate impact of a crisis.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Derivation of the Growth Rate
The average growth rate in the economy is equal to the growth rate of the average
quality level q¯t whose value in (t+ 1) becomes:
q¯t+1 =
∫
j∈Jt+1
qjt+1dj
=
∫
j∈Jt
(
1− ξexitj
) {(
qjt + ijλq¯jt
)
+ ξ
ipo
j (κ − 1)
(
qjt + ijλq¯jt
)}
dj+
∫
j∈Jentry
qjtdj
The components of this expression take into account the changes due to innovation, IPO,
exit, and entry, as explained in detail in Section 3.2.5. Dividing both sides of this expres-
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sion by q¯t and dropping time subscripts in BGP, we obtain
1+ g =
∫
j∈J∗
(
1− ξexitj
) {(
qˆj + ijλ
)
+ ξ
ipo
j (κ − 1)
(
qˆj + ijλ
)}
dj+
∫
j∈Jentry
qˆjdj
=
∫
j∈J∗
(
1− ξexitj
) {
qˆj + ξ
ipo
j (κ − 1) qˆj
}
dj+
∫
j∈J∗
(
1− ξexitj
) {
ijλ+ ξ
ipo
j (κ − 1) ijλ
}
dj+
∫
j∈Jentry
qˆjdj
=
∫
j∈J∗
qˆjdj+
∫
j∈J∗
{
ξ
ipo
j (κ − 1) qˆj − ξexitj
[
qˆj + ξ
ipo
j (κ − 1) qˆj
]}
dj+
∫
j∈J∗
(
1− ξexitj
) {
ijλ+ ξ
ipo
j (κ − 1) ijλ
}
dj+
∫
j∈Jentry
qˆjdj.
The second equality above collects the normalized quality levels into the first integral.
The third equality separates
∫
qˆjdj which, by definition of normalized quality, equals 1.
Hence, we arrive at
g =
∫
j∈J∗
(
1− ξexitj
)
δ
ipo
j (κ − 1) qˆjdj−
∫
j∈J∗
δexitj qˆjdj+∫
j∈J∗
(
1− ξexitj
) {
ijλ+ ξ
ipo
j (κ − 1) ijλ
}
dj+
∫
j∈Jentry
qˆjdj
=
∫
j∈J∗
(
1− ξexitj
) {
ijλ+ ξ
ipo
j (κ − 1)
(
qˆj + ijλ
)}
dj−
∫
j∈J∗
ξexitj qˆjdj+
∫
j∈Jentry
qˆjdj.
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C.2 Firm Growth in Data
Log(Sales)
VC
0.502∗∗∗
(11.03)
VC*TimefromMatch
0.211∗∗∗
(11.23)
VC*TimefromMatch2
-0.012∗∗∗
(-8.73)
TimefromMatch
0.121∗∗∗
(10.11)
TimefromMatch2
-0.003∗∗∗
(-4.12)
Industry FE Yes
Year FE Yes
N 17,885
R2 0.18
Table 20: Regression Results, Puri and Zarutskie (2012)
Table 20 summarizes the OLS regression results obtained Puri and Zarutskie (2012)
with t-statistics given in parentheses. The logarithm of sales of matched VC-backed and
non-VC-backed samples is regressed on a number of independent variables and controls.
“VC*TimefromMatch” is the variable of interest that captures the effect of VC firms over
time. It is highly significant with a t-statistics of 11.23.
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C.3 Firm Size Distributions
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0  0.5 1  1.5 2  2.5 3  
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Normalized quality (firm size)
Si
m
ul
at
ed
 d
en
sit
y 
fu
nc
tio
n,
 m
od
el
 
 
private
public
(c) Private vs. Public firms, aggregated
0  0.5 1  1.5 2  2.5 3  
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Normalized quality (firm size)
Si
m
ul
at
ed
 d
en
sit
y 
fu
nc
tio
n,
 m
od
el
 
 
all firms
(d) All firms
Figure 24: Firm Size Distributions by Firm Types
Figure 25a illustrates the stationary distributions of VC- and non-VC-backed private
firms. The distribution of VC-backed firms has a larger mass of smaller companies com-
pared to non-VC-backed counterparts. Although it may look counter-intuitive at first
sight, this is a natural result of three factors.1 First, VC firms select smaller companies
1Notice that this is a static comparison. The comparison of growth rates in Section 3.3.4 has already
explained the positive growth impact of VC financing on firms that they invest in.
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to for their higher growth potential. Second, the increased profit level per unit of quality
due to VC’s financial support helps firms with smaller capacities survive in the business.
And third, as demonstrated in Figure 17b, VC firms go public at smaller sizes as they can
afford its cost due to higher profits. This implies that companies that are smaller than a
relatively lower threshold remain in the VC-backed distribution.
The lower IPO threshold for VC-backed firms also implies that, every period, smaller
firms enter the distribution of public firms via VC-backed IPOs. Therefore, as shown in
Figure 25b, the distribution that defines public firms that had VC backing has a thinner
tail compared to the stationary distribution of public firms that never received VC sup-
port. Figure 25c compares the stationary distributions of all private and public firms. As
expected, the latter has a fatter right tail because larger firms issue an IPO. Lastly, Figure
25d shows the stationary distribution of all firms in the economy.
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